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In order to gain a better sense of the globe’s biodiversity there have been concerted 
efforts within the biodiversity community to aggregate dispersed databases to facilitate universal 
access to information. Central to these systems are nomenclatural and taxonomic mechanisms 
that validate, organize, and collocate data using established standards and classifications. This 
dissertation is about the identification, naming, control of, and access to, this cache of 
biodiversity knowledge, and the common information, documentation, and classification 
problems that materialize as part of this process. Invoking theories articulated in Information 
Studies, I examine how documentary control functions within the biodiversity environment, 
defined as it is by contingent concepts and documents, and how these disciplinary conditions 
negotiate this tension through classification structures. In particular, composite taxonomies are 
examined as authoritative access-oriented classifications designed predominantly to aggregate 
multiple biodiversity taxonomies under one management classification to facilitate efficient data 
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communication. Such composite structures are situated in contradistinction to traditional, 
descriptive-based taxonomies, primarily designed to argue a hypothesis-driven position about 
how organisms are related. As constructed knowledge organization systems, biological 
classifications make implicit epistemological and ontological claims about biological facts, yet 
these attributes are often overlooked in the practice of interfacing with these systems. Given the 
increased prominence of these databases within scientific and professional communities, this 
dissertation asks what kind of knowledge these composite taxonomies instantiate and represent, 
and how successful they are in serving a consensus-based taxonomic purpose. Taking a critical 
Information Studies approach, these issues are explored by deeply analyzing the Catalogue of 
Life, a prominent composite taxonomic schema, invoking documentary, historical, and 
qualitative methodologies. This project critiques and illustrates the radiant effects of composite 
taxonomies in biodiversity networks and their multiple uses in professional and scientific 
practice. This manuscript argues all knowledge organization systems—biological and 
otherwise—are constructs of cultural and historical circumstances, manufactured artifacts of 
certain spatiotemporal positions. My goal is to show how other disciplines can inform the 
literature, theories, and work within Information Studies to rethink our problems anew. As I see 
it, the question is no longer whether our classification systems can attain true representational 
capacities, it is more about how we are going to acknowledge their constructedness and harness 
their contingencies for the most situated social benefit. 
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Chapter 1: Information Studies, Biodiversity, and Ecosystemic Approaches to Knowledge 
Organization 
 
In [Knowledge Organization] we make implicit statements about knowledge of concepts, acts (such as 
representation), entities, and systems. In doing so, we create knowledge, and our epistemic stance dictates 
what kind of knowledge that is.  
—Joseph Tennis 
“Epistemology, Theory, and Methodology in Knowledge Organization: Toward a 
Classification, Metatheory, and Research Framework” (2008, p. 103) 
 
The individual scientist’s view of the world is shaped in cultural-historical and disciplinary contexts which 
influence their criteria of, among other things, classification. 
—Birger Hjørland, Eric Scerri, John Dupré 
“Forum: The Philosophy of Classification” (2011, p. 14) 
 
The purpose of a classification is to provide a simplified reference system that is biologically sound and 
widely useful. It should be compatible with the phylogeny, but it cannot serve its central simplifying 
purpose unless it leaves out some of the fine detail about relationships that are essential for some 
phylogenetic purposes. One can use a phylogeny as a basis for making a classification, but one cannot 
logically deduce a fully detailed phylogeny from a classification. Nor is a phylogeny sufficient to give a 
classification. A phylogeny and a classification must be congruent (i.e. not contradictory) but they are 
different ways of abstracting from and representing biological relationships.  
—Thomas Cavalier-Smith 
A Revised Six-Kingdom System of Life (1998, pp. 212–213) 
 
In scientific work the aim is not so much to discover properties of kinds, or to define essence, as to select a 
particular property of interest for some scientific purpose, and to determine the conditions of its 
appearance. The purpose is not by study of the property to prove the nature of the thing that has it, but to 
fix or control the circumstance under which a thing possesses a property necessary to prove something else 
… The theory of properties is not so far removed from causal explanation, for to say, “this thing has the 
property of such and such” is merely a way of saying “this thing under certain conditions behaves in such 
and such way.” … Whereas logical division would merely co-ordinate species, “as being all alike members 
of one differentiation of a common element,” the arrangement of books must take the form of a serial 
order, since books are constructed so as to be placed in a row. Had they been products of nature, existing 
in every conceivable shape, no serial arrangement could have intruded into their classification, and they 
would have been classified in some other pattern, less obliterative of distinctions.  
      —A. Broadfield 
The Philosophy of Classification (1946, pp. 93–95) 
Identifying a Global Biodiversity Taxonomic Impediment 
In June of 1992, a meeting of nations gathered at the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio di Janeiro, Brazil (collectively called the “Earth 
Summit”), to discuss some of the most pressing issues facing the sustainability of biological life 
on the planet, “leading to the adoption of Agenda 21, a wide-ranging blueprint for action to 
achieve sustainable development worldwide” (United Nations, 1997, 2017). Topics of the 
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Summit included the lack of access to potable water, the increasing use of fossil fuels and the 
concomitant production of toxic waste, and the decline of the globe’s biodiversity due, in 
particular, to the detrimental influence of human activities (Department of Public Information, 
1997). A critical international treaty arising from this Summit, the “Convention on Biological 
Diversity” (CBD), documented the critical need for coordinated scientific information-exchange 
infrastructures in order to better understand and reverse the globe’s diminishing biological 
diversity (2016). A core focus of the CBD was the acknowledgement that biodiversity was much 
more than merely the identification of “plants, animals and micro organisms and their 
ecosystems” (2017c), but also included the radiant influence this information has upon global 
populations (all biological populations, including, but not limited, to humans), as well as the 
research practices of professional scientists that engaged in this work on a daily basis.  
The historical importance of this document as it pertains to worldwide biodiversity has 
been relatively significant, for it served as a motivating and pro forma agreement upon which 
numerous biodiversity and ecological initiatives could build support and endorsement for their 
respective projects. On a local level, the CBD has influenced the drafting and implementation of 
laws and policies that govern a number of domains pertaining to biodiversity issues (Kate, 2002). 
The CBD has arisen as a watershed moment in biodiversity studies, and a catalyst and authority 
for coordinating geographically local knowledge within openly accessible, global intellectual 
infrastructures of information exchange.  
In particular, Article 7 of the CBD explicitly acknowledged the importance of 
maintaining and organizing “by any mechanism data, derived from” (“Convention on Biological 
Diversity (full text),” 1992, p. 5) the identification and monitoring of biological diversity. 
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Building on this acknowledgement, during the 1998 Conference of the Parties,1 participants 
established the Global Taxonomic Initiative (GTI) to rectify what participants called the 
“taxonomic impediment” toward the successful implementation of the CBD organizational and 
access goals (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2017b; Hopkins & Freckleton, 2002). The 
impediment identifies a “shortage of taxonomic expertise, taxonomic collections, field guides, 
and other identification aids, as well as to the difficulty in assessing existing taxonomic 
information” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2003, p. vii). According to the CBD, The GTI 
marks “the first time in history that taxonomy has had recognition at such a high level in 
international policy” (2003). Given the CBD’s articulated concerns with the fragmented nature 
of biodiversity knowledge, the GTI was meant to articulate clear steps by which authoritative 
online platforms could potentially collocate regional taxonomic information by strengthening 
“networks for regional cooperation” (2003, p. 1). Locally-specific knowledge had grown too 
fragmented, too many researchers were “[hoarding their] data,” and with limited funding to go 
around, centralizing databases seemed to be one mechanism by which scientists could sustain a 
long view approach (Ribes & Finholt, 2009) to describing the world’s organisms (Thomas, 
2009). In response to the Global Taxonomic Initiative, large-scale federated platforms began to 
gain operational steam, aggregating taxonomic and descriptive data with the goal of unifying 
geographically specific caches of biodiversity knowledge (Bowker, 2008, p. 120; Waterton, 
Ellis, & Wynne, 2013, p. 108).  
Despite the existence of initiatives such as the GTI, global biodiversity, according to 
scientific literature, continues to decline (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, & 
                                                
1 “The Conference of the Parties is the governing body of the Convention, and advances implementation of the 
Convention through the decisions it takes at its periodic meetings” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2017a).  
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Courchamp, 2012; Butchart et al., 2010).2 A more robust understanding of the biodiversity of the 
planet is a continually pressing agenda, essential to efforts seeking to fully document the extent 
(and, increasingly, extinct) number of biological species. Scientist’s ability to study and 
understand the scope of any given ecological issue, however, rests on the scientific community’s 
capacity to name, document, and classify, the collective knowledge regarding biological taxa 
(their circumscription, interrelationships, and ecology) for easy access, sharing, and utilization in 
research, policy-making, and conservation efforts. Uniform, publicly accessible, up-to-date 
biodiversity knowledge is essential if scientists are to pool their efforts and engage in scholarly 
conversation. The assumption underlying this coordinated approach is that such global 
knowledge provides the foundation for larger-scale approaches to biodiversity problems.   
The problematics and machinations of coordinating and producing such biodiversity 
taxonomic infrastructure, however, are numerous and complex, particularly if we look more 
closely at the specific technological databases that have been created to aggregate this 
knowledge. In the last twenty years—spurred on by, if not created as a direct result of, the 
Convention’s articulated aims and directives—new federated digital initiatives such as the 
Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) (2015), the Catalogue of Life (Species 2000, 
2015b), Encyclopedia of Life (“Encyclopedia of Life: Global access to knowledge about life on 
Earth,” 2015), and the Barcode of Life (2015; Waterton et al., 2013), have taken on the 
                                                
2 Of course, there is much debate about how we define and categorize aggregate biodiversity knowledge, and how 
such approaches and mechanisms lead to the misconception that biodiversity is decreasing in aggregate (Dornelas et 
al., 2014; Vellend et al., 2013). Assessment of biodiversity loss depends upon many factors, including spatial and 
temporal research emphases (McGill, Dornelas, Gotelli, & Magurran, 2015). Results differ between regional and 
local examinations, and “paleontological data show that life is surprisingly resilient” (2015, p. 104). In general, 
certain charismatic species are given more attention than others (Bowker, 2008, p. 146), forcing developments 
regarding the growing number of extant and proliferating bacterial species in the background of these debates 
(Locey & Lennon, 2016). Yet, despite the differences of opinion on the matter, “the majority of models indicate 
alarming consequences for biodiversity, with the worst-case scenarios leading to extinction rates that would qualify 
as the sixth mass extinction in the history of the earth” (Bellard, Bertelsmeier, Leadley, Thuiller, & Courchamp, 
2012). Given the importance of species variety to the ecological health of all geographies, widespread scientific 
opinion is that biodiversity loss is a pressing issue that requires coordinated efforts to address. 
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management of worldwide biodiversity data toward the end of universal access and 
standardization of information, and represent some of the world’s most robust aggregators of 
biological description and control. These information systems are collectively used in scientific 
research to direct global biodiversity initiatives supported by governmental and non-
governmental organizations in the development of “effective policies,” and to make decisions 
“regarding land management, health, climate change and biodiversity conservation” (Jetz, 
McPherson, & Guralnick, 2012, p. 151).  
This dissertation is about the identification, naming, control of, and access to, this cache 
of biodiversity knowledge and the common information, documentation, and classification 
problems that materialize as part of this process. Given that biodiversity scientists and 
informaticians perform these activities in particular contexts, I will also necessarily look to how 
this control is articulated and maintained within certain limited organizational and social 
frameworks.  
Disciplinary Framing 
 
 “The world is full of writings,” wrote Patrick Wilson, “How can the valuable be kept 
from oblivion? How can [one] be sure of finding, in the great mass of writings, good and bad, 
pedestrian and extraordinary, the writings that would be of value to [them]?” (1968, p. 1). Long 
has it been the tradition in Information Studies3 to focus on the bibliographic tradition in relation 
to classification systems. But information fields are concerned with far more than traditional 
bibliographic documents. The information disciplines, or “disciplines of the cultural record,” as 
articulated by Marcia Bates, are orthogonal in nature, meaning “they deal with every traditional 
                                                
3 A note is warranted related to my use of “Information Studies” (I/S) throughout this document. For the purposes of 
simplicity and brevity, I will use I/S as the umbrella term that also encompasses information science as well as 
archives. 
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subject matter” by asking particular questions about the “collection, organization, retrieval, and 
presentation of information in various contexts” (2007, pp. 1–2). The information disciplines 
deal with the myriad of documentation forms produced within these numerous disciplines, 
broadly conceived in this dissertation to refer to any signifying set of objects, markings, and 
signs, that act as evidence for some kind of process, activity, object, or phenomena of interest. 
Whether our focus of attention is a library, a museum, or a database, the primary issues of 
concern from an information point-of-view are how these units of documentation relate to 
particular fields of human activity. As Bates remarks, “the universe of living things throws off 
documentary products, which then form the universe of documentation” (2007, p. 7). The world 
is, indeed, full of writings, but it is also full of information, data, and documents, that we identify 
as significant in particular contexts for particular purposes—which we then classify and organize 
so as to provide access to our collective public knowledge (Wilson, 1977). This organization, 
however, is more than pragmatic; it is also an emergent knowledge in-and-of itself, framing, as it 
does, documents into discreet presupposed ontological and classificatory categories, which are 
then doubly presupposed to relate to one another based on various likenesses and differences 
(Broadfield, 1946, Chapter 1). 
This manuscript, then, is very much a work about the core concepts of information, 
documentation, and classification as they are articulated and theorized in Information Studies. In 
particular, I am primarily concerned with the analysis of biodiversity classifications on a global 
scale. Aside from my longstanding general interest in the subject, biodiversity taxonomies are 
interesting and applicable to our discipline because they force new perspectives onto the 
literatures, theories, and approaches, central to Information Studies. It is too often the case that, 
when asked to describe my research to colleagues in Information Studies, the reactionary 
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question is, Why biodiversity studies? My response to this is, Why anything? But it is more than 
that. What concerns me slightly about this general inquiry is that topics and concepts such as 
information, documentation, classification, and taxonomy are either conceptualized primarily in 
relation to bibliographic systems, popular classification schema such as the Library of Congress 
Classification (LCC) system, Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC), and other classification 
schema; or as web based ontological schema and semantic languages. In other words, the wide 
scale default assumption is usually that classifications should organize all knowledge into 
universal systems. Divergent, extra-disciplinary, and discipline specific forms of classification 
are often considered an atypical course of study in the field of I/S.4 Of course, this is not a 
categorically negative assumption, for much of this dissertation is meant to be in service to these, 
and other, general approaches to organizing knowledge. Moreover, the intent is to deepen our 
understanding of niche classificatory approaches so as to more adequately produce flexible and 
extensible systems that can more adequately represent divergent points of view and 
epistemological stances.  
The problem (if that is not too strong a word), as I see it, is that not enough individuals at 
the current moment are looking at the “generation of theories, principles and methods that 
emphasize both the cultural and historical specificity of classification practices and their 
emancipatory function” (Furner, 2013a). If they were, then initial reactions to my topic of 
analysis would be less confounding to some. It is useful, I think, to exit our spaces of disciplinary 
comfort to find surprises in these specificities. My argument here is that we need more of this 
                                                
4 Certainly there are exceptions to this rule in the Information Studies literature, especially within the subfield of 
Knowledge Organization. Scholars, and in particular Birger Hjørland, have long advocated the utility for looking at 
domain specific (Asundi, 2012; Deokattey, Neelameghan, & Kumar, 2010; Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1995; Hjorland 
& Hartel, 2003) knowledge organizing systems. Hjørland’s case study of the classification of psychology (1998) is a 
good example of such as approach, as have other articles in the journal, Knowledge Organization, looking at the 
production of scientific classification in various contexts (Blake, 2011; Gnoli, 2006; Hjørland & Nicolaisen, 2003; 
Hjorland, Birger, Scerri, & Dupre, 2011; Marco & Navarro, 1993).  
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work, for the situatedness, contextually-specific, and historically-contingent attributes of these 
specific systems can inform, broaden, and render more pluralistic, our understanding of 
classification and knowledge organization in general. Such work, I believe, is vital to longevity 
of our discipline, and keeps theories within I/S relevant and knowledgeable of current knowledge 
organizing concerns. Secondly (and admittedly most anecdotally), I also see fewer scholars than 
I would hope engaging with those authors they suppose to be essential reading on the syllabi for 
our core Information Studies courses. While there are surely names that I am omitting, I see the 
work of Patrick Wilson (Wilson, 1968, 1977, 1983), A. Broadfield (1946), Henry Bliss (Bliss, 
1929, 1933), Elaine Svenonius (Svenonius, 2004, 2009), Seymour Lubetzky (1969), among 
many others, as some of these individuals.5 This dissertation is also my modest attempt at re-
engaging with these scholars on contemporary terms, hoping to restate their significance in 
relation to problems of current concern.  
The fundamental questions I ask here regard how we can think about extending the 
concepts of Information Studies outward to think about classificatory domains that otherwise 
have received very little notice in our discipline, or at least that have not received much in-depth 
notice in quite some time. I hope this project will produce a balanced view of the strengths and 
limitations of such biodiversity approaches to Knowledge Organization (KO) in the biodiversity 
sciences, as well as how such approaches can somehow inform practices within Information 
Studies. Additionally, I wish to bridge the classifying and standardization activities that occur 
within biodiversity studies with similar literatures and activities within Information Studies. As 
Ronald E. Day states, “Universal bibliographical classifications and descriptions followed the 
example of zoological taxonomy and classification in the century before them” (2014, p. 39). 
                                                
5 Again, certain authors—who I cite extensively—do look to these intellectual predecessors, such as Jonathan 
Furner, Joseph Tennis, Jens-Erik Mai, among many others, and I would like to think of my work as being in 
conversation with this long line of individuals. 
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Seen in this light, this project seeks to return back to these roots, to reengage I/S scholarship in 
the organizing endeavors and practices of the natural sciences. Taking a close look at the 
practices of biodiversity scientists in relation to practices in Information Studies isn’t an 
altogether strange juxtaposition, for as David Hull states, “as most people view taxonomists, they 
are more librarians than scientists and just as loveable…collectors and classifiers were [and, I 
would argue, still are] the ones who had sufficient knowledge to appreciate the true diversity of 
life” (1988, p. 81). 
For one, comparing the theories and practices of biodiversity classification—concerned 
with biological entities—with the organization of documents in Information Studies has 
highlighted a rather important difference between how these approaches conceptualize the object 
of classificatory concern in relation to the system in which it is embedded. In Information 
Studies, our aim is to organize a set of books or documents, their classificatory and ontological 
specificity within a system of organization is anchored only by the artificial boundaries and 
suppositions imposed by the classifier. Books and documents are not created out of a natural 
system or ecology that makes their classification self-evident. Such artificial classificatory 
concepts are what drove Hope Olson, in her influential text, The Power To Name: Locating the 
Limits of Subject Representation in Libraries (2002), to push against the “fundamental 
presuppositions” on which our information practices rest (in Olson’s case, she was focusing on 
subject representation within library systems). If there is a defining system that constrains the 
ontological specificity of texts, many have stated that disciplines fit the bill. Many of the most 
widely-used classification system schedules, including the LCC, DDC, and the Bliss 
Bibliographic Classification (BBC), take disciplines (or disciplinary areas of study) as the 
primary classificatory unit through which documents gain their cognitive and institutional 
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authority (Wilson, 1983, Chapter 4). Disciplines change and are redefined over time, however, 
while schedules change ever so slowly, if at all, to account for these ongoing developments. 
Within these socially-constructed disciplinary systems the terms by which the description of 
documents function is idiosyncratic and can take many forms since there is no presupposed 
natural organization of disciplines upon which classifiers can say, ‘this is the definite system,’ 
and by which they can compare or contrast classificatory outcomes.  
In the biodiversity realm, however, there certainly is an extent to which ‘the real’ plays a 
fundamental role in how and why we classify things the way we do. After all, “from the 
beginning, one of the chief goals of science, possibly the chief goal of science, has been to 
discover classes of phenomena that are lawfully related—classes commonly termed natural 
kinds” (D. L. Hull, 1988, p. 78). Biodiversity classifications are unique in that they engage with 
ostensibly natural occurring objects (species and taxa) that can empirically be examined and 
assessed for subsequent coordination in classifications. The biological objects can be assessed in 
many ways, using any number of traits: morphological, genetic, ecological, etc. But as Johanna 
Drucker indicated in a private communication, “there is no equivalent to DNA in a book, rather, 
it is subject to the interpretive activity of description.”  For biodiversity classifiers there is a 
definite system of natural objects that can serve as a ground for comparison and contrast between 
different approaches. However, as the chapters of this dissertation will illustrate, even with such 
a notion of the ‘real’ grounding the act of classification, there is no still no presupposed way in 
which this system can be translated into representational classifications. In fact, biological 
classifications are arguments and hypothesis for how we can understand these natural classes 
according to current scientific research. Classifications—even those empirically based—are 
models, not mirrors. Each scientist will have a different take on what natural kinds exist and how 
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these kinds are related to one another. The end result is that even classifications based on natural 
phenomena are subjective and presuppose a number of socially constructed presuppositions.6 
How we interpret a natural object as it relates to the natural phenomena in which is embedded 
will change over time; science is not static, our understanding of the world changes as new 
information and understandings are built. This distinction between documentary and biological 
systems is a key one to keep in mind as you read this manuscript. The contrast between these 
approaches, and how they construct and verify the existence of a classifiable object, is a space 
that can tell us a great deal about the subjective and representational qualities of knowledge 
organizing schema more broadly speaking.  
But this project is much more than a demonstration of how two related scholarly domains 
can engage in productive discussions, it is also a way in which we can articulate the importance 
of Information Studies theories, literatures, and methodologies to domains that otherwise remain 
blind to the robust theoretical and methodological work the discipline has to offer.  Our 
discipline has something to add, for as Jonathan Furner has stated, “there are several scholarly 
communities other than information studies that do require a separate concept of information, but 
that those communities have good reason to look to information studies for help. Any approach 
to conceptualizing information that downplays the contributions of LIS— i.e., information 
without information studies—is needlessly impoverished, not least on account of the range of 
ontological possibilities that it misses” (2014). In addition to information, I would add 
                                                
6 As I will also discuss in chapter four of this manuscript, there are some scholars in the field of Knowledge 
Organization that subscribe to a phenomena-based approach to classification (Claudio Gnoli & Riccardo Ridi, 2014; 
Gnoli, 2009; Gnoli & Poli, 2004; Rick Szostak, 2008). Such approaches assume that phenomena can be structured 
according to “integrative levels” (Gnoli & Poli, 2004) that see reality as organized into strata that then consist of 
varying levels of complexity (2004, p. 152). Reality—and documents—then, can be organized and classified 
according to this complexity by the application of descriptive facets. If the study of biodiversity taxonomy tells us 
anything, it is that phenomena are not static and interpretively unrestricted, and that such an approach does not and 
cannot produce a universal knowledge system that conforms to a uniform and consistent model of reality any more 
than one that arises from a disciplinary approach to organization. 
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documentation, classification and knowledge organization literature as a worthwhile set of 
writings that have a great deal of value to other scholarly communities.  
Broadening Traditional Knowledge Organization in Information Studies 
In this manuscript I take a relatively broad view of the practice of KO, one that extends 
beyond the organization of documents and the design of systems that provide adequate 
representations of those documents for mere retrieval (Hjørland, 2008, p. 86). Rather, I embrace 
a definition of KO that embodies the organization of all concepts as the derivative mechanism by 
which we control the “production and dissemination of ‘knowledge’” (2008, p. 86). Given the 
role taxonomic systems play in the organization of biodiversity (and biological knowledge more 
generally), I see these infrastructures as an equal topic of consideration for Information Studies.  
KO and classification theory is a robust subdomain in I/S research. Joseph Tennis defines 
KO as “the field of scholarship concerned with the design, study and critique of the process of 
organizing and representing documents that society see as worthy of preserving” (2008, p. 103). 
Building on this definition, Hjørland adds “works and concepts” to the list of KO concerns, as 
well as a more “narrow meaning” of KO, that includes those practical activities familiar to 
[Library and Information Science] audiences, such as bibliographic description, indexing, and 
the classification of documents in “memory institutions” (Hjørland, 2008, p. 86). KO literature 
can broadly be seen as encompassing a number of other narrow concerns, such as the 
development of controlled vocabularies for description; the building of classification systems; 
the articulation of entity relationships within KO systems; the development of taxonomies; the 
effective use and “goodness” (Furner, 2009) of KO systems; the philosophy and theory of KO; 
and the social practices that support such infrastructures. This list is not exhaustive, but it serves 
to indicate the breadth of this sub-domain, and how its concerns are suitable to examining how 
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biodiversity taxonomies are structurally producing a certain argument about how biological 
organisms relate to and function within our global database ecosystem.  
KO in this dissertation is understood to embrace the broader, more inclusive definition 
advocated by Hjørland above, and by doing so, embraces the practices taking place in the 
production of biodiversity taxonomies. Hjørland’s move to include not only “document 
representations,” but also “works and concepts” (2008, p. 86) is a significant one. On the one 
hand, we can understand the concept in this case to refer to concepts-as-subjects, such as the 
articulation of the subject of documents (and other derivatives) in cataloging, indexing, or 
bibliographic classification systems (as in document x is about the subjects y and z). On the 
other, I also take this to mean the representation of concepts more broadly and generally 
understood. Metaphysically speaking, concepts as understood in this project can be as broad as 
the “kinds (a.k.a. categories, classes, sorts) and individuals” articulated by Jonathan Furner in 
“Type-Token Theory and Bibliometrics” (2016b). Such kinds could include the concept of 
species and/or taxa for any given set of biological organisms that, as described above, are 
anchored to an external reality. 
As classification systems have evolved, they bring with them the vestiges of 
epistemological approaches specific to their circumstances, bounded by classificatory “inclusions 
and exclusions” (Olson, 2002, p. 6) that are evidence of particular domain subjectivities. 
Information Studies scholars Birger Hjørland and Jenna Hartel help us understand the extent to 
which the classificatory and epistemological commitments of such domains find their way into 
the knowledge organizing infrastructures that define how we partition information objects of 
interest, and biological classification exemplifies this phenomenon. They state, “It is critical to 
understand that domains are dynamic. Knowledge production and knowledge organization are 
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not just about the addition of new elements into pre-established classification. As knowledge 
develops and evolves, the view of structures of the world and the relations between different 
concepts changes symbiotically” (2003, p. 244). The dynamism proposed here is of core 
importance in this manuscript, for the divergent (and multiple) interpretive frameworks imposed 
upon biological classifications are a fundamental hindrance to providing a unified structure for 
information coordination.  
Threads of Inquiry and Composite Taxonomies   
This work examines how biodiversity knowledge is collected, represented, organized, 
and delivered within domain-specific composite taxonomies by examining how such taxonomies 
instantiate particular notions of what constitutes information entities, documents, relationships, 
representations, and knowledge itself. Composite taxonomies are understood in this project as 
taxonomic infrastructures that aggregate multiple taxonomies into one, authoritative 
infrastructure, in an effort to unify biodiversity data from multiple sources. More specifically, 
this dissertation takes as its case study the knowledge organization practices of the Catalogue of 
Life as a pivot point and primary object of study, to examine how this taxonomy articulates and 
expresses biodiversity information. The Catalogue is an “authoritative” biodiversity schema and 
framework that strives to serve two functions in the biodiversity database ecology: (1) to provide 
“a single integrated species checklist,” as well as (2) “a taxonomic hierarchy” around which 
scattered biodiversity data can be appended onto and organized, and through which it can 
subsequently be accessed (2015a). Thus, this is not only a project about classification, it is also a 
project about the representational building blocks that make these classifications function with a 
certain amount of purchase in the biodiversity community. This work will also necessarily 
describe how species concepts are documented in these systems, as well as how nomenclature 
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(as text-strings) serve as tokens around which species-specific data are collocated. There are 
many layers of a classification that must be peeled-back to understand how it is they work as 
both a container for produced knowledge, as well as an architecture for a new kind of emergent 
interpretative framework. 
To examine the Catalogue’s composite taxonomy, as well as its attendant layers and 
components, I follow two main lines of inquiry simultaneously, both of which have direct 
bearing on the practices and theoretical foundations of Information Studies. The research 
questions driving this dissertation include, 
1. How can biodiversity taxonomic practices be brought into conversation with the theories 
about information, documents, and concept representation within Information Studies? 
2. How might we understand composite taxonomies as information systems designed to 
both represent biological knowledge and coordinate efficient data communication? 
Two distinct points I think that are essential to examine: one, that there is epistemological 
and ontological work that happens quite separately from the space of taxonomic production. This 
research brings to the fore the constructedness and artificiality of classification systems in 
general. And of course scholars working in the domain of knowledge organization and 
classification know this to be true—after all, the first short section in Elaine Svononius’s, The 
Intellectual Foundation of Information Organization (2009), states that intellectual foundation 
upon which a system of organization rests consists of the ideology, formalized processes, 
research generalizations, and research foci of the discipline in question (2009, p. 1). Exposing 
this foundation is part of my goal here. Knowledge organization is as unique within 
communities—scientific or otherwise—as the theories, methods, and objects of analysis, that 
define their particular domain of study. The biodiversity taxonomic profession illustrates and 
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amplifies this fact. Each taxonomy, generated by every scientist, is produced under a certain set 
of intellectual conditions: assumptions about what comprises a species or taxon, as well as 
engrained suppositions about how these concepts can then be related in various ways based on 
any number of morphological, genetic, or ecological traits. The resultant taxonomic 
representations, classifications, taxonomies, trees of life, etc., are shaped by the minute and 
seemingly infinite intellectual and methodological assumptions of those that create them. 
Systems of any kind, and no less taxonomic classifications, are contingent historical 
reconciliations, based on current and present knowledge-sets with an equal footing in the 
laboratories “of the past” (Rheinberger, 2010, pp. 89–90). If you pick a taxonomy—any 
taxonomy—it is a network of knowledge that represents years and perhaps decades of layered 
and accumulated information and research.  
Despite this unavoidable and complicated reality, the Catalogue has taken it upon itself, 
to the best of their efforts, to comingle these diverse and multiple taxonomic constructions into 
one unified space. This is not apolitical work, nor universally recognized as effective by the 
taxonomic community. Real conflicts arise as practical and pragmatic approaches to data 
collection and collocation are positioned in tension with the hermeneutic and hypothesis-driven 
work of scientific taxonomic production. Yet, the Catalogue’s stance is that information must be 
shared in order for biodiversity knowledge to reach its full research impact and potential, and in 
order for such facilitation to take place, standards need to be implemented, even if taxonomies 
must be manipulated as they are ingested into a global taxonomic framework. And so, a 
composite taxonomy can help Information Studies better understand the virtues and downsides 
of this integrative approach.7 Concerned as the Information Studies community is with pluralistic 
                                                
7 I certainly do not want to give the impression that my critiques indicate, in any way, that the Catalogue (or any 
other system) is doing something incorrectly. Systems take time to produce and while the long view of infrastructure 
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approaches to classification (Mai, 2011; Szostak, 2015) and the representation of diverse voices 
and fluid ontologies in and for our information systems (Seddon & Srinivasan, 2014; Srinivasan, 
Boast, Furner, & Becvar, 2009; Srinivasan & Huang, 2005; Srinivasan, Pepe, & Rodriguez, 
2009), spaces such as those inhabited by the Catalogue can be incredibly instructive toward these 
just ends.  
But internal taxonomic comingling in the Catalogue is just one valence of the story; the 
Catalogue is also integrated into other systems as core organizational data architecture. Once the 
Catalogue is compiled, it can (and is) subsequently embedded into a network of other 
biodiversity systems, thereby amplifying its effect across the discipline of biodiversity and 
taxonomic studies. Contemporary database taxonomies are now the main source of taxonomic 
knowledge, structured in such a way for reuse and manipulation for a number of constituents 
(Hodkinson, 2011; Parr, Lee, Campbell, & Bederson, 2004; Watson, Lyal, & Pendry, 2015, 
Chapters 2, 9). As such, representation of knowledge within these systems, and the constitution 
of its classificatory knowledge should be closely scrutinized for what it renders invisible in its 
infrastructure, including the assumptions about taxon definitions, nomenclatural control 
                                                                                                                                                       
may seem a simple task to implement from the outside, the short view from those that need to coordinate the 
structure know all-too-well that even the simplest actions require negotiation and time to conceptualize, plan, and 
process, as well as to gain support from within the biological and taxonomic community. My goal is to think about 
what might be working or not working from an information management standpoint—in service to the documentary, 
library, and museum knowledge systems that Information Studies is primarily concerned with—and to identify how 
epistemological choices and approaches in these taxonomies play a role in what synergies and conflicts I was able to 
identify in my research and fieldwork. Secondly, I do not purport to have any radical new insights into the process 
of nomenclature and taxonomy for biodiversity scientists in specific; while I have grown acquainted with the field 
during these three years of research on this subject, I am far from a biologist or taxonomist by training. This said, 
what I have learned in this process is that taxonomists and biodiversity informaticians are an incredibly self-aware 
and meta-analytic community that are always willing to examine their own practices and discuss particular insights 
into, and blind spots within, their discipline and practices. As biodiversity systems become the primary method of 
communication, nomenclature and taxonomic groups are becoming seriously focused on how to mediate scientific 
practice within the limitation of networked and computational systems. This renewed organizational and disciplinary 
focus proved a fertile environment for research and study.  
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processes, local taxonomic practices and interpretations, as well as the historical evolution of all 
of these intellectual activities.   
The narrative of this dissertation, then, begins at the buildings blocks of these taxonomic 
systems (information, documentation, databases, type specimens, species literature), then moves 
outward to nomenclatural control, discusses the composite taxonomy of the Catalogue of Life, 
then finally articulates how this taxonomy is utilized as a knowledge base in multiple ways.  
Method of Examination  
 
The question then becomes how I managed to gain access to the distributed data 
necessary to situate and analyze the Catalogue’s systemic effects. In the earliest phase of this 
project, I had a lengthy conversation with Science, Technology, and Society (STS) scholar, 
David Ribes, now Associate Professor in Human Centered Design and Engineering at the 
University of Washington, about my preliminary thoughts on how I was to approach biodiversity 
global taxonomic coordination. During this discussion he asked what seems to be a very basic 
question, but one that had a huge impact on the framing of my overall theoretical approach: Is 
your project for people in the discipline of STS studies or the discipline of Information Studies? 
The truth is, of course, I hope that this work has some relevance in each of these disciplines, but 
certainly decisions had to be made, not only theoretically, but also methodologically about how I 
was to approach my object of analysis. It became clear, quite quickly, that my approach to 
biodiversity taxonomic coordination was to emphasize information problems, supported by an 
examination of socio-technical issues as they relate to the political and cultural issues that shape 
and are shaped by distributed technologies. Of course, this does not mean that I ignore the social 
and cultural valences, and production of biodiversity knowledge and systems, in these arenas, or 
the ways in which information objects alter these social arrangements. Nor does it mean that STS 
   19 
studies does not ever take information approaches—one need look no further than the work on 
standards, classification, and information infrastructure to see these connections are alive and 
strong (Bowker, 2008; Bowker & Star, 1999; Bowker, Timmermans, Clarke, & Balka, 2015). It 
does mean, however, that this manuscript favors what I consider to be core Information Studies 
literature, while drawing from STS literature related to biodiversity studies and databases 
generously as appropriate in the conversation. 
As will be expanded upon below—and progressively through the course of this 
manuscript—the Catalogue of Life is a highly integrative, fragmented, and hybrid entity. To say 
the Catalogue is the object of study for this project is to invoke a number of institutions, policies, 
research groups, and technical infrastructures that are involved in its maintenance. Given this 
distributed framework, there are a number of key individuals, sites, and archives that have been 
integral to this project’s success.  Studying how and why such a composite taxonomy is 
necessary in the biodiversity field required an equally fragmented approach to studying its 
composition. The project, thus, makes use of multiple modes of analysis. First, and primarily, it 
takes a historical and documentary analytic (often critical) approach as its core methodology, 
tracing how concepts within biodiversity studies can be seen in conversation with the literature 
and philosophy of Information Studies. This theoretical approach is augmented by a series of in-
person and video interviews with scientists and informaticians from all over the globe, both 
within and without the Catalogue’s staff and administration. In order to gain a balanced sense of 
the Catalogue’s functions and influence, speaking to individuals unassociated to the Catalogue 
was significant here. It is important to note that the production of a system like the Catalogue of 
Life is a relatively new initiative in the biodiversity sciences, therefore understanding the nitty-
gritty, so to speak, of how it works technically and informationally required a good deal of travel, 
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conversation, and intent listening. Research required flying over 34,500 miles, visiting four 
foreign countries, nine field study sites, perusing seventy-five archival collections, and 
interviewing twenty-five individuals (some on numerous occasions). The general architecture 
and emphases of the dissertation was dictated by these travels, conversations, and data. What 
was most important to the matter at hand rose to the top, what was least applicable was, 
unfortunately, omitted from this narrative. This is not the end of the story, only the first phase of 
a much longer research trajectory.    
Mapping the Integrative Landscape: The iLife Consortium 
 
In the early days [the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF)] considered a broad scope of 
options.  The organisation considered implementing species pages; tracking, digitizing and indexing 
literature; building a global taxonomy - a catalogue of life; they considered museums and specimen data; 
they talked about observational data. The early founders of GBIF originally considered implementing work 
programmes covering all of those.  It was decided that they didn't have the [ability] to do everything, or the 
resources. The focus was put on the occurrence [data] ... I understand that decision opened the doors for 
Encyclopedia of Life to take ownership of the species aspects; BHL for the literature; increased investment 
in the Catalogue of Life... It is interesting though, that originally it was seen … as a global biodiversity 
project … and since taxonomy binds/links all of this together, and that much of the science is intrinsically 
linked to literature, and to the specimens we need to be working very closely together across those aspects. 
 —Tim Robertson, Head of Informatics, Global Biodiversity Information Facility (2016) 
 
The production of a global taxonomic database like the Catalogue of Life is one thing, 
but it is quite another task to take that data and coordinate it across the globe in multiple online 
platforms that, together, comprise a much larger biodiversity ecosystem. As Tim Robertson’s 
statement above makes clear, these multiple entities have been conceptualized as comprising a 
larger data-sharing consortium from the very beginning of the process. Biodiversity data is, at its 
heart, data about global phenomena, but that does not mean that said data is shareable globally. 
Paul Edwards emphasizes this distinction and shift from “making global data” to “making [that] 
data global” in his examination of climate data (2010, Chapters 8, 10). In order for the Catalogue 
to coordinate taxonomic knowledge on a global level, this dissertation will occasionally refer to 
other biodiversity platforms within the larger integrated landscape—together, all of these 
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constitute what I am calling the iLife consortium (See Figure 1, below). I’ll now sketch out the 
contours of this iLife space, beginning with the Catalogue of Life, and then provide the briefest 
snapshot of other platforms that will play a part in the forthcoming analysis; emphasizing, in 
particular, how they intersect with the Catalogue of Life functionally within this online ecology.8  
 
 
Figure 1. The Life Partnership. Source: Thomas Orrell and Peter Schalk (2016). 
The Catalogue of Life: A consensus and composite global taxonomy. 
 
Though the Catalogue will be thoroughly examined in this manuscript as the main focus 
of analysis, a brief overview of its architecture is warranted to serve as a starting point for the 
discussion. The Catalogue is a federated database that has two core functions significant to this 
study: (1) it has the most comprehensive listing of all known existing species of the planet, and, 
(2) it produces a consensus-based management composite classification to organize the many 
taxonomies it ingests as part of the nomenclature collocation process.  
                                                
8 In the interest of brevity, I have not listed all iLife participants as depicted in Figure 1 as part of this description—I 
have chosen to focus only on those platforms that play a significant role in my analysis.  
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The first aspect of the Catalogue that is pertinent to our discussion is its species checklist. 
Species names are valuable biodiversity tools. Names serve as the unifying agent in a sea of 
documentation, biological evidence, and produced scientific literature. Species checklists aim to 
be a “universal and complete” reference that identifies what species exist in a particular area, and 
without this information, “ we can not sustainably use, explore, monitor, manage and protect 
biodiversity resources” (Species 2000, 2015a). Species checklists can be compiled as part of 
local ecological surveys (Kalamath Bird Observatory:, 2017) or for national purposes, and 
function most effectively if they are “integrated, coordinated and disseminated from a single 
platform” (Hamer, Victor, & Smith, 2012, p. 1). Species on lists such as the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature Red List (International Union for Conservation of Nature, 2017) are 
embedded in policy actions based on their inclusion on the list. Similarly, the Catalogue’s 
taxonomic structure, embedded within other information systems, and browsed for species 
information, is functional because of the relationships that the document presents for each 
included piece of information. The Catalogue of Life is attempting to create a checklist for all 
known species that exist on the planet.9 As of November 2016 it contained more than 1.6 million 
species, populated by over 150 individual databases from around the globe. 10 An “Annual 
Checklist” is published once yearly to solidify taxon groups and to allow for comparative studies 
of its development, while an ongoing dynamic (monthly) version allows for up-to-date, yet less 
easily citable, reference throughout the year. Established taxonomic editors control all data 
                                                
9 The Catalogue of Life has recently begun integrating fossil data into their checklist, but this phase is in its 
preliminary stages and thus is far from complete. Species counts as reported by the Catalogue also do not include 
fossil records (Species 2000, 2017b). 
 
10 This is the species goal articulated by the Catalogue of Life, though numbers differ widely as to how many 
species actually exist on the planet (Eng, 2016; Hug et al., 2016; Zimmer, 2016). David Hill’s Open Tree of Life 
Project projects 2.3 million species (Hinchliff et al., 2015; “‘Tree of life’ for 2.3 million species released,” 2015), 
while a recent study estimated over one trillion microbial species alone on the planet (Locey & Lennon, 2016). This 
dissertation will use the Catalogue’s estimated count as a matter of convenience and consistency.  
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accepted into the system. Synonymy fields are built into the Catalogue to allow for variable 
terminology for species—an issue that remains common in most classification systems, including 
the Catalogue.  
The second part of the Catalogue that we will examine is its consensus management 
classification. The management classification is “reviewed by experts, not merely aggregated by 
computers,” (Species 2000, 2015b) which is especially important in this analysis because other 
systems (such as GBIF) take a more computationally mediated approach.11 The Catalogue uses 
one, authoritative “taxonomic classification (also called a hierarchy) for management purposes,” 
and uses this classification above the node of attachment of each database. Beneath this node it 
uses the classification provided by the [Global Species Database]” (Species 2000, 2014). While 
there have been numerous attempts to aggregate taxa and names in the biodiversity world, “the 
main difference of the Catalogue of Life in Frank [Bisby’s] mind,” the founder of Species 2000 
and one of the principle coordinators of the Catalogue of Life, “was that we are doing this 
through [the] selection of authoritative taxonomic treatments on a global scale for each particular 
taxon ...”  (Roskov, 2016a). So, while the Catalogue of Life is unique in many respects—namely 
through it’s highly curated structure—it is not the only management taxonomic structure. The 
Catalogue differs from these other management structures in that it collates existing taxonomies 
to build the base of its infrastructure. Unlike similar systems, such as the National Center for 
Biotechnology Information (NCBI) Taxonomy Project, which curates a similar kind of 
management taxonomy based on gene sequencing additions to GenBank, the Catalogue absorbs 
a number of existing taxonomic infrastructures and curates a singular taxonomy in an effort to 
organize all biodiversity in one infrastructure (Federhen, 2003). Thus, the NCBI backbone is a 
                                                
11 Again, I provide no particular opinion as to which approach may be effective or not, I merely identify the benefits 
and downsides of these approaches during the course of this discussion.  
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singular taxonomy that progressively adds individual species as sequences are added to their 
database, while the Catalogue is comprised of multiple, whole and unified taxonomies, within 
one structure. It is this quality that makes the Catalogue a composite taxonomy that unifies 
multiple taxonomic trees with varying “epistemic stances” (Tennis, 2008, p. 103) under one 
umbrella infrastructure. Secondly, the Catalogue is unique in its scope and influence, given that 
the taxonomy is deeply integrated with the iLife consortium in general and is used as the 
hierarchical backbone for a number of highly influential and heavily used database 
infrastructures. 
The Catalogue drew a great deal of attention within the scientific community when it 
formed and became accessible in 2001, most quite optimistic and excited about the prospect of 
an aggregative, authoritative taxonomic system (Reichhardt, 1999; Bisby, Shimura, Ruggiero, 
Edwards, & Haeuser, 2002; Cachuela-Palacio, 2006; Gewin, 2002). The Catalogue is comprised 
of two previously independent entities that merged in June 2001 (Bisby et al., 2002): the Species 
2000 organization (2015b), which covers species across the globe (with an original emphasis on 
European species), and the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (2016), a biodiversity 
database-sharing partnership of North American organizations. The primary motivator for this 
merger and the creation of the Catalogue of Life vision was the late Frank Bisby, who believed 
that biodiversity data “globalization and interoperability” (Bisby, 2000) were essential to 
motivate future courses and directions in biodiversity science. Species 2000 is the current “legal 
body for the global Catalogue of Life programme, holding its Intellectual Property Rights, 
copyright, domain names, access licenses, Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), taking 
responsibility for continuity between major projects and providing the ongoing governance of the 
global programme. It is structurally a federation, owned and governed by the participants that 
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become its members” (Species 2000 Secretariat, 2015a). Based at the Smithsonian Museum of 
National History, The Integrated Taxonomic Information System  (ITIS) is the central, 
authoritative species checklist for North American species. ITIS “is the result of a partnership of 
federal agencies formed to satisfy their mutual needs for scientifically credible taxonomic 
information” (ITIS, 2017a). Based on communication with the Catalogue of Life editor in 
January 2017, ITIS had contributed about 50% of the Annual Checklist in 2000. Though detailed 
data from the 2000-2004 datasets is no longer easily available, ITIS comprised 158,884 of the 
220,000 core species in the taxonomic Catalogue of Life database in 2005—a full 72% of the 
total database species count. Comparing these figures with more recent data from the 2016 
release, ITIS contributions have increased by only a small margin to 159,821 total species; 
however, given the Catalogue now totals 1,640,969 species, ITIS now comprises about 9.7% of 
the total database environment (Species 2000, 2016e).  
The subsidiary component datasets that make-up the Catalogue’s data set—Global 
Species Databases (GSD) and Regional Species Databases (RSD)—come from various locations 
around the world, including databases provided by Kew Royal Botanic Gardens, the World 
Register of Marine Species (WoRMS) (2017c), Fishbase (2017), and Systema Dipterorum (Pape 
& Thompson, 2017), which comprise the largest groups of these contributing databases (Species 
2000, 2015d). Over time, as more and more GSDs and RSDs are added the Catalogue, species 
checklist becomes more robust.12 The Catalogue stands at the center of a multi-tiered 
                                                
12 Of course, while the general trend of the Catalogue’s core species and GSD count tends to increase over time, 
decreases occasionally occur as GSDs redact their data from the system (see Appendix B and the species count drop 
between 2012 and 2013). Comparing GSD data sets for these years, one sees significant changes amounting to a 
51,926 species count drop in 2013. Databases added in 2013 included, the Freshwater Animal Diversity Assessment 
(FADA) Project; Catalogue of Life China; the World Checklist of Freshwater Mollusca; Psocodea Special File (lice 
taxonomic groups); and the WoRMS Mollusca database. Equally important are those databases that are no longer 
contained in the list, including AlgaeBase; the WoRMS sea cucumber database; and the Rotifera database (Species 
2000, 2016a, 2016b). The significance here is that these fluctuating numbers represent entire taxa that are removed 
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infrastructure, ingesting subsidiary databases from regional hubs from around the world (Figure 
2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Catalogue of Life Infrastructure Layers (Species 2000, 2015b). Nomenclators exist at the bottom of the 
infrastructure layer and include all code governed nomenclatural acts, including original name usages (in taxonomic 
literature), objective synonyms, as well as other name forms (see chapter three for more information). Regional 
Hubs are regional checklists (RSDs) for a given geographic area. Global species databases (GSD) are those 
databases that (typically) collect one taxa on a global scale (usually at the genus or family level)—all instances of 
that genus regardless of geographic boundaries (see chapter four). The Catalogue of Life then aggregates GSDs and 
RSDs into a master species checklist and composite consensus management taxonomy. The Catalogue is then used 
as a taxonomic backbone for many other online systems, including GBIF, EoL, and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of Threatened Species (see chapters four and five). 
The Secretariat for the Catalogue rotates on a five-year basis, at which point institutions 
“bid” for hosting privileges. The Catalogue is currently based at the Naturalis Biodiversity 
Center in Leiden, Netherlands, after a stint at the University of Reading (Evans, 2013). The 
                                                                                                                                                       
or added en bloc, creating a cascading effect in numerous domains of biodiversity practice as the Catalogue is 
updated in the numerous platforms that integrate its taxonomic backbone. 
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Catalogue’s Executive Editor—currently based at the Illinois Natural History Survey, Prairie 
Research Institute at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign—with the support of a team 
of editorial experts, collocates the taxonomic and species information, and makes this taxonomic 
infrastructure freely available as the backbone to a number databases comprising some of the 
world’s most significant aggregators of robust biological description. These partner systems, 
such as The Encyclopedia of Life, the Global Biodiversity Information Facility, The Barcode of 
Life Initiative, and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of 
Threatened Species, focus more on descriptive species content, image data, geographic 
information system information, and occurrence data. These heavily used online systems are 
collectively used to direct global biodiversity initiatives supported by governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Scientific research is scaffolded and supported by their data. 
Despite its smaller citation count, the Catalogue is a fundamental, central structural node of 
ecological infrastructure, serving as the hidden architecture for numerous systems central to the 
endeavor of biodiversity research (Parr et al., 2012, p. 100, illustration), and as such, its 
structural, representational, and epistemological attributes should be better understood as a 
document of biodiversity knowledge and classificatory practice.  
Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF). 
Amid the iLife consortium GBIF is arguably the most visible, and certainly the largest, 
aggregator of data points of all participants. GBIF began in 2001, and was founded as a space 
where biodiversity datasets could easily be published in an open access environment, with the 
expectation that user groups of all types could explore and download this data to facilitate a more 
cooperative, globally contextualized biodiversity research (Global Biodiversity and Information 
Facility, 2013b). The GBIF Secretariat is currently located “at the Natural History Museum in 
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Copenhagen, Denmark, [and] is charged with developing, executing and reporting on the GBIF 
work programme” (GBIF, 2013). Similar to the Catalogue, GBIF functions through a distributive 
structure, with the Secretariat supported by a Governing Board and various standing committees 
and task groups populated by scientists and professionals around the world. GBIF has a unique 
stature in the iLife environment as an intergovernmental collaboration, charged with the 
coordination of a series of global nodes (operational bases) that coordinate the collection and 
provisioning of data to the global environment—these nodes are often located in a prominent 
natural history or other biodiversity-related institution within the node country. As of November 
2016, there are currently fifty-six governments that have agreed to a non-binding memorandum 
of understanding, promising to establish a Secretariat that will take the responsibility of 
maintaining partnerships and coordinating internal institutional network development and 
contribution of data (GBIF, 2016b, n.d.). Additionally, GBIF is a core source of data for the 
production of “downstream science”—science that is produced using GBIF as a primary set of 
core data (T. Robertson, 2016). In 2015 alone, 407 articles were identified as using GBIF-
mediated data, and trends show considerable increases since 2005 when only 52 articles were 
identified as having done so (GBIF Science Committee, 2016).  
Given its stature, relatively large staff support, and consistent funding, GBIF plays a 
significant role in the general discussion of the Catalogue’s functionality and future trajectories. 
In particular, GBIF is one of the largest iLife participants that integrate the Catalogue’s 
management classification into the architecture of their taxonomic backbone (Döring, 2016). 
GBIF has invested heavily in the coordination of nomenclature in technical environments, and 
participated in the “NAMES in November” Conference (Global Biodiversity and Information 
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Facility, 2016b) that is heavily cited later in this dissertation.13 In chapter five, I describe how 
GBIF plays a central role in assessing the limitations of the Catalogue’s curated taxonomic 
space, seen especially through GBIF’s recent initiatives to enhance their Nub Taxonomy 
(another term for a backbone taxonomy) via computationally-mediated algorithmic methods 
(Global Biodiversity and Information Facility, 2016a).  
Biodiversity Heritage Library.  
 The Biodiversity Heritage library (BHL)—an initiative also hosted at the Smithsonian 
National Museum of Natural History, along with ITIS—is a biodiversity literature repository that 
coordinates digitization efforts across a number of natural history and other biodiversity 
scientific institutions. As stated on their website, “the BHL consortium works with the 
international taxonomic community, rights holders, and other interested parties to ensure that this 
biodiversity heritage is made available to a global audience through open access principles” 
(Biodiversity Heritage Library, 2017). Given the intellectual property and copyright issues 
associated with published items, the majority of the work in BHL is dated pre-1923, and all 
digital documents are hosted on the webservers of the Internet Archive. BHL uses optical 
character recognition (OCR) software to identify name-instances that are currently identified and 
available in the Global Names Architecture.14 These identified names then allows for the 
collocation of documents from multiple institutions in one digital space. Mechanisms are 
currently being put in place to extract names from BHL for immediate inclusion into the GNA, 
which would provide a workflow mechanism by which newly located species name-tokens can 
                                                
13 See chapter three for more information. 
 
14 See chapter three for a more extensive discussion of the Global Names Architecture. GNA is “a system of web-
services which helps people to register, find, index, check and organize biological scientific names and interconnect 
on-line information about species” (Global Names Architecture, 2017c). 
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be assessed (and subsequently absorbed) into the Catalogue of Life Plus’s nomenclatural 
workflow.15 Once BHL identifies particular scientific names in their OCR’d documents, they can 
then be imported/attached to species-specific webpages on the Encyclopedia of Life.  
Encyclopedia of Life.  
The Encyclopedia of Life (EoL) is an open-access environment hosted at the Smithsonian 
NMNH16 primarily intended to collocate species-specific data from various sources (GBIF and 
BHL being two of the primary data stores) for display on their one “webpage for every species” 
(2016) platform. Alongside any given species content page, EoL publishes a series of possible 
taxonomic arrangements (2017d), of which the Catalogue of Life is one.17 The curatorial data 
model of EoL differs significantly from the Catalogue—in EoL’s system, a series of curatorial 
roles are assigned (master, full, and assistant curators), that have varying levels of curatorial 
responsibility over the veracity of included data, as well as for setting default species display 
preferences for species that fall within their species expertise, including the default taxonomic 
arrangement for any given species. According to EoL staff, the primary user base for their 
services are the general public and K-12 educators—users that want information displayed in a 
convenient and user-friendly fashion, but that would not otherwise download data for scientific 
and/or research purposes.  
International Commissions on Biological Nomenclature. 
 Numerous international codes exist to provide guidelines for the application and control 
of biological species. Prominent codes include, the International Code of Nomenclature for 
                                                
15 See also chapter three for information on Catalogue of Life Plus. 
 
16 Incidentally, ITIS, EoL, and BHL are all located within the same wing of the Smithsonian National Museum of 
Natural History.  
 
17 See chapter four for more information about the use of the Catalogue of Life taxonomy on their platform. 
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algae, fungi, and plants (ICNAFP); the International Code of Zoological Nomenclature (ICZN); 
the International Code of Nomenclature of Bacteria (ICNB); International Code of Nomenclature 
for Cultivated Plants (ICNCP); and International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV). 
Nomenclatural codes govern the global production and control of all names, regardless of 
geography of language. Only valid scientific names (those correctly published and available in 
public repertories) are managed through these processes—common names, for example, have no 
professional relationships with the codes. For the most part, when I discuss the codes of 
nomenclature from this point forward, I will draw upon the two most significant codes for the 
Catalogue of Life as well as any of the associated infrastructures that have been discussed: the 
ICZN (International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, 1999) and the ICNAFP 
(International Association for Plant Taxnomy, 2011).  
Toward a “CERN” collaboration for biodiversity informatics. 
The importance of this wide-scale iLife coordination was reiterated time-and-time again 
in the meetings I attended and interviews I conducted. The benefits of such collaboration and 
integration have numerous benefits, particularly at the local level, including the pooling of both 
fiscal and human resource, and the elimination of work, labor, and technical redundancy that 
results from the fragmented nature of biodiversity science. Such long-range, higher-level 
coordinative efforts have been compared to the approach taken by the Conseil Européen pour la 
Recherche Nucléaire (CERN) initiative (2017), a Geneva-based particle physics laboratory 
providing a suite of instruments, tools, and complexes, whereby scientists from all over Europe 
(and the world) can collectively utilize these resources for research purposes. The underlying 
motivations for a CERN collective were two fold: to capitalize on the increased interest toward 
“favoring collaborative European bodies like the European Economic Community,” and to offset 
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the reality that “no single European state had either the financial or human resources needed to 
build the big laboratories that were key to the future of physics” (Galison & Hevly, 1992, p. 81). 
The same tendencies and problems can be said to apply to taxonomic and biodiversity 
infrastructure in today’s contemporary scientific communities, albeit on a much smaller and less 
complex technological scale.18 As taxonomist, marine biologist, and Catalogue of Life Executive 
Secretary, Peter Schalk, indicated,  
Seeing how [the Life partnership] fits together and how, all together, we are [becoming] a CERN. And 
that's what we told the [European Commission]—if you want to build a European taxonomic facility with 
all of these elements in different countries, you're looking at an investment of between 500 million Euros to 
about one billion Euros. But if you do that and you connect the name component to the molecular 
component, the gain and yield financially is bigger. And I think for most countries, the running cost of 
facilities like this will come down. And [then] the focus can be more about science ... rather than tinkering 
with the engine all the time. In the next 10 years you will have something like CERN. [The] Catalogue as 
index: a species list and management hierarchy. The question is, how are these functions working together 
or separately? You need a management hierarchy because if you download a dataset from, say a Diphtheria 
database, it goes from species to family level to order, etc. The rest is not [there] because the guy who built, 
he knew where it belongs. You need to put it somewhere, though, to make one system (2016a). 
 
The goal here, not unlike CERN, is to find ways to centralize the data and work functions in 
some of the biggest natural history museums in Europe, including the Natural History Museum 
at the University of Copenhagen; the Natural History Museum, London; Museum für 
Naturkunde, Berlin; French National Museum of Natural History; Senckenberg Natural History 
Museum (Naturmuseum Senckenberg); and Naturalis Biodiversity Center in Leiden, Netherlands 
(collectively and anecdotally called the “Big Six”). So much of the informatics work in 
biodiversity science is focused on the technical facilitation and coordination of data in 
centralized service hubs. This collaboratory-type infrastructure (“Science of Collaboratories 
(Home),” 2010) could potentially serve to free up scientist’s time for primary scientific 
activities—those activities on and by which a scientist’s professional value and work is defined 
                                                
18 By “less complex” I mean that biodiversity science has relatively low-level technical requirements in comparison 
to the infrastructure required of particle physics. While databases require a great deal of memory (increasingly so, as 
museum and natural history assets are digitized, and as databases proliferate and are continually downloaded and 
duplicated), the software and hardware requirements for such work are a considerably lower-level investment than a 
hadron collider.   
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and assessed at an institutional level. As Schalk explained, the six institutions listed above, 
comprise approximately 120 staff members (of all ranks) working on information and 
communication technologies (ICT), and thus the merger of these institution’s technical efforts 
frees-up local staff to engage in more traditional scientific activities.19 The idiosyncratic nature 
of these multiply-produced biodiversity data caches produces the need for both centralized 
instrumentation (informatics knowledge and computational hosting capabilities) and intellectual 
taxonomic mediating services to serve as the architecture for said instruments.  
New Sharing Networks, Familiar Problems 
An important point to note at this juncture, before we embark on a more detailed analysis 
of the Catalogue, is that the kinds of problems experienced in collocating biodiversity data within 
these technical spaces have long been an issue for biodiversity institutions. One of the major 
methodological difficulties I encountered in examining a distributed structure like the Catalogue 
of Life, especially in the early stages of beginning research, was being able to understand the 
variety of work involved in producing data, and the extent to which, traditionally and 
historically, this work has been performed in silos within natural history institutions. Geoffrey 
Bowker has performed considerable research in the biodiversity sciences (2000b, 2000a, 2008; 
2015), and throughout this body of work he articulates how the collaborative and aggregative 
nature of the work of biodiversity sciences inherently produces a number of tensions and 
complications. One essential tension is that each of these institutional silos produces data specific 
to their purposes, which may or may not conform to the data kinds and structures that exist 
within other silos. Further, data structures change as technological advancements are integrated 
                                                
19 Others have noted that the skills of ICT professionals do not necessarily overlap with those of scientists, so while 
the freeing-up of staff in the ICT sector of an institution may free up human resources, those resources may not 
funnel directly into the production of more taxonomic science.  
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into the practices of performing scientific work—much of the work prior to the 1980’s is 
primarily in paper form and conformed to no global data standard (Figure 3).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Undated specimen list from Vema (ship) Expedition. American Museum of Natural History Archives 
(“Specimen list, n.d., color-coded list of specimens,” 1955). The codes on the left—V-7, V-8, etc.—are specimen 
numbers that correlate to physical specimens collection on the voyage. Used by permission.  
In August of 2016, I spent a good deal of time in the Natural History Museum, London 
(NHML), which has historically been highly influential and active in the biodiversity informatics 
community. Serendipitously, I came upon a series of boxes containing the archival documents 
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produced by the Biometric and Computing section of the NHML (then referred to as the British 
Museum of Natural History—BM(NH)). The Biometrics and Computing Section was primarily 
concerned with “inter-departmental compatibility software” (D. H. Thorpe, 1985), much of 
which contained data that was taxonomic in nature. “The first mention of a coordinated approach 
to the development of computer (IT) strategy was made in a recommendation (no. 2) of a report 
of a visiting group to the Biometrics and Computing section in March of 1980” (D. H. Thorpe, 
1985). In response to this report, the Biometrics Section formed the Information Technology 
Program Group (ITPG) in order to identify the various data collecting activities, including the 
types of software and information organizing systems in use at the NHML; the programming 
languages being used; word processing packages being implemented; database and taxonomic 
databases being compiled to maintain the output of research activity (Thompson, 1987), as well 
as the data formats being collected by both digital and analog means. The end result of this 
survey could just as well be articulated in the current global biodiversity taxonomic and 
informatics landscape: 
The current use of computers in the area of collections was unsatisfactory, both from an organizational 
point of view, and the degree to which requirements are fulfilled. The scientific departments are currently 
responsible for servicing their own requirements for computing, but this has led to: 
 
1. Computing section support is only used in a percentage of activities 
2. Incompatible systems are being used 
3. In several departments a scientist must spend a proportion of their time looking after computer 
systems. This is sometimes reluctantly, and is sometimes felt to damage their career prospects. 
4. Site-license agreements are not used 
5. Insufficient funding leads to inadequate systems (Information Technology Program Group, 1985). 
 
In the mid-1980’s, when this proposal was distributed to NHML administrators, computational 
capacities were fairly limited, so unified data stores were explicitly ruled out as a possibility. In 
lieu of such technical collocation, unifying data standards across units was proposed, as was the 
identification of redundant tasks across departments to “reduce duplication of effort” (1985).  
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 By 1989, however, new software models were being proposed and implemented to 
“provide taxonomists with user-friendly tools for creating and managing data which describe 
organisms, and to process this into identification keys, classifications, and descriptions” 
(Thompson, 1989). Noted as well was the importance of nomenclature in the process of data 
aggregation. ITPG interest then shifted toward the articulation of a computing strategy that could 
connect these disparate data stores and provide an adequate means of access (without 
compromising intellectual property or other privacy issues associated with the data, in a pre-
internet and web environment) (Thompson, 1988). Four possible options for managing 
biodiversity data within the NHML were proposed (Figure 4), including a model where (Option 
1) all “computing activity was … undertaken on a large main frame or quite of machines; 
(Option 2) “each department will ultimately have their own system” (as well as being responsible 
for its own IT strategy); (Option 3) “resources are shared by topic … for example, a single 
machine would be procured for all taxonomic computing for use by all departments that wish to 
use the computer in this way”; and (Option 4) “a hybrid between 2 and 3, [where] each 
department would ultimately obtain their own system…There would be no direct communication 
between departmental systems but each system would be able to communicate with [the] 
JANET” United Kingdom research network (1988).20 The default mode for data management, if 
agreement on a structure could not reached, was that the museum would treat departments “as 
five separate museums and each department [would] have to look after its own computing needs” 
(Information Technology Program Group, 1985, p. 5). Ultimately, in response to this particular 
initiative, no centralized structure was agreed upon and the siloed approached remained in effect. 
 
                                                
20 The JANET network is “a high-speed network for the UK research and education community” that traces its roots 
back to the 1970s (Joint Information Systems Committee, 2017). 
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Figure 4. Possible network configurations for data control and sharing at the Natural History Museum, London 
(Thompson, 1988). Used by permission. © The Trustees of the Natural History Museum, London. 
 
Even with such historical efforts to centralize biodiversity data, the current Informatics 
team at the NHML continues to deal with incommensurable data created within numerous 
museum departments. Five data silos that harken back to those identified by the ITPG remain 
deeply engrained in institutional culture, 21 even taking into consideration the significant progress 
made by the informatics team to centralize data for global sharing (Smith, 2016; Woodburn, 
2016).22 One issue to note—that will be brought up again and again in this manuscript—is the 
extent to which data is “flattened,” filtered, or altered, as it enters the communal data space. The 
                                                
21 These department “silos” include zoology, entomology, mineralogy, paleontology, and botany.  
 
22 The NHML makes its research and collections data available through its online Data Portal (Scott & Smith, 
2017), which, via an application program interface (API), contributes data to infrastructures such as GBIF, which 
then makes it way to other platforms via data sharing protocols.  The Data Portal  
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flattening of data is the selection of local (or departmental) data that only conforms to the 
standards and capabilities of the centralized database structures.23 Additionally, the NMNH uses 
the open-source data management system and portal software, CKAN (2017), which has a 
particular data structure that only allows the NMNH to have a single table as a dataset. Thus, in 
CKAN, because you cannot build a relational or maintain data relationships, most data that 
comes into the Museum’s data portal is denormalized, meaning that multi-value fields 
maintained within Museum departments are being flattened down to conform to this 
denormalized structure.24 Further, the Museum’s collection management system is about nine 
separate modules—a core module for the catalogue, a taxonomy module, a collection events 
module, multi-media module, etc.—and much of this information is not relevant for the data 
portal or available for public consumption. In the case of the NHML, much of this filtering is 
performed for good reasons—data may be embargoed while research is ongoing or awaiting 
publication, species data may identify the location of endangered species, etc.—but this fact does 
remind us to be constantly aware that the data landscape, as it exists in the iLife consortium, is 
only a small fragment of all possible data types that exist within the local, institutional 
environments that contribute data to these aggregated structures.  
The problems with sharing biodiversity data on a global scale, then, are long familiar to 
taxonomists. The issues we see at plat in the NHML above are only amplified in a global space, 
where multiple institutional protocols, practices, and data types must be merged together into a 
functional network of database fields. What makes the contemporary climate in taxonomy so 
                                                
23 Three-dimensional image data, for example, is not included in the NHML’s central database, which is then 
filtered outward into systems such as GBIF. 
 
24 It was noted by NHML staff that flat, denormalized data files are generally what users request when they need 
datasets. However, extracting the relationality of multi-value fields back out again for users who wish to maintain 
that information is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, in the current staffing and technical environment.   
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exciting is that a critical mass of scientists are starting to see the benefits and importance of such 
data sharing to both their current research, as well as to the field of taxonomy as a whole 
(plagued as it is with the “impediment” of diminishing practitioners and expertise). And given 
this momentum, the Catalogue of Life—with its curated pool of species names and its consensus 
management taxonomic architecture—stands at the center of this iLife consortium, primed to 
shape the collocation and access mechanisms of extent species knowledge.  
Introduction to the Chapters  
This dissertation constitutes my attempt at understanding the kinds of coordination 
required to create global taxonomic knowledge structures by way of the Catalogue of Life. The 
chapters take a graded approach to examining this phenomena, beginning with the most basic 
concepts that populate these databases—species concepts and names—then I progressively 
expand the scope of my analysis outward to include nomenclatural control; biodiversity 
taxonomic instruments in general; the consensus-based composite management classification of 
the Catalogue; and finally ending with an examination of taxonomies as knowledge bases, and 
the limitations of said instrumentation in the field of biodiversity and within taxonomic practice.  
The following chapter, “The Documentary Universe of Biodiversity Databases,” 
examines the fundamental informational units of biodiversity databases and proposes an 
expanded work-entity conceptual model that can help us understand the production of document 
entities in database documents like the Catalogue of Life. I begin with Patrick Wilson’s notion of 
the bibliographical universe and progressively broaden his construct outward by including 
documents, broadly conceived, as an integral part of this new contemporary informational and 
documentary distributed database space. It seems to me that the fundamental entities that inhabit 
Wilson’s bibliographical universe still hold much relevance—one glance at the Functional 
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Requirement for Bibliographic Records illustrates this fact—including his concepts of works, 
texts, exemplar, and events/objects, but they can also benefit from some reevaluation and 
expansion to conform to activities that are performed in online biodiversity documentary spaces. 
In essence, this chapter looks at the Catalogue as a document-generating document, and attempts 
to define the universe of documents that it instantiates as a defined biodiversity text publisher. In 
order to accomplish this, I identify the various kinds of entities defined within the biodiversity 
database environment, beginning with information, progressing through data, documents, and 
knowledge. Documents are defined as the fundamental entity in this analysis, acting as the 
representational element for all biodiversity evidence. An argument is then made that databases 
themselves (and biodiversity taxonomy databases in this particular case) are contingent 
documents, defined as they are by continual change, a distributed format, and defined in relation 
(contingently) to other database documents (and taxonomies). As a contingent document, then, 
what kinds of documentary entities—fixed and fluid—constitute the production of the 
Catalogue’s data environment? The overall aim of this chapter is to understand how control is 
initiated and constructed at an entity-level in a taxonomic document in order to facilitate a 
subsequent discussion about Wilson’s concepts of descriptive and exploitative power.  
In the third chapter, “Complex Concepts And Nomenclatural Control,” I look at the 
organization of biodiversity evidence and how such documentary evidence is integrally 
connected to nomenclature, and finally, how nomenclature is controlled through institutional 
workflows in database environments as a precursor to taxonomic knowledge production. I 
examine the complexity that defines the contingency of (species) concepts and the nomenclature 
that biodiversity databases seek to control. As intellectually-circumscribed objects, I describe 
what types of evidence—type specimens, species circumscriptions, and biodiversity 
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publications—constitute a species concept, and how the shifting historical application and 
interpretation of this evidence creates a situation in which multiple, valid species concepts 
(represented as species names) can potentially apply to the same group of material referents—a 
situation that creates the existence of, what I call, complex concepts. Next, I examine how these 
represented documents, translated into complex concepts, become circulateable, named entities 
in order to maintain intellectual purchase in taxonomic communication. Thus, the management 
of nomenclature becomes a key focus of my attention (see Figure 5). Nomenclatural control 
moves us from Patrick Wilson’s descriptive power to an ability to exploit these names in 
scientifically functional ways. Managing these complex concepts is far from straightforward, 
requiring workflows that both disambiguate code-compliant name-tokens from non-compliant 
forms, and that assess the valid name form (and the concomitant species concept attached to that 
name) among a host of names that potentially refer to the same species concept or type 
specimen. A current initiative by the Catalogue of Life, known as the Catalogue of Life Plus, is 
introduced as a possible organizational workflow and administrative process aimed at controlling 
the iterative disambiguation and articulation of this name space. 
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Figure 5. Toward a centrally shared and owned name index. Source: Thomas Orrell and Peter Schalk (2016) This 
figure illustrates how the Catalogue of Life stands at the center of the iLife environment, providing a stable and 
curated species checklist and consensus-based management taxonomy that is then utilized in any number of online 
data collection and access platforms. The Catalogue, thus, stands as the mediator between an undifferentiated pool 
of names (produced through data collection and observation data activities) and the rest of the iLife environment.  
 
Chapter four, “Documentary Instruments: Taxonomic Specifications, Consensus, and 
Interpretive Flexibility,” then delves into the Catalogue’s consensus-based management 
classification specifically, how it is constructed, and how it differs from the taxonomies that it 
ingests. Again, taking one of Patrick Wilson’s notions—that of bibliographic instruments—I 
situate taxonomies as particular modes of access that have implicit documentary arrangements 
that define the kinds of work these taxonomies can perform and the ways in which we can 
understand and navigate the classificatory system as a self-contained ontological and 
classificatory space. I then introduce what Jonathan Furner (2009) calls descriptive-oriented and 
retrieval-oriented biodiversity systems as two key notions to differentiate in this taxonomic 
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space. The fragmentary biodiversity world is defined by numerous descriptive-oriented 
taxonomies that each argue a specific classificatory point of view—each arrangement is a 
hypothesis about how relationships between organisms are defined, related, and subsequently 
represented.  Some examples of specific descriptive-oriented classifications are examined, 
including evolutionary taxonomy, cladism, and pheneticism. I then look to the Catalogue’s 
management classification as an access-oriented classification system designed, as it is, to 
reconcile and comingle numerous subsidiary databases for the predominant purpose of access. 
The chapter ends by extending Wilson’s two powers—those of descriptive and exploitative 
power—to include extensive power, which describes classificatory instruments designed to be 
repurposed and reformulated in a number of external environments.  
The concluding chapter, “Knowledge Bases, Taxonomic Change, and Contentions with 
Consensus,” looks to the potentialities of the Catalogue as a knowledge base for taxonomic 
professionals, as well as to its limitations as an extensible taxonomic document. As a taxonomy 
intended to function in particular ways—to aggregate all extant data from numerous global 
sources—the Catalogue’s evolutionary informatic potential is discussed. The Catalogue as a 
knowledge base can be used to answer questions about the historical development of taxonomies 
as a taxonomic concept repository. Much like the tracking of nomenclature over time helps us 
understand the relation of taxonomies to historical biological evidence and species concepts, 
being able to track the evolution of taxonomic structures can help scientists understand 
evolutionary trends and make large-scale phylogenetic inferences. I then turn to the qualitative 
taxonomic transformations that taxonomies undergo as they are brought in to the Catalogue’s 
schematic, and how we can understand such change in light of theories in Information Studies. 
Such changes will set the stage for a series of critiques about the Catalogue. Joseph Tennis’s 
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notion of second-order classificatory theory is extended outward to the Catalogue’s documentary 
space to frame such schematic change, focusing on how classificatory relationships are affected 
and reconstructed in the process of taxonomic collocation; how taxonomic schemes interoperate 
within the Catalogue’s structure; and how taxonomies are fundamentally transformed as they are 
absorbed into this global space. Finally, I look to critiques of the Catalogue as a knowledge base 
and taxonomic model that comes into tension with biodiversity practice, and so look to what its 
extensive limits are in daily practice. I focus on a series of critiques that include, (a) the 
unsupportable funding model of the Catalogue; (b) the difficulty with which you can assess the 
completeness and quality of its component parts; (c) the rate at which data errors are proliferated 
given the Catalogue’s deep integration into the iLife ecology; and finally, (d) its inability to 
absorb name-tokens that fall outside of Linnaean nomenclatural traditions, such as genetic 
barcodes.  
Conclusion  
No biodiversity taxonomic platform can serve all needs for all constituents, the question 
becomes how global control can be balanced with the flexibility required to do biodiversity work 
at the local level. As Broadfield claimed,  
Several suggestions are made as to how we should think of the communal mind whose activity is 
manifested in the consensus of scientists and philosophers. The relation of a community to its component 
minds is that “of a whole to its parts,” a relation that can be understood by considering the functional 
relation of the parts of an organism. …But the relation of an organism to its members is not that of a 
physical whole to its parts, for the latter is a relation in which the parts are not distinguished by differences 
of function. The parts of a divided whole do not function to make up the whole, whereas organs function in 
ways which interconnect them in the being of an organism. The relations of these organs are misconceived 
when we try to think of the organs as parts of the whole, for the latter is a quantitative relation of physical 
things…The “compositeness” and “aggregation” which are thought to make one mind out of many imply 
the heaping together of physical things, which does not help explain an intellectual unity” (Broadfield, 
1946, p. 76). 
 
The function of this dissertation is to better understand how intellectual unity is problematized in 
the biodiversity space. What does it really mean to say that the Catalogue is a consensus-based 
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classification? What are its benefits and drawbacks? The whole of the Catalogue is not purely the 
additive qualities of the classifications it includes in its schema. It is both far more and far less 
than that. Again, the goal here is to think about how the historical, disciplinary, and theoretical 
specificity of biodiversity infrastructures can inform our own work and theories in Information 
Studies. The extensive power and consensus-generating capabilities of the Catalogue are 
especially intriguing in a field where the majority of our documentary systems are tightly 
controlled and intellectually cohesive spaces—and certainly for good reason, since with that 
control comes more effective and reliable retrieval capacities. There is still much to theorize 
about the relationship between classifications as representational entities, and classifications as 
efficient data communication facilitators; the Catalogue’s schematic shines new light onto this 
longstanding debate. Without looking farther afield than our own discipline, the Catalogue’s 
approach could never force us to question and push against our own approaches to 
documentation and classification. Examining the Catalogue exposes some of the fundamental 
constructed presuppositions and intellectual impositions we make during the act and practice of 
classifying. Even the Catalogue’s classification of ‘real phenomena’ shows us that there is no 
such thing as a fully accurate and just representation of the world (for there is no such thing in 
the classificatory world); there are only interpreted documents. Embracing this notion is 
emancipatory in its own right.  
Lastly, this manuscript, I hope, will show us how the theories of Information Studies are 
applicable in realms far beyond our typical systems of concern. So while it is certainly true that 
Information Studies is a relatively new discipline that borrows heavily from the philosophical, 
linguistic, and mathematical domains, among others (Furner, 2004b, 2015), what Information 
Studies offers other disciplines is the space in which concepts and theories can be applied  to the 
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practices of information institutions and information endeavors through various technological 
(broadly conceived) means. Let this be a proposed model for how Information Studies concepts 
can be aptly applied to related, but historically and culturally distinct disciplinary traditions. 
Such an approach, I believe, is essential to the longevity and applicability of, not only 
Knowledge Organization, but the entire field of Information Studies, which has much more to 
offer the academy than is otherwise exhibited.  
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Chapter 2: The Documentation Universe 
 
To have bibliographical control over a collection of things is to have a certain sort of power over those 
things; what things, and what sort of power, it is our business to discover and decide. Let us ask first what 
are the things over which one might have bibliographical control.  
—Patrick Wilson 
Two Kinds of Power: An Essay on Bibliographic Control (1968, p. 6) 
Introduction 
In Patrick Wilson’s text, Two Kinds of Power: An Essay on Bibliographic Control, he 
postulates a bibliographic universe to identity the kinds of “things” available to be identified, 
described, and related within bibliographic systems, as well as how these entities are related as 
part of an ontological system. In Wilson’s ‘universe,’ the primary issues of concern were texts—
books, documents, etc.—but he also understood the landscape of texts and objects over which 
bibliographical systems have control exceed far beyond such restrictive conditions. The iLife 
ecology, as seen in the previous chapter, is a highly integrated network of online biodiversity 
platforms. These platforms control information. They control data. They control the 
documentation and evidence of the biodiversity world. But before one can have descriptive 
control over a system of information, one needs to understand what kinds of entities these 
systems contain, represent, and produce. The articulations of Wilson’s bibliographic universe—a 
product of its time and the conditions of bibliography in the 1960’s—in many ways still apply. 
The Functional Requirements for Bibliographical Records (FRBR) schema, following and 
incorporating many of the same entity categories as Wilson, shows how his influence radiates 
deeply in a number of contemporary standards and schema within cataloguing and bibliographic 
theory (Coyle, 2016, p. 3).25 Thinking about Wilson’s approach to the bibliographical world, I 
                                                
25 Though the FRBR Final Report (Standing Committee of the IFLA Section on Cataloguing, 2009) makes no 
references to the underlying literature that influenced its composition, it’s hard to imagine a circumstance where 
Patrick Wilson is not part of a discussion centered on creating a conceptual model for bibliographic records. Karen 
Coyle (2016), Allyson Carlyle (2006), Richard Smiraglia (2002, 2003, 2012), among others, articulate Wilson’s 
influence on the articulation of FRBR (most often related to the concept of the “work” entity), though others omit 
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began to examine about how we might think of the Catalogue’s biodiversity database ‘universe’ 
in relation to this model, concerned as it is with an ever-expanding set of documents and objects 
that circulate in very specific digital and professional conditions that affect how they are treated 
as units of scientific work.  
In other words, I want to broaden Wilson’s notion of the bibliographic universe to think 
about the documentation universe of the biodiversity database environment, and how this notion 
might expand upon, and perhaps problematize, Wilson’s basic schematic.26 How do Wilson’s 
concepts apply to the Catalogue of Life, and even more importantly, what other theories and 
literatures do we need to cull from in order to understand the Catalogue in all of its 
representational and digital complexities? 
An essential question to ask when considering composite structures such as the Catalogue 
(and GBIF, and the like) is how their wholeness and documentary boundaries are defined at any 
particular point, given that one of their defining qualities is that they are ever-evolving, never 
complete, and always in a state of maintenance, refinement, and data ingest. As Elaine Svenonius 
                                                                                                                                                       
Patrick Wilson as a key influence in conceptualizing the FRBR model, focusing instead on Seymour Lubetzky and 
Charles Cutter’s influence on the matter (rightly so, for these individuals, indeed, played a big role in 
conceptualizing bibliographic entities for the practice of cataloguing) (Denton & Taylor, 2007). It is my general 
opinion that, despite some scholar’s acknowledgement of his influence, Patrick Wilson’s (indirect, if not direct) 
influence in this domain deserves more in-depth attention by scholars. 
 
26 Richard Smiraglia (2002) also notes the need to expand Patrick Wilson’s notion of bibliographic families beyond 
the bibliographic domain and uses the term “instantiation network” to suit this purpose. He states, “With this term 
[instantiation network] I retain the concept of connectedness, but move beyond even the textual. (I use 
“instantiation” instead of the more generic “manifestation,” to indicate a sense of temporality; an instantiation is 
essentially a manifestation at a specific point in time)” (2002, p. 7). I use the term documentary universe instead 
primarily because, in this chapter and those that follow, I am not only interested in the documentary instances that 
the Catalogue of Life produces (that is to say, I am not only interested in the texts, exemplars and objects the work 
of the Catalogue instantiates—though that is certainly part of my discussion), I am also generally interested in the 
kinds of documents that can potentially inhabit documentary databases at all whose instantiation is quite separate 
from their representation and circulation in the Catalogue environment. My documentary universe is all possible 
objects that can inhabit the Catalogue with some kind of evidentiary and token-serving purpose, as well as those 
entities that the Catalogue produces as part of its role as a documentary entity in-and-of itself. My approach here 
takes a broader starting point than Smiraglia’s discussion, though his distinction is certainly useful to this line of 
thought. Secondly, while my use of “documentary universe” arises from Wilson’s use of bibliographical universe, I 
want to acknowledge Marcia Bates’s use of the term “universe of documentation” in relation to documentary 
production in the various disciplines (2007). 
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states in The Intellectual Foundations of Information Organization (2009), “Willard Quine 
characterizes the entities encompassed by scientific theory as consisting of the values of its 
variables. A bibliographic theory can be similarly characterized, its variable being the entities 
that populate the bibliographic universe…These are the primary objects, abstract and concrete, 
admitted into a language of bibliographic description and, as such, the fundamental constructs of 
bibliographic theory” (2009, p. 31). The informational “units” (or, variables, to Quine, as 
conveyed by Svenonius) and the boundaries of what “items” reside within, and are produced by, 
the Catalogue, however, are not so easy to assess and articulate within its fluid ecology. What are 
the Catalogue’s limits as a unit of documentary analysis, and how is it that we can deconstruct 
these limits to understand how the parts intersect and interact? Secondly, and most crucially to 
scientific practice, is what are the physical entities these databases represent, as well as the 
intellectual articulations that define how it is we understand them as bona fide objects that 
occupy a space of coherent and conceptual persistence.  
As such, this chapter is broken-up into three broad sections: First, I provide an overview 
of the literature in Information Studies to illustrate how the discipline defines the most basic 
entities and concepts in the discipline, such as information, data, and documents—entities that 
are circulating, to some degree or another, within the Catalogue’s space. I start at these basic 
building blocks for two main reasons: 1) to acquaint readers outside of Information Studies with 
some of the core definitions and conceptual entities of the field, and 2) to place the subsequent 
extensive discourse about documents and documentation within a solid disciplinary context. 
Additionally, while Wilson’s universe was unconcerned with “units generally smaller than whole 
texts and copies of them” (Wilson, 1968, p. 19)—primarily because information extracted from 
context was less useful and more difficult to appraise—in the biodiversity world, the information 
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within the Catalogue holds intellectual purchase in the scientific community, acting as fully-
fledged documentary units in their own right. Thus, beginning with literature from the 
philosophy and history of information, I illustrate the progression of information from mere 
normalized patterns of data, to information as meaningful and truthful units of systemically 
circulateable data. I’ll then make the bridge from data to document, invoking Jonathan Furner’s 
(2016a) assessment of the issue, which ultimately defines data as a kind of document. With that 
foundation in place, documentation literature is then reviewed so as to understand how 
documents act as representations and orientations of evidence— and, in the case of the 
Catalogue, biodiversity evidence in particular. This dissertation uses the term document as the 
fundamental unit within the space of the Catalogue: the Catalogue is a database-document that 
holds representations of other kinds of documents in the form of a species name (that serve as 
evidence of biodiversity types and descriptions). I trace how it is that I can make this claim. 
Form is key here: the intended end of this discussion is to show that information within 
biodiversity databases, in order to function socially and scientifically as valid knowledge forms, 
must iteratively become formed in ways that conform to biodiversity practice. The names that 
form the collocating foundation for a taxonomic database must have been negotiated through 
certain protocols to validly represent species concepts and other disciplinary forms of 
knowledge—this becomes key in the next chapter and beyond.  
This leads into the second movement of this chapter, which describes how contingency is 
an essential concept to acknowledge and understand if we are to conceptualize databases (such as 
the Catalogue) as documents understood within these sets of literatures. This contingency makes 
it difficult to define the kinds of entities the Catalogue produces. The Latin adjectival form of 
contingent, contingere, means “to happen,” thus databases are always in the process of becoming 
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something else, always “liable to change,” and “dependent for [their] occurrence or character on 
or upon some prior occurrence[s] or condition[s]” (OED, 2017). Though contingency can also 
connote a sense of accidentalness or chance, the Catalogue is anything but accidental. Change 
does not equal chance in this environment, for the Catalogue is closely and concisely controlled. 
It is this attempt to control contingency (through versioning and editing) that necessarily 
instantiates new documentary forms (versions) arising from the original database-document. The 
documentary nature of the Catalogue is emergent in that its document-ness is defined by a family 
of fixed productions that together constitute the intellectual formulation we understand as The 
Catalogue. The database document can change and yet is able to retain its identity precisely 
because its qualities and purpose are held together by defined units of control: instantiated 
document forms that allow us to assess it in ‘concrete’ terms. The Catalogue’s contingent 
documentary nature is paradoxically dependent upon its concrete versions. 
Part two and section three of this chapter begins to specifically identify the basic 
“entities” of the Catalogue—the intellectual forms and fundamental constructs of documentary-
database theory—that collectively constitute its documentary families (what Karen Coyle calls 
the “inhabitants” of its emergent bibliographic universe) (2016, p. 13). And this is where 
Wilson—as well as other entity schema, including FRBR—is pertinent to invoke. Works, Texts, 
Exemplars, and Items as they relate to the Catalogue become the focus of our attention. If 
information, data, and documents are the individual building blocks of a database, then how do 
we understand and define the basic meaningful forms these units take within the practices of the 
Catalogue—meaningful in the sense that they define formulations of data-documents that can be 
seen as fixed or complete (even if artificial and contingently so) and useful in scientific practice? 
In practice, these forms are the species checklists and the management taxonomies the Catalogue 
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produces.27 To perform this assessment, close attention is paid to the two specific forms the 
Catalogue publishes to control the management of biodiversity data: its Annual, “fixed” dataset, 
and its Dynamic, monthly edition. Each of these documentary streams produces entities that 
differ wildly in their contingency. While the Catalogue certainly changes (and can never been 
seen as truly complete), it leaves behind trails of its production that together fix its documentary 
space.  
This understanding of the component parts of the Catalogue sets the groundwork for the 
subsequent discussions regarding nomenclature and taxonomic classification—two essential 
formulations that depend upon truthful information and the stability of documentary entities. In 
introducing an overview of bibliographic models, Karen Coyle states,  
 
The challenge for us lies in transforming what we can of our data into inter-related “things” without 
overindulging that metaphor. There are indeed things of interest to be defined for cultural heritage and 
creative objects, but our universe of operation lacks the precision of, for example, financial data, where 
every point of information is precisely known, or the calculation of tensile strength in the engineering task 
of bridge building. What we describe is not easily subject to quantitative testing, and the difference 
between success and failure is hard to measure (2016, p. xiv).  
 
This chapter defines the universe of things within and produced by the Catalogue so that 
we can better understand how they inter-relate in later chapters. This, and subsequent chapters, in 
no way try to oversimplify or overindulge in the “thingness” and “fixity” of the documentary 
concepts I introduce and discuss. This narrative embraces documentary contingency, for science 
is nothing if not the generative accumulation of knowledge based on systematic testing, 
falsification, and verification. There is no reason to expect the totality of our documents to be 
any more static than the practices that produced them.  
                                                
27 I use the plural form of checklist and taxonomy to emphasize that many versions of these entities are created 
iteratively over time as the Catalogue is refined and edited.  
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Part I: Tracing Units: Information, Data, to Documents in Database Environments 
Information to data. 
 The first order of business here is to address how the literature within Information Studies 
defines the fundamental unit of  “information” within information environments, and how such 
concepts might be differentiated from data, documents, and knowledge as they are circulating 
within the taxonomies and database environments of the Catalogue. As we will see, 
“information” as a concept is defined in many different ways and takes on many definitions, 
ranging from a rudimentary, undifferentiated notion of information, to well-formed, meaningful 
informational units. Using the development of information as a concept as an analytic frame, we 
can then broaden this discussion to be more specific about how such units are functioning within 
the Catalogue specifically, as well as within the discipline of taxonomy and biodiversity in 
general as biodiversity data proceeds to biodiversity knowledge. Classification structures are 
complex in their own right, so as to avoid any ambiguities at that bird’s eye level, it makes sense 
to define what things these classification schema are recombining as they negotiate taxonomic 
arguments. Such a framing is not atypical in information and documentation studies. In the “task 
of collectivizing knowledge,” “order, marking, and selection [are] three essential steps in 
intellectual occupations,” Briet commented in regard to the techniques of modern documentation 
systems. Such actions, however, as Hope Olsen so carefully indicated in regard to the act of 
labeling and naming within classification structures (2002), gloss over the complex natures of the 
phenomenon and entities that we try our best to organize. What are the kinds of things that we 
are ordering and what do they represent intellectually in relation to their scientific context? 
As Jonathan Furner indicates, “questions such as ‘‘What is information?’’ and ‘‘What is a 
document?’’ received close attention in the 1990s in the field of Information Studies, and the 
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various suggested answers to these questions continue to be treated as candidate cornerstones of 
emergent theoretical frameworks in the field” (2004a, p. 234) (See also: (Bates, 1999, 2006, 
2009; Buckland, 1991; Capurro & Hjørland, 2003; Floridi, 2010, 2011). These questions are 
central to examinations of information systems, especially since the goal of any classification 
system (and certainly within biodiversity taxonomic systems) is to properly locate and describe 
objects for recall, retrieval and use. Certainly, Information Studies is not alone in using 
information as a core element of analysis. Furner usefully examines the treatment of the term in 
disciplines outside of Information Studies, including linguistics, computer science, mathematics, 
and media studies (2014)—and though these domains will remain tangential to my argument and 
will not be covered in any depth here, it is worthwhile to indicate that other traditions exist in 
parallel to this discussion. Readers should be aware that “information,” as I use it for the duration 
of this piece, has a particular literature and pedigree that is disciplinarily specific to I/S. And 
while the topic of this chapter has as its focus the concept of the document, understanding how 
this concept overlaps, informs and becomes clouded by the similar and related concepts of data, 
evidence, and records within the information disciplines can perhaps avoid some confusion. 
Below I will progressively relate how these concepts can be tied together usefully to situate and 
set the foundation for our discussion of biodiversity concepts.  
In Michael Buckland’s often-cited essay, “Information As Thing” (1991), he provides a 
tripartite structure for the “principle uses” of information that are generally of note in the field of 
Information Studies. The first, information-as-process, is the usage that describes the active 
process of “informing” as part of the process of communication (information-as-verb); the 
second, information-as-knowledge, are those facts, subjects, or events that constitute the 
“message” (Furner, 2004b, p. 439) of communication; lastly, is Buckland’s concept of 
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information-as-thing, which describes the objects (such as “data and documents”) that have the 
potential to transfer information-as-knowledge, as well as facilitate the events of information-as-
process (1991, p. 351). Jonathan Furner expands this material version of information to also 
“designate symbols, signs, or signals, i.e., noises or marks (or even aromas or flavors) that are 
interpreted in some way by the hearer or viewer (or smeller or taster)”—according to Furner, 
“utterance,” “data,” “signal,” and “document” are more or less functionally equivalent” (2004b, 
p. 439).  
These distinctions made by Buckland (and Furner) are crucial when considering 
biodiversity databases (and, I would argue, databases in general) because information in these 
spaces can (and will) inhabit the quality of being a process, a kind of knowledge, and a token-
bearing thing that moves around in a material space. As will be discussed in great detail from this 
point forward, at any given moment, a core concept such as a species, inhabits each of these 
information states at different times—potentially simultaneously—depending on what kind of 
action is being placed upon it, as well as what system-based activities it is engaged with at any 
given moment. A species (represented semantically by a name) within a database informs a 
receiver about a host of descriptive and identifying information and material evidence that 
defines its boundaries; the name also represents a series of professional standards and bodies of 
evidence that render this knowledge available to scientists as verified, public information; and 
finally, the name is also a thing—a token—that must be formed in such a way that it can travel in 
computational and technical systems. The complexity displayed by the different states 
information can embody has significant implications in terms of how the Catalogue system is 
designed to control these various aspects. Thus, these categories can help deconstruct and situate 
the purposes of biodiversity concepts (as information units) within the database environment. 
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In Figure 6, Jonathan Furner supplies a possible schematic—adapted from Luciano 
Floridi’s map of information concepts (2010)—through which we can identify a hierarchy and 
progression for types of information. 
 
 
Figure 6. What is Information? Source: Jonathan Furner (2013b) 
 
This graphic model of information will be crucial in our discussion, as it will help us explicate 
how biodiversity information and data are transformed iteratively through these stages, and most 
importantly, validated, as it travels through the iLife documentation and information sharing 
processes and workflows. This taxonomy of concepts begins at the level of phenomena—
processes (natural or otherwise) that occur, can be observed, and can be recognized, recorded, 
inscribed, or documented in some material form as evidence of (or part of) that phenomena.28 In 
the biodiversity sciences, the phenomena of interest are ecologies, species, and, most broadly, the 
natural world. The goal of biodiversity taxonomists is (among other things) to locate, examine, 
                                                
28 Of course, the tools, mechanisms, and methods used to record and document phenomena are designed with 
epistemological stances that influence the contours of whatever data is eventually recorded. In other words, recorded 
data is never objective data (Gitelman, 2013); it is always selected and manipulated for inclusion into the system of 
disciplinary discourse that validate its need for collection. For a nice discussion of how tools, mechanisms and 
models shape the subjects and objects of discourse see Lorraine J. Daston and Peter Galison’s, Objectivity (2007). 
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and define taxa, and delineate their classificatory position in relation to a range of other taxon 
concepts, as they exist undifferentiated in an integrated natural world.  
Beginning at the second level of Furner’s schematic, then, Data (Information 1) lies at the 
highest level of extracted information from phenomena. As defined by Marcia Bates, 
Information 1 is “the pattern of organization of matter and energy” (Bates, 2006, p. 1033)—the 
ways in which phenomenon create “arrangements that [are] not pure chaos or organization” 
(2006, pp. 1034–1035). Information here can be seen as a network of connections that, together, 
constitute the informational area of interest, bounded and extracted from the whole of the 
phenomena witnessed. Bates’s scientific approach to information is particularly inclusive, 
including “physical, biological, perceptual, and cognitive” (Bates, 2006, p. 1035) patterns, both 
perceptible and not perceptible, by a human being. Information at this level is merely identified 
and potentially useful, not yet semantically meaningful in that it does not (necessarily) conform 
to any particular system of discourse (and thus is not yet constrained and formulated to enter any 
structured biodiversity database, let alone a taxonomic schema). One can identify a potential 
species in the natural world, but in order to use this species concept in practice, it must be 
described, given a name, and connected with other similar formulations, to make sense within 
scientific and taxonomic discourse. This concept of information roughly corresponds to Luciano 
Floridi’s first component of the General Definition of Information (GDI): that all semantic 
information is “comprised” of datum from a general pool of pattered information (2011, p. 84). 
Well-formed data—the next level down in Furner’s schematic—is the first point in which 
information, as a differentiated object (Floridi, 2004, p. 42), is situated within codes that a) 
follow the syntactical rules of a system (Floridi, 2011, p. 84), and, most importantly for our 
purposes, b) are amenable for entry into designed biodiversity schema. Being well-formed 
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“means that the data are clustered together following the rules that govern the system, code, or 
language being analyzed” (2011, p. 84). In the Catalogue’s realm and the biodiversity world, 
which deals with species and their organization, this means that our potential species has been 
designated by a potential scientific name and that name can now enter the realm of scientific 
communication (in databases or otherwise). As Bates articulates, if data is not well-formed, then 
it cannot be set apart within the pattern of organization. 
Moving downward on the schematic, semantic data (well-formed and meaningful 
information), according to Floridi, means that “data must comply with the meanings of the 
chosen system, code, or language in question” (my emphasis) (2011, p. 84). In Bates’ terms, 
“Information 2” is strikingly familiar to Floridi’s definition, where she indicates that meaningful 
data is data with “some pattern of organization matter and energy given meaning by a living 
being” (2006, p. 1036).29 Without semantic or meaningful data, communication fails (assuming 
one of the primary goals of information is to inform in some sensible way). In the biodiversity 
realm, semantically-meaningful data is species nomenclature (and related data) that is validated 
and proven to follow the rules of codification, in addition to following the norms format of a 
scientific name. Names, and the species concepts they represent, in order to circulate effectively, 
                                                
29 A further note on the difference between Floridi and Bates’s notion of semantic data is in order here. Floridi’s 
system of information emphasizes a human user as the primary mechanism by which we can understand whether or 
not “data” is meaningful, truthful, and ultimately, useful. Bates, on the other hand, does not presuppose a human 
user (recall that Bates’s pattern of organization does not, necessarily, have to be perceptible). The Catalogue of Life 
occupies an interesting space between these two approaches to information: it must balance the social mechanisms 
set in place to label and order non-human, natural patters of the natural world, but also try its best to maintain a 
certain adherence to the original order of the taxonomies it ingests to create its management hierarchy. As we will 
see in chapter four, the Catalogue of Life is a system designed to facilitate communication and transfer data, which 
means it is always primarily focused on a potential user as part of its epistemological approach to the kinds of 
knowledge it purports to construct. In comparison, scientific taxonomies that are focused on a scientific argument 
are produced to try to argue a certain ontological and classificatory structure about the natural world. Of course, 
even hypothesis-based taxonomies are intended to communicate a certain position to others, but it seems to me, and 
as I will argue, that the description of nature takes precedence in these systems over the retrieval of that information 
for easy use (as in the Catalogue). All of this said, however, all classifications are mediations and intend to 
communicate information, so all artificial classifications presuppose a user to some extent—even if that user is only 
the creator of the taxonomy.  
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must be confirmed as being described according to particular nomenclatural codes and 
established materially using appropriate type specimens.  
Finally, the last level articulated in Furner’s schematic is truthful data, which is the final 
necessary component of semantic information. “Data that are incorrect (somehow vitiated by 
errors or inconsistencies), imprecise (understanding precision as a measure of the repeatability of 
the collected data), or inaccurate (accuracy refers to how close the average data value is to the 
‘truth value) are still data…but if they are not truthful, they can only constitute misinformation” 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 104). Within the biodiversity realm, only names and identification attributes 
that are valid and accepted are true in the sense that they gain authority and are confirmed 
(scientifically) to represent a particular species concept, and can be considered known-to-
science. Biological specialists and taxonomists spend a great deal of time filtering through 
scientific names: they must assess the valid name forms within nomenclators, assess their 
adherence to codes, and compare multiple duplicate name forms to assess which one is the most 
accurate and correct.30 
 One concept necessary for this discussion that Furner’s schematic omits is knowledge, 
which in Floridi’s original schematic (2010, p. 20), constitutes the next level downward from 
factual and “truthful information” (“truthful data” in Furner’s terminology). Floridi explains that, 
Knowledge encapsulates truth because it encapsulates semantic information, which, in turn, encapsulates 
truth. Knowledge and information are members of the conceptual family. What the former enjoys and the 
latter lacks, over and above their family resemblance, is the web of mutual relations that allow one part of it 
to account for another. Shatter that, and you are left with a pile of truths or a random list of bits of 
information that cannot help to make sense of the reality they seek to address” (2010, p. 51).  
 
One point of departure from Floridi, however, is that what constitutes “knowledge” at any given 
point in the scientific community is subject to consensus-based mechanisms (Broadfield, 1946, 
                                                
30 “Truth” is a tricky word to use in this context, for it is always dangerous to claim that any representational 
structure is truthful. Truthful in this context should be taken to mean that a species concept is “known to science” in 
the sense that it has been formed in ways that conform to nomenclatural codes. Any proposed, “correct,” name for a 
species concept is tentative and subject to reevaluation.   
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Chapter 4). Scientific knowledge is constructed by scientific communities, it is not self-evident 
merely because it emerges from a web of what has been deemed “truthful” units of information. 
For the Catalogue, this is a key component of what makes it a functioning resource for the 
biodiversity community as a repository of knowledge. The Catalogue conveys informational 
units that function as both a series of species concepts, traced as they are to their synonyms and 
variants, and a mapping of concepts situated within taxonomic schema that both constitute 
“integrated” (Bates, 2006, p. 21) knowledge domains that form a conceptual and cohesive unit of 
delivery. The Catalogue’s authority within the scientific community depends on validated, 
truthful species concepts at its core (in the Floridian sense that they are accepted as facts by the 
scientific community—that they are species terms that hold purchase). Without this supposition 
of truth, the reliability of the Catalogue would diminish within the professional community. The 
process by which nomenclators are compiled and verified (the subject of the next chapter), and 
then subsequently matched with species concepts, is seen as the creation and articulation of 
“knowledge” filtered from undifferentiated nomenclatural spaces. But these interpretations 
change over time, and the Catalogue must account for this change. The Catalogue is about the 
maintenance and verification of emergent and shifting knowledge interpretations (dynamic and 
contingent), and as later chapters will discuss, mapping this knowledge over time is no easy task. 
The Catalogue, then, is not only a “data”-base, but is also a system that must balance various 
“theoretical constructions” (“schema, n.,” 2016), into a fully conceptualized knowledge schema.  
Data to document. 
Shifting our attention away from information and knowledge for a moment, I now want 
to chart the relationship between data and documents as articulated in literature. We are, after all, 
dealing with the Catalogue of Life—a database that organizes various kinds of documents. As 
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was previously mentioned, documents form the core concept that I will use in this manuscript to 
describe the fundamental units within the database environment. This is primarily because 
document theory emphasizes the evidentiary value of information, and perhaps more 
importantly, that a document is, according to Michael Buckland, not “a set of known facts … but 
that it has propositional content” (Furner, 2016a, p. 300) that attempts to make evident some 
concept (for example, a species or a set of relationships between species). In order for taxon 
concepts within biodiversity science and taxonomy to be credible, they must be articulated and 
circumscribed though a network of evidentiary documents that form the basis of their concept or 
taxonomic hypothesis.  Further, ‘document’ studies has engaged far more with the museum 
specimens and biological objects (Otlet & Rayward, 1990, p. 197) that form the foundation of 
biodiversity work.  
Running parallel to Floridi and Bates’s theoretical discussions of information and (at least 
in Floridi’s case) data, then, are discussions regarding the distinction between data and 
documents. David Blair’s “The Data-Document Distinction” (1984) is one such text that takes a 
system-based, information retrieval view of data and documents that is articulated quite apart 
from the documentalist discourses that find their origin in European writers such as Paul Otlet 
and Suzanne Briet.31 Blair’s general differentiation between the two entities is that documents, 
on the whole, are those entities that are most useful to information seekers to make informed 
decisions (in that documents are what information retrieval systems are intended to return as part 
of a query), and that data collectively make-up the whole of the document: “Much information 
germane to decision-making is not data, but contained in documents. Documents often contain 
                                                
31 Blair’s “The Data-Document Distinction Revisited” (2006) article was released the 2006, the same year Ronald 
Day published his highly-influential English translation of Suzanne Briet’s, What is Documentation? (1951/2006), 
thus the surge of interest in documentation after Day’s publication may be one reason this area was not alluded to. 
Another reason may simply be that Blair comes from an information retrieval background and posits a more system- 
and technologically-based point of view of documentation. In either case, Blair’s discussion is useful to mention. 
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data, of course, but it is data that has been selected, interpreted and presented for use—it is data 
in context” (2006, p. 78). Blair (1984) provides four distinctions that illustrate differences in the 
qualities of data and documents insofar as they influence the systemic retrieval of information 
from search systems; they include, 
1. Data retrieval queries are specific, while document queries are “indirect and ambiguous”; 
2. For data there is a “necessary relation between a formal query and the representation of a 
satisfactory answer,” while for documents, “there is a probabilistic relation between a formal 
query and the representation”; 
3. The “criterion for success” is data retrieval is correctness, while for documents it is “utility”; 
4. Query speed for data depends “on the time of physical access,” while for documents it is 
“dependent on the number of logical decisions the searcher must make in the course of her search” 
(2006, pp. 79–81). 
 
In 2006, Blair revisits these distinctions and identifies eight more that only serve to blur 
the difference between the data and document retrieval models. While the differences between 
data and documents often rest on the specificity, exactness, and scalability of the former (and the 
ambiguity, indeterminacy, and broad search space of the latter), unlike the conclusion drawn in 
his 1984 article, in this expanded view, “it becomes apparent that in spite of the numerous 
differences that we can identify between data and document retrieval, most of these differences 
stem from a common problem: the indeterminacy of language. Data retrieval and document 
retrieval do not occupy mutually exclusive classes of information systems, but, instead, are two 
extremes on a spectrum of representational indeterminacy” (2006, p. 78). For all of the work that 
Blair invests in differentiating “data” from “document” in system spaces, the end result is that, as 
data and document systems grew in prominence and occurrence, their differences became less 
significant functionally. 
Useful as Blair’s examination is, he does little to demarcate a clear distinction between 
data and documents. Jonathan Furner’s (2016a) historical analysis of data articulates how the 
concept of data relates to the similarly-fundamental concept of document within information 
studies discourse—and provides a useful, definitive statement about how they are related. In this 
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piece, Furner concludes that, unlike the prevailing assumption that “all documents are in some 
sense made of up data” (2016a, p. 288), documents are, in fact, the “primary concept,” and “a 
dataset is made up of documents; and the dataset is a species of document” (2016a, pp. 289, 
303). In order to articulate this assessment, Furner exhaustively examines the conceptualization 
of data by examining its use historically, beginning with classical Latin from the period 100 BCE 
to 20 CE; tracing its evolution through the more familiar usage of data as evidence (ca. 1648-); to 
an informational interpretation, which includes the rise of tabularized data that represents 
“content … about a referent”32 within the social sciences (ca. 1630-); and, finally, the 
“computational interpretation” of data as bits (ca. 1980-) (2016a, pp. 290–299). Furner then lays 
out a logical argument illustrating how one can think about the relationship between text, data, 
and document, merging “an information interpretation of ‘data,’ an information interpretation of 
‘document,’ and a subjectivist interpretation of ‘information’ (as meaning)” (2016a, p. 303). The 
end result is that the computational approach to data (data as bits) is less preferred than the 
information interpretation where data, among other issues, is inclusive of multiple formats, 
substances, and kinds.  
Though an obvious statement at this point in database management, within the discourse 
of biodiversity databases, it should be noted that “data” are nearly universally understood to be 
of the “informational” type of data, encompassing a variety of different types of objects outside 
of the numeric form indicative of “computational” data in Furner’s schema (2016a, p. 298). As 
will be expanded upon at a later point, data in the biodiversity world includes two- and three-
dimensional images, video, alphanumeric values, type specimens, journal articles, genetic 
samples, etc. Though, even while data are conceptualized as inclusive of multiple forms in 
                                                
32 For a rather exhaustive examination of the use of data in observational scientific activities not otherwise 
mentioned in Furner’s examination, one can look to Loraine Daston and Elizabeth Lunbeck’s edited monograph, 
Histories of Scientific Observation (2011).  
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museum and biodiversity practice, much of the networked infrastructure that supports this work 
is incapable of more complex data sets, particularly video and three-dimensional data (both due 
to the memory required to store these instances and third-party software requirements to display 
these assets). For example, as we saw in chapter one, the media asset management system 
currently in use at the Natural History Museum, London—Open Text Media Manager (known 
internally as MAM)—does not have the capability to store video or 3-D files. As Matthew 
Woodburn, Science Data Architect for the Natural History Museum's Digital Collections 
Programme, indicated, “we either have to wait for that capability to be put in place or we need to 
look for a workaround if it's not going to happen. There are [many] kinds of difficulties on the 3-
D side of it. Is 3-D an image or is it a dataset? Because effectively it's all bits and bytes but it 
tends to be ... visualized by a particular piece of software ... We can publish it as a dataset, which 
is not a problem ... then it would be up to them to find a visualization service” (2016). In more 
than one conversation with museum specialists, such a distinction was made between ‘data that 
can be used in any particular database’ and that data ‘that was unable to be properly ingested into 
the digitization and digital management program.’ As such, what constitutes data within an 
institutional setting at a pragmatic level is often dictated by what formats and types of data any 
particular system has the ability to accept and integrate.  
Document to database-document. 
Now that we’ve made our way from information to documents, we next need to expand 
on the notion of documentation a bit to understand how they constitute modes of evidence—a 
concept central to the practice of biodiversity taxonomy. I also want to address how it is that the 
Catalogue, evidence as it is for a variety of organizational, professional, and disciplinary 
functions, is a type of document in-and-of itself. This latter notion is important, since, as a 
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documentary entity, the Catalogue produces other documents—these other documents, and their 
relationship to the dynamic Catalogue database, will be the focus of Part Two of this chapter.  
In her influential text, What is Documentation? (Briet, 1951/2006), Susan Briet begins 
her exposition asking a fundamental question: how do we define a document? Briet offers the 
following definition: “any concrete or symbolic indexical sign [indice] preserved or recorded 
toward the end of representing, of reconstituting, or of proving a physical or intellectual 
phenomenon” (1951, p. 10). This is not a trivial issue when considering biodiversity databases, 
particularly because the core functions of a database in these terms is to represent intellectual 
concepts (species/taxon) with some high degree of effectiveness via nomenclatural tokens, in 
addition to reconstituting (digitally) the intellectual evidence that gives these concepts credibility 
within scientific discourse. In Briet’s terms, a document is a physical entity (definable, finite), 
one that, as Ronald Day states, acts as “evidence—of things or larger grouping of things” 
(1951/2006, p. 48). Paul Otlet also reiterated the physical nature of documents, indicating that 
numerous objects have the potential to constitute documentary entities, including, “museums and 
cabinets, collections of models, specimens and samples” (1990, p. 197). Briet’s famous antelope 
exemplifies this fact as well. Materiality plays a key role for documents here, in that these 
sources of evidence are representational and semiotic objects that can subsequently be “placed in 
a cage,” “stuffed and preserved,” or have “its voice recorded on disk” (1951, p. 10). The unit of 
analysis is generally clearly defined in these circumstances: we know what we are talking about 
when we talk about an antelope—it is a specimen in a zoo, a physical photograph, an article 
about the antelope.  
The material examples used in these instances, however, may give the impression that 
documents are only physical things. Documents are also situated artifacts that are associated 
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with, and constitutive of, the social and organizational contexts that give them credibility. Briet’s 
antelope, for example, is only an evidentiary specimen because it is displayed in a museum. As 
Ronald Day points out,  
Otlet’s understanding of documentation was expressed through his trope of “the book,” which Otlet 
variously referred to as the book (le livre), the book-document (le livre-document), the document, and 
generically as “le Biblion.” Otlet’s trope of the book referred to both the physical object of the book and, 
even more importantly, to a cultural concept of the book as a unifying form for positive knowledge. 
Inasmuch as this concept not only embodies the physical object of the book but also is reflective of social 
and natural “facts,” it represented for Otlet a concrete embodiment of the history of true knowledge and is 
thus a vehicle to global understanding (2008, p. 10). 
 
The use of the word “document” here is a term that is inclusive of, not only physical objects like 
antelope or books, but also more abstract informational entities that together make a document 
informative as part of a discursive network of other objects, ideas, and norms. This notion of the 
document as a site for cultural, informational, and material synthesis, allowed for a 
conceptualization of documents far beyond the material bounds of any one object. If 
documentation could be conceived as a network of associations, then the informational units 
could be culled from them and rearranged in multiple combinatory ways to formulate new, 
emergent knowledge sets. As Day states, “Nor is Otlet’s notion of the book antiquated by today’s 
hypertext: it was that of a whole with multiple, interconnected parts, a forerunner of hypertextual 
linking following what Otlet termed the ‘monographic principle’ (that is, ‘atomic’ chunks of 
text)” (2008, p. 11). Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine’s, Mundaneum—a space in which all the 
world documentary knowledge could be collected and consulted (Rayward, La Fontaine, & 
Otlet, 2010; Wright, 2014)—is premised on the very fact that “facts” could be culled from 
documents, rearranged and reorganized to produce a networked repository of global 
knowledge.33 Numerous scholars, including Alex Wright, have rightfully pointed to the fact that 
the Mundaneum, along with other card catalogue-esque technologies, are the direct ancestors of 
                                                
33 Refer also to Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine’s, International Federation for Information and Documentation, 
(Rayward, 1997). 
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database systems (2014, p. 33). Scott Dewey also notes how “Otlet and the [International 
Institute for Bibliography (IIB)/International Federation for Documentation (FID)] developed 
precursor techniques and strategies for addressing core problems and challenges of the modern 
information society in various areas, including systems and organizational arrangements, 
databases and collections, image databases, database management…” (2014, p. 4). Otlet’s 
conceptualization of documents both as things and facts allowed for the recombination of 
documentation in databases-like forms. 
Following this thread, Matthew Hull notes, “It is unclear if databases, for example, are 
documents, but they are certainly forms of documentation that demand greater attention in the 
anthropological investigation of bureaucracy” (M. S. Hull, 2012, p. 261).  Geoffrey Bowker, in 
his text Memory Practice in the Sciences, asserts that databases contain the root elements of a 
narrative that are vital to understanding the development and constitution of social and scientific 
practices (2008). By producing a narrative of social practices, databases are a form of 
documentation. Much as a paper document—or an antelope—is an artifact representing some 
other state of affairs, so too is a database representative of a social process as it occurred in the 
past. Richard Smiraglia, in “Further Reflections on the Nature of a ‘Work,’” notes, “we speak of 
a documentary entity…when we wish to speak of a document that has been collected for the 
purposes of information storage…documents record raw data” (2002).  Returning to Buckland’s, 
“What is a Digital Document,” he states, “for practical purposes, people develop pragmatic 
definitions, such as ‘anything that can be given a file name and stored on electronic media’ or ‘a 
collection of data plus properties of that data that a user chooses to refer to as a logical unit’ 
(1998). Documents represent things, just as databases do, but they also act as a “vehicle of 
meaning: in other words, the object effectively serves some purpose” (Buckland, 1998). 
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Databases also model, in a functional and pragmatic way, the enumeration and distribution of 
physical, bona fide, species groups so that certain kinds of actions (conservation, policy, 
taxonomic, etc.) can be employed. Though Buckland indicates that a final definition of a ‘digital 
document’ will continue to “remain elusive,” for the purposes of this study, given this literature, 
I will assume a database to be a digital document, given the fact that it is a collection of 
contextualized data that documents social activities; is locatable in some defined, database 
(material) form; and represents a fragmented “information object” like those defined by Otlet’s 
(Day, 2008, p. 10). 
Continuing with Buckland, “if ‘documentation’ (a term that included information storage 
and retrieval systems) is what you do to or with documents, how far can could you push the 
meaning of ‘document’ and what were the limits to documentation?” (Buckland, 1997, p. 804). 
The distinction here between documentation—“tools for intellectual work” in the Briet-ian sense 
(Briet, 1951/2006, p. 14)—and the document itself—the evidence meant to be organized— 
merits more examination, especially if we are to understand biodiversity databases as, 
themselves, a kind of emergent document that, as part of their essential functions, wildly 
fluctuate in composition as new GSDs are added and redacted; and as changing taxonomic 
opinions are offered over time. Databases are not merely a mode for “systematic access to 
written texts” (Buckland, 1997, p. 805); the physical limits and boundaries of database systems 
are dynamic and permeable in a number of senses. This separation of the machine of 
documentation (the structural methods by which we organize subsidiary documents; the 
database), and the collection and organization of evidence (species concepts and names) within 
these systems is a useful distinction, and certainly acknowledged in biodiversity taxonomic 
circles. Vincent Smith of the Natural History Museum, London, states, “There's the conceptual 
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aspect to this [taxonomic work] and then the technical implementations, which often try to 
approximate ideals with practicalities. It's particularly complicated because often we are trying to 
model concepts, and those concepts are slippery and … difficult to precisely define, and 
therefore depending on how perfect our information is, it is going to dictate how much [and] 
what you can do with that data” (2016). One cannot speak of biodiversity taxonomic work 
without acknowledging the inherent tensions between the document-system and the document-
representations (the data) themselves.   
As Buckland has indicated, “definitions based on form, format and medium appear to be 
less satisfactory than a functional approach, following the path of reasoning underlying the 
largely forgotten discussions of Otlet's objects and Briet's antelope” (1998). Such difficulties in 
articulating a clear and concise definition for a digital document arise in the digital and database 
world, at least in part, from the fact that databases such as the Catalogue of Life are, by design, 
never complete. Things that “don’t have easy boundaries are of indeterminate theoretic status” 
(2008, p. 144) and difficult to classify, as Geoffrey Bowker has commented. Digital and 
networked environments force us to re-conceptualize what it means to classify a document-as-
entity; they force us to understand that documents are more than just physical formulations, but 
also encompass a range of community practices, intellectual concepts, and professional 
guidelines that serve as boundaries in their own right. And most importantly, a key aspect of 
database documents is that they are often defined by their instability and contingency. 
Historically, it is not only the digital environment that prompts us to re-address and broaden the 
production, function, and definition of “document.” Similar theoretical interrogations have 
occurred within bibliographic and archival spaces as well, domains that have critiqued the 
traditional object-centric approach to notions of the ‘the text’ and ‘record.’  
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Contingent Documentary Stability: Bibliography, Relevance, Records 
  
All documents are fragments. Let’s begin with that premise. Excerpts. All works are partial, almost in 
inverse proportion to their appearance of completeness … I don’t see a simple, positive material fact when 
I look at a document, I see fields of shifting relations momentarily stabilized in an artifact that exists in a 
continuum of temporal and spatial and quantum dimensions, only constituted through the framing acts of 
intervention.  
—Johanna Drucker 
What Is? Nine Epistemological Essays (2013, pp. 48, 58) 
 
The discussions surrounding the non-linear, indefinite, and combinatory spatial qualities 
of the database environment have strong analogues in the domain of bibliographic studies, where 
the boundaries of the documentary and textual entities have, for some time, been questioned. As 
evidenced by Johanna Drucker’s quote above, texts are constantly shifting along temporal and 
spatial lines. Drucker’s (2013) use of Kiernan’s study (Kiernan, 1998) of the Boethius 
manuscript illustrates this concept nicely: wrecked by fire, textual emendations, and additions, 
the original manuscript text (fragmentary in composition) stands in juxtaposition to the collage-
like entity that developed over the years as a transcription was pasted alongside the original. 
Fundamentally, Boethius’ “Consolation of Philosophy by Alfred the Great” manuscript prompts 
us to ask what constitutes the “text” and “document” in this space of continually emendation and 
addition? As Drucker tells us, they “are never the same as each other” (2013). The relationship 
between this circumstance and the ever-evolving database as a textual object are striking. Even 
as versions of the Catalogue of Life are codified on an annual basis, GSD’s are constantly being 
reevaluated, added, and redacted throughout the years intervening these editions. 
This problemetization of the text stands in contrast to traditional bibliographic 
approaches, such as those espoused by Fredson Bowers, where the notion of the “ideal copy” (an 
“ideally perfect copy” (1994, p. 113) of a text upon which variations and errors produced by 
production methods can be identified and documented) is at the core of how we understand 
descriptive bibliographic practices. As Thomas Tanselle reiterates, “the ideal copy” is central to 
   71 
descriptive bibliography, because it is the element that distinguishes bibliographic description 
from cataloguing: whereas a catalogue entry, regardless of its level of detail, exists to record a 
particular copy, a bibliographic description aims to provide a standard against which individual 
copies can be measured” (1980). Ideality presupposes a printer’s intended perfect instance of a 
book/text upon which all deviations can be measured. The “ideal copy” as a concept, however, 
falls somewhat short in the realm of biodiversity database-documents. There is no cohesive 
instantiation (ideational or otherwise) upon which any given version of the Catalogue can be 
compared against. The “problem of ideality” as articulated by Bowers has certainly been 
critiqued: 
Even if 'ideal copy' is simply the generic term for a group of objects, there remains an ambiguity: it is either 
the intellectual ideal (what the printer had in mind) that is imperfectly realized in any particular object 
(Platonic ideal); or it is merely a nomen, a generic term covering a group of objects: the name can then 
refer to all products of a press edition and, furthermore, to all as yet undiscovered products of that press-run 
(Dane, 1995, p. 40) 
 
The same kinds of ambiguities identified by Dane apply in our biodiversity database spaces as 
well: if there is an intellectual ideal in the Catalogue’s case, that ideal is no more specific than 
“the names of all [potential] species set in the context of a taxonomic hierarchy and of their 
distribution” (Species 2000, 2015b). There is no ideal object, only the conceptual aim of 
completion, which cannot be quantified in any stable manner. The standards used to identify and 
articulate an ideal copy must be an already-present set of graphical and/or textual conditions that 
act as a ground by which we can assess modes of difference. As Jerome McGann noted in 
Radiant Textuality: Literature After the World Wide Web (2001), 
The exigencies of the book form forced editorial scholars to develop fixed points of relation — the 
"definitive text", "copy text", "ideal text", "Ur text", "standard text", and so forth — in order to conduct a 
book-bound navigation (by coded forms) through large bodies of documentary materials. Such fixed points 
no longer have to govern the ordering of the documents. As with the nodes on the Internet, every 
documentary moment in the hypertext is absolute with respect to the archive as a whole, or with respect to 
any subarchive that may have been (arbitrarily) defined within the archive. In this sense, computerized 
environments have established the new "Rationale of HyperText” (2001, pp. 73–74). 
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Unlike McGann’s Rossetti Archive, which he makes a point of saying is “anything but 
decentered” (2001, p. 74), the Catalogue’s database environment is, indeed, decentered and 
dynamic in both presentation (as in what and how concepts are presented as the database morphs 
over time) and in content fluidity (the “text,” at any given point, has no ideal cumulative 
“textspace” (McGann, 2001, p. 149) on which to base any sense of a “center”).  
Building on this idea of decentered presentations of narrative, numerous alternate forms 
of sign interpretation can be found in indigenous and New World cultures that collectively 
exemplify a similar reconceptualization of unbounded document forms. Recent writings on these 
‘bibliographical alterities,’ most prominently by Johanna Drucker (2014), help us articulate how 
a “non-object” centered interpretation of ‘documents’ existed far before the advent of digital 
technologies. Drucker likens the conditionality and “co-dependencies” of electronic documents 
to the performative and “distributed character of landscape signs, wampum performance, and 
quipu knowledge” systems as encountered in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century “contact 
zones” (2014, p. 21). In these systems, the conceptualization of the document cannot begin by 
assuming “the existence of a book as an object, a priori” (Drucker, 2014, p. 16), but rather the 
articulation of what constitutes a document is an interaction between social conditions, 
interpretive acts, and whatever form the inscription might take and the communication process 
might entail.  David M. Levy asks, “What are documents?” to which he answers, “they are, quite 
simply, talking things” (2011, p. 21). But as Drucker makes quite clear, what can ‘speak’ moves 
far beyond the “clay, stone, animal skin, plant fiber, and sand” that Levy provides as possible 
vehicles for communication (2011, p. 23). Meaning, reading, and comprehension within a 
documentary environment is a constitutive process and performative act between a document and 
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receiver, occurring within a broader “knowledge ecology” (Drucker, 2014, p. 22) that is defined 
by a document’s use and function at a given point in time.  
There is also a sense in which the concept of “relevance” within the sub-discipline of 
information retrieval is applicable when thinking about document conditionality as well. 
Documents within a given system will not (necessarily) hold the same significance to any given 
information seekers at hand. The usefulness of any text, document, fragment, or set of 
documents, is contingent on a certain set of needs. W.S. Cooper (1971) lays the foundation for 
this concept drawing on logical relevance as his model, defining relevance as, “whether or not a 
piece of information is on a subject which has some topical bearing on the information need in 
question” (1971). Patrick Wilson (Wilson, 1968, Chapter 3, 1973), building on this concept, 
defined relevance as “a matter of evidential or argumentative status; that which adds to the 
weight of the evidence for or against an hypothesis is more or less relevant, as it adds more or 
less weight; that which adds no weight on either side is irrelevant” (Wilson, 1968, p. 44). If, as 
Briet indicates, documents are entities or objects that provide evidence for the existence of some 
thing or phenomena, relevance helps us understand that “evidence” is contingent upon 
situationally-specific circumstances and a “particular individual’s situation—but to the situation 
as he sees it, not as others see it or as it ‘really’ is” (Wilson, 1973, p. 460).  
Of course, notable studies have pushed even these claims of logical relevancy and 
contingency to their limits by embracing a “cognitive paradigm” of documentary retrieval (Allen 
& Ellis, 2000; Cronin, 2008; Ellis, 1992)—what Wilson had previously defined as 
“psychological relevance” (Wilson, 1973, p. 458). Such cognitive approaches to information 
retrieval “sought to develop an understanding of the user’s mental models and knowledge states 
with a view to constructing more effective retrieval systems, stressing agency contexts and tasks 
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as much as recall-precision ratios and other quantifiable performance measures” (Cronin, 2008, 
p. 469). Thus, documents are not only contingent in the sense that they can be seen as distributed 
decentered phenomena, but also in that they can be contingent on the particular (logical and 
cognitive) need these documents can and are meant to address. Documents (either as singular 
items or in sets within systems) have no universal boundaries aside from those we fabricate as 
part of our limited lived experience of them in certain professional, social, and intellectual 
conditions and contexts.  
Distributed records. 
Finally, a database can also be conceptualized as a kind of distributed record. As 
collective entities, archival records that act as “evidence of the functions and responsibilities of 
their creator” (Society of American Archivists, 2017a), are similar to the way in which databases 
can be seen as a kind of memory practice. As Geoffrey Bowker (2008) has carefully articulated, 
databases contain the root elements of a narrative that are vital to understanding the “constitution 
of social and scientific practices” (2008). Archives and records, like Bowker’s notion of 
databases, play an essential role in maintaining and articulating a “collective memory and human 
identity” (Schwartz & Cook, 2002, p. 2; Taylor, 1982). By producing a “catalog of traces” (2008, 
p. 9), databases are a form of documentation that “function within shared systems” processually 
created by their contingent “arrangement with other things … within infrastructural systems” 
(Gorichanaz & Latham, 2016, p. 1127). Archives concern themselves with “records and 
documents” that collectively constitute “the archive” (Schwartz & Cook, 2002, p. 5).  
The theories behind records and archives have acknowledged the de-centered and 
distributed nature of electronic records. In contradistinction to a ‘paper minded’ approach to 
archives, Terry Cook (1994) articulates the need for new modes of archival collection and 
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management given the digital “world of virtual, destabilized, [and] fleeting documents” (1994, p. 
403). Cook proposes that archivists necessarily need to “shift their emphasis from [focusing on] 
the physical ‘records’ to the conceptual ‘management’ … with redesigned recordkeeping 
systems” (1994, p. 406).34 Cook calls for a new paradigm for archival work and theory, one that 
shifts the emphasis from “the artifact (the actual record) to the creating processes behind it, and 
thus to the actions, programmes, and functions behind those processes” (p. 410). A key part of 
Cooks new paradigm—and one that has gained considerable momentum into contemporary 
archival spaces—is a postcustodial approach to the archival management.  
Postcustodial archival theory helps us understand that archivists need not physically 
acquire and centralize records in order to manage them. The supposition behind this approach is 
that it “shifts the role of the archivists from a custodian of inactive records in a centralized 
repository to the role of a manager of records that are distributed in the offices where the records 
are created and used” (Society of American Archivists, 2017b).  The purview and intellectual 
jurisdiction of the archivist no longer (necessarily) resides in centralized repositories, but instead 
“sees archivists as regulators, auditors, and ‘internal consultants, defining record keeping 
regimes and tactics’” (Henry, 1998, p. 321). The record—the evidence of, in our case, 
biodiversity’s scientific functions—can now be conceptualized as a disparate, decentered, and 
networked set of objects that, together, constitute the whole body of documentation under the 
purview of the archival profession. The South Asian American Digital Archives (SAADA) is an 
example of an organization that takes a postcustodial approach to archives.  Michelle Caswell, 
co-founder of the organization tells us that, “SAADA is stewarding digital copies of these 
records for activist organizations, and the communities they mutually serve rather than owning or 
                                                
34 See also (Bastian, 2002; Henry, 1998). 
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controlling them” (Caswell, 2014). The responsibility of the record is coordinated between 
creator and archivist, both within the community as well as within institutional boundaries. Even 
the record itself can occupy multiple social domains within this model. SAADA’s “digitization 
day” model invites community members to bring their own records and document so that they 
can be digitized, and with individual permission, those documents are then added to the SAADA 
repository (SAADA, 2016).  
Archives, then, have becomes distributed in their own right—not only in terms of how 
they understand the purview, authority, and jurisdiction of archival work, but also in terms of 
how they see the constitution of the archive itself as a set of fluctuating (digital and analog) 
documentary entities that define an ever-contingent and ever-evolving notion of archival 
boundaries.  
The lessons gained from documentation, bibliographic, and archival literatures, can help 
us conceptualize and reframe documents, not as static object-centered spaces, but as distributed 
phenomena that are continually shifting and contingent. Part two of this chapter will now 
examine how control is gained in the Catalogue’s contingent space. To do so, we will now dive 
deeply into Patrick Wilson’s entity model and see how it can be expanded to meet the needs of 
the Catalogue’s ever-evolving database environment.  
Part Two: Document Forms and Database Entities 
Up until this point, this chapter has dealt with the most basic entities within the 
documentary universe: information, data, and documents. I have also articulated an argument for 
why databases are kinds of contingent documents, evidence as they are of the formal, 
intellectual, and social processes that bring them to fruition. But while database documents may 
be contingent, this certainly does not mean that they lack any bounded material instantiations. In 
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fact, the Catalogue of Life produces a number of distinct and discreet derivative documentary 
objects. To better understand how we might think about the form of these entities within 
databases, my analysis will turn to the Catalogue directly to break down what kinds of entities 
can be located and identified. As has been discussed, Briet and Otlet’s approach to 
documentation places an emphasis on the function of the document “rather than traditional 
physical forms of documents” (Buckland, 1998). The task then becomes how the Catalogue 
functions as a document within the domain of biodiversity scientists and studies. And how does 
this functionality impose kinds of operational limits and iterative formulations to the composition 
of the Catalogue-as-document as part of practice? What is actually produced and how can we 
trace this production along the way?  
In November 2016, I was invited to participate in a meeting on the organization of 
scientific biological names at a global level in Leiden, Netherlands.35 At this “NAMES in 
November” meeting (Global Biodiversity and Information Facility, 2016b), the following 
conversation precipitated between a group of scientists discussing the implications of making 
nomenclatural data sets available before being edited (and how it may, potentially, contain 
errors),  
Participant 1: Most of the researchers consider this [database] work “in progress.” It’s never finished. This 
is part of the problem. It’s that the work is not finished. 
Participant 2: [I’m] afraid to open raw data to the public because [of our] open data approach. Somebody 
will take the data without knowing what happened in the work bench. It is eventually finished, but it 
doesn’t loop back. [The] Catalogue of Life encourages the publishing of draft systems monthly. [The] final, 
annual checklist will have a more polished presentation. 
Participant 3: [There is] a psychological element. Scientists want it to be perfect but it never will be. 
Participant 4: Users don’t see how much work [goes] into compiling the database.  
Participant 1: Because most of the custodians do it in their spare time. If you have an incomplete dataset 
you get questions and you have to spend time answering them.  
Participant 5: If you care about [the] science you don’t want to publish something that isn’t refined. [We] 
strive for perfection because we have the knowledge and want to pass it on. We feel a disservice if it is not 
finished.  
 
                                                
35 Much more will be said of this NAMES meeting in chapter three where more information about this meeting can 
be found.  
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A few important themes emerge from this brief conversation: the first is a matter of the 
Catalogue’s completeness and how that completeness might translate to a matter of quality. It is 
well understood within the taxonomic community that databases such as the Catalogue of Life 
are never complete; in fact, in over half of the interviews I conducted and meetings that I 
attended, this fact was reiterated numerous times. For the Catalogue of Life, the aim is currently 
1.8 million species, which means at 1,655,913 species total as of December 2016, they are 92% 
of the way to their projected goal (Species 2000, 2016e). Scheffers, et. al., estimate that “the 
completeness of global inventories varies greatly. Completeness ranges from approximately 97% 
for mammals, 80–90% for flowering plants, 79% for fish, 67% for amphibians, roughly 30% for 
arthropods and <4% for nematodes” (2012, p. 502). But even if, hypothetically, we were to pin 
down a definite number of species currently present on the globe, changes will occur as new 
species are formed, some are driven to extinction, and most importantly, they are reclassified 
over time given a multitude of variables, methodologies, and emergent scientific discoveries.  
 The second issue illustrated here precipitates as a solution for the first issue: how to 
establish and construct (artificially or otherwise) intermittent notions of ‘completeness’—
monthly and yearly—amid a database environment that is defined by its evolution and 
instability. To do this, publishing models have been established within the Catalogue to establish 
authoritative database versions over time. The result of these activities is that many forms of the 
Catalogue are circulating at any given moment: you have “Dynamic” monthly editions of the 
database that are iteratively posted online, as well as the Annual checklist editions that are 
published both online and in CD form. How do these documentary forms relate to one another as 
emergent documents that must be described in information terms (within catalogues and 
bibliographic/documentary systems)? All issues aside, one thing is clear in this environment: the 
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Catalogue remains The Catalogue regardless of how it fluctuates over time, both in terms of 
what content is available at any given period, as well as how it might define and express its 
taxonomic schema spatially and graphically at any given moment. Our task is to understand the 
subsidiary identities of the entities that describe this cohesive whole.  
Within Information Studies, it has always been of utmost importance within bibliographic 
descriptive circles to be able to accurately represent documentary objects in systems for retrieval. 
To reiterate, Elaine Svenonius articulates “works, editions, authors and subjects” (2009, p. 31) as 
the basic entities of the bibliographic universe, and so below we will examine the first two 
concepts she raises: works and editions. However, the overall model that I will use for this 
discussion will be borrowed from Patrick Wilson’s, Two Kinds of Power: An Essay on 
Bibliographic Control (1968). In illustrating the difference between works, texts, and exemplars, 
Patrick Wilson (1968) presents the following scenario,  
“A man writes a poem, a letter to a friend, a report on an investigation; he spends a certain amount of time 
… constructing a particular linguistic object, the piece of language … What he has done can be described 
in many ways, of which the most important ones are these: has composed or invented a work, a poem or 
letter or report; he has ordered certain words into a certain sequence and so produced a text; he has 
produced marks or inscriptions on some material that constitute an exemplar of that text” (1968, p. 6).  
 
Wilson lays out the following entities: works, texts, and exemplars in this example, and later in 
his text, adds events and objects to this schematic. I will also borrow from the Entity and Primary 
Relationship model from the Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (2009) 
recommendation to build upon Wilson’s final concept, exemplar, by expanding this notion to 
include both manifestation and items. This seems to me a useful addition to Wilson’s schematic 
given the (relatively) vague presentation of Wilson’s exemplar concept to mean both sets of 
physical texts as well as individual texts themselves. FRBR’s schematic makes a distinction 
between a manifestation as a (potential) group of items, and items as instances that arise from a 
group of manifested texts. Using these notions, I have summarized how Wilson’s concepts 
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(borrowing from FRBR) can be potentially applied to the Catalogue’s entities in Figure 7, below. 
We will begin with the notion of the work, proceed with the text concept, and then end this 
section at the exemplar and item level. 
But first a quick note: the exercise of identifying entity concepts within the Catalogue 
database is not merely for theoretical purposes (though certainly that would be enough of a 
reason to proceed with this thought experiment), there is also a practical reason for this 
assessment as well: namely that, throughout my fieldwork, it became clear to me through 
conversations with various stakeholders, that the Catalogue needs a way to understand, keep 
track of, and articulate the particular mode of data publishing specific to the Catalogue. While 
they embrace data dynamism on the one hand, fixity is incredibly important as well, especially if 
the Catalogue is going to be a citable, authoritative resource in the long term. Such fixity also 
helps apportion credit to the various functions required to build and maintain the Catalogue: 
schema conceptualization, data wrangling, editorial services, cleanup, etc. The first step to being 
fully able to describe and provide credit is to understand what functional entities are at work in 
the database space. Let this be my attempt at beginning to articulate this model. 
Work. 
It makes sense to begin at the most inclusive entity category in Figure 7, which, in Patrick 
Wilson’s universe, is the concept of the work. The work “simply is a group or family of texts, 
and that for a text to be a text of a particular work is the same thing as for it to be a member of a 
certain family. The production of a work is clearly not the writing down of all of the members of 
the family, but is rather the starting of a family, composing one or more texts that are the 
ancestors of later members of the family” (Wilson, 1968, p. 9). If we understand the Catalogue to 
be one work entity, then all of its data derivatives—instantiated in a number of forms—constitute 
its ‘family.’ A work acknowledges and embraces a certain degree of change that is inevitable 
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from successive generations of work instantiations. For a database that is constantly in flux, this 
is a powerful concept. Recall the limitation of the “ideal copy” or “ideal text,” particularly that 
each of these terms depends on trying to construct a sense of (non-existent, fabricated) stability 
that is antithetical to the Catalogue’s core functioning model (and, as we have seen, such 
concepts are perhaps antithetical to the ways in which we understand even object-centered 
approaches to texts). A complete text of the Catalogue has never existed since no species 
catalogue has ever been (and probably never will be) complete. Approaches based on imagined 
ideal material or narrative conditions for text will not suffice in the biodiversity database realm. 
A work, however, is generative and allows for variations in text over a given space and time.  
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Figure 7. Entities of Catalogue of Life. The center depicts entity types as expressed by Patrick Wilson and FRBR. 
The Work and Text entities are abstract in that they do not have any tangible or concrete form that can be seen or 
heard. Exemplars, Events, and Objects are physical and tangible. The left flow chart indicates the entity types for the 
Fixed (Annual) version of the Catalogue. The right flow chart indicates the entities for the Dynamic (Monthly) 
version of the Catalogue. The dynamic version is not archived or saved for later use, so they are temporary exemplar 
documents (indicated by dotted lines).  
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Discourse surrounding the partitioning of work entities (Svenonius, 2009, Chapter 3) in 
bibliographic descriptive circles is a more fruitful direction when attempting to conceptualize the 
Catalogue as a documentary entity. If only because it allows us to understand database-
documents as abstracted, intellectual, and administrative objects from which different texts and 
expressive objects can be produced. Svenonius admits that the “concept of the work has never 
been satisfactorily defined” (2009, p. 35). Lubetzky (1969, p. 33) understood that the work, as a 
concept, was abstracted and quite separate from the “book” itself. For Svenonius, “the set of all 
documents sharing essentially the same information” (Svenonius, 2009, p. 35) constitute a 
“work.” And, perhaps this gets us a little bit closer to the way in which the Catalogue can be 
perceived as a work-like entity.  
A fundamental question in these discussions is how one distinguishes one work from 
another, which is an especially important issue to delineate if our goal is to understand the 
“limits” (or lack thereof) of a taxonomic databases (Coyle, 2016; Le Boeuf, 2001, 2005). The 
digital environment presented by the Catalogue presents a number of challenges to traditional 
notions of bibliographic and documentary entities on top of this already-existing problem. For 
one,  
The much looser distribution channel of the Internet eliminated the packaging and any vestige of 
description that those packages contributed. Descriptive rules based on predictable, stable and named 
"sources of information" (title pages, colophons, etc.) about a resource, with a prescribed order of 
preference, were not adaptable to resources without title pages or pages, and not suitable for resources that 
existed in a state of constant change (Coyle & Hillmann, 2007). 
 
Svenonius set-theoretic approach offers the following definition for a work, which is useful: “for 
book materials (at least), a work W1 can be defined as the set of all documents that are copies of 
(equivalent to) a particular document aw (an individual document chosen as emblematic of the 
work, normally its first instance) or related to this individual by revision, update, abridgement, 
enlargement, or translation” (Svenonius, 2009, p. 37). Inklings of the “idea copy/text” lie 
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dormant in the first part of this definition (“emblematic”), but as has already ascertained, there is 
no generative Ur text from which successive editions can be usefully compared (in that each 
edition is drastically different from the former, which, in bibliographic circles, would likely 
constitute an entirely new work altogether). The second part of this definition, however, is far 
more useful in this context, for each successive database version of the Catalogue is related by 
way of revision, update, and enlargement (here enlargement can be viewed in terms of species 
number and/or the an increase in raw GSD counts). Relations are essential here: families of 
works are held together by continuities. 
Assessing how the Catalogue work versions relate formally—via commonalities—is 
certainly a good start toward defining what provides continuity from work to work. On a 
structural level, what then remains the same? Svenonius’s sense that “all documents [share 
essentially] the same information” is most pertinent here. For one, the kinds of information and 
data objects that inhabit the database space remain the same, which can act as one distinguishing 
characteristic of a biodiversity database. Standards have been implemented for the Catalogue, 
which constitute “both the core knowledge set of the Catalogue of Life and around which 
processes and protocols are designed” (Species 2000, 2014) (see Figure 8). Obligatory standard 
fields for contributing GSDs include, accepted scientific name, latest taxonomic scrutiny, 
Catalogue of Life LSID (applied by CoL Taxon Matcher software), and source database. So 
while the specific species or infraspecific taxa may change (in number, in rank, etc.) among 
different versions of the database, what does not change are the basic metadata fields that 
structure the information in ways that make it continuous and fully functional within the iLife 
ecological space.   
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Figure 8. Catalogue of Life Standard DatasetField Groups. Species 2000 has defined fourteen field groups to be the 
standard set of data (version 7, 23rd September 2014) for each species and infraspecific taxon in the Catalogue of 
Life. (Species 2000, 2016f) 
The second significant commonality connecting work iterations of the Catalogue together 
is what the Resource Description and Access (RDA) (Joint Steering Committee for Development 
of RDA et al., 2015, sec. 6.2) calls responsibility for the work. The statement of responsibility 
for a work, “[relates] to the identification and/or function of any persons, families, corporate 
bodies responsible for the creation of, or contributing to the realization of, the intellectual or 
artistic content of a resource” (2015, p. 2.4.1.1). According to RDA guidelines, if a change to the 
responsibility of the work occurs, this is ground for a new description of the title in question 
(2015, sec.6.2). In his Principles of Cataloging, Simon Lubetzky (1969) identified a number of 
work entity types for which more than one person is responsible for the content; these are: 
1. Works compiled by editor from writings or contributions by other authors 
2. Works of authorship that have no principle authorship or compiler 
3. Works of changing authorship 
4. Serials 
5. Revisions and adaptations (p. 34-45) 
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Administered by the Species 2000 Secretariat, the management of revisions, updates, and the 
enlargement of the Catalogue work are controlled by its editorial board. The Catalogue sees itself 
function under the serials model of production.36 Executive Editor for the Catalogue, Yury 
Roskov, based at the Prairie Research Institute at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
stated, 
My contribution to [aggregating names and taxa] was that we need to [approach] the selection and 
composition of the Catalogue of Life and move it as close as possible to the traditional way of scientific 
journals. It means that if you have a choice [between] different taxonomic databases that cover the same 
group, we need to have a peer review process where independent reviewers will tell us which is the best 
source (2016a). 
 
But a serials approach to defining the Catalogue as a work is just one part of the descriptive 
equation here, for this model really only applies to that portion of the database that is fixed in 
iterative volumes (either by Catalogue itself, or by a cataloger who downloads the data set in 
order to create an exemplar)—namely, the Annual version of the database document. The 
dynamic, monthly edition is another matter altogether, and far more difficult to qualify and 
describe. The monthly database set is not permanently stored on any hard drive, nor are the 
changes made between monthly editions documented in any detail. However, describing these 
serial iterations take us into the domain of exemplars and manifestation, which will be described 
below. First, a brief understanding of the Catalogue’s text is in order. 
                                                
36 The FRBR report certainly acknowledges that, in some cases, “the value for an attribute of a given instance of an 
entity [in this case the Catalogue document] may change over time (e.g., the “extent of the carrier” for a serial will 
change as new volumes are issued)” (Standing Committee of the IFLA Section on Cataloguing, 2009). FRBR 
provides mechanisms by which this change (at least within the expression of the work) can be quantified and 
described within bibliographic systems, including by describing sequencing pattern, expected frequency, and the 
expected regularity of the issues. (2009, p. 38). The Library of Congress’s “Guidelines for Coding Electronic 
Resources in Leader/06” (Library of Congress, 2007) also provides a method by which a Textual Continuing 
Resource can be described.  
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Text. 
Now that we have a sense of what makes the Catalogue function as a continuous work 
over time, what constitutes the text entity in the database space? As Wilson explains, the text is a 
“sequence of words and auxiliary symbols, is an abstract entity, like the words of which it is 
composed … The text of which [a] book contains an exemplar is no physical object, has no 
weight, no physical space” (1968, p. 7). Why this distinction? For one, it allows a text to take on 
multiple manifestations and instantiations outside of traditional print forms. A text can also be 
recited, “written, typed, printed, recorded on tape or phonograph record or sound film; a sign-
language performance might be filmed” (1968, p. 7); it may also be stored as bits, or “stored in 
one’s memory” (p. 7). Wilson’s notion of the text is similar and relatable to FRBR’s 
“expression” entity-type (Carlyle, 2006, p. 265), which is defined as a string of “specific words, 
sentences, paragraphs, etc. that result from the realization of a work in the form of a text, or the 
particular sounds, phrasing, etc., resulting from the realization of a musical work” (Standing 
Committee of the IFLA Section on Cataloguing, 2009, p. 19).  The boundaries of the text entity 
are defined, however, so as to exclude aspects of physical form, such as typeface and page 
layout, that are not integral to the intellectual or artistic realization of the work as such. 
It is the abstract nature of the text of the Catalogue of Life that allows it to inhabit the 
multiple exemplars that we will describe below. The text of the Catalogue cannot be pre-
determined, however, and as it changes over time, the “sequence of words” changes significantly 
from iteration to iteration.37 But given the fluctuating nature of the Catalogue, a question to ask is 
                                                
37 On average, taking into account the years 2000 to 2015, the Catalogue has changed approximately 16% of its 
total size annually (Species 2000, 2017d). In the year 2000, the first year the Catalogue fixed an annual version on 
its dataset, the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS) comprised approximately 50% of the dataset (Y. 
Roskov, personal communication, 2017), while in the 2016 annual version (Species 2000, 2016e), it comprised a far 
less significant 9.7%. 
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how much change can the Catalogue endure before it qualifies as having a different textual 
identity? Describing Theseus’s paradox, Jonathan Furner states,  
The problem of identity over time—diachronic identity—remains a live issue in philosophical debate. The 
paradox of the ship of Theseus might be familiar in this context. Every day that Theseus’s ship is in the 
harbor, a single plank gets replaced, until after a few years the ship is completely rebuilt: not a single 
original plank remains. Is it still the ship of Theseus? And suppose, meanwhile, the shipbuilders have been 
building a new ship out of the replaced planks? Is that the ship of Theseus? (2009, p. 6).38  
 
This paradox lends well to the Catalogue’s text if one imagines a situation in which taxa are the 
“planks” of Theseus’s ship: as GSDs are replaced over time—for whatever reason, be it because 
they provide better quality, more coverage, etc.—the source of a taxa might change, but the taxa 
itself may remain available within the nomenclatural listing and the taxonomic structure 
provided by the Catalogue. Even more, though the taxa may appear to be the same (as in that 
taxa’s name is represented in the database) different source databases may, in fact, have defined 
that species concept differently than another database (different publication sources, term 
relationships, taxonomic relationships, etc.), and thus, the knowledge constituted by these sources 
has the potential to be appreciably different.39 For example, imagine the species Ursus arctos is 
contributed by one database, but that database is replaced by another database, also containing 
Ursus arcos. One would need to look to the evidence of that species concept to confirm that they 
are, in fact, the same species concept (not just the same species name). Text as strings in the 
Catalogue are less useful than in typical bibliographic sources in identifying a biodiversity’s 
textual identity—the defining aspects of the Catalogue are much more than its sequence of 
words.40 
                                                
38 See also Plutarch, 75 A.C.E/2009). 
 
39 The relationship between species concepts and names is the subject of our next chapter, so more information can 
be located there.  
 
40 This is particularly why, in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, I stated that, unlike Wilson’s bibliographical 
universe, in our biodiversity documentary universe we are, indeed, concerned “units generally smaller than whole 
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While the Catalogue’s text may be abstract, it is important to note that the concept of a 
work allows for textual deviations that each constitute one branch of the family of texts. The text 
is a more narrowly specified entity concept in that it requires a certain degree of (abstract) textual 
fixity to define its parameters. The boundaries of the text, then, are those that are implemented 
by the establishment of annual and monthly database sets that have final impressions of textual 
and numeric strings.  
Exemplar and item. 
Making our way downward in Figure 7, the exemplar and item entity levels are where 
derivative documents are produced that can be described, fixed, and retrieved within database 
and information systems.  
Defining the exemplar, Wilson illustrates that this concept is what we traditionally 
understand to be the material production of a text, or as Lubetzky states, the “material 
embodying the work” (Lubetzky, 1969, p. 55)41: a physical book, or a written letter, for example. 
Elaine Svenonius’s term for this entity is the “edition,” (2009, pp. 38–43), being the “particular 
manifestation” of a work. Manifestation is the term utilized in the FRBR model to refer to the 
same general entity type (Standing Committee of the IFLA Section on Cataloguing, 2009, p. 5). 
A manifestation in FRBR language is the “physical embodiment of an expression of a work” 
(Standing Committee of the IFLA Section on Cataloguing, 2009, p. 21). Continuing, the FRBR 
guidelines indicate, “as an entity, manifestations represents all the physical objects that bear the 
same characteristics, in respect to both intellectual content and physical form” (Plassard, 1998, p. 
                                                                                                                                                       
texts and copies of them”—the context of the information contained in biodiversity database has a complexity that 
must also be accessible and appraisable to the system user. 
 
41 Seymour Lubetzky did not articulate a concept of the text in his Principles of Cataloging. Final Report. Phase I: 
Descriptive Cataloging (1969) that was situated between what he called the “work” and the physical embodiments 
of those works, which he called the material (inclusive of “books, film , tape, recording, or other medium containing 
the work”) (1969, p. 33). 
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20), which means that manifestations can represent sets of objects (though manifestations need 
not always be multiple; some objects, such as unique archival works, have only one 
manifestation). The Exemplar is all available copies or editions of a text that are produced from 
one instance of Wilson’s text.  
Different graphical arrangements also make for new exemplars. After all, one of the 
qualities of documents is that “the same information” (in this case the text) “can be embodied in 
different carriers” (Svenonius, 2009, p. 113). The FRBR report indicates that, “the boundaries 
between one manifestation and another are drawn on the basis of both intellectual content and 
physical form. When the production process involves changes in physical form the resulting 
product is considered a new manifestation. Changes in physical form include changes affecting 
display characteristics (e.g., a change in typeface, size of font, page layout, etc.)” (Standing 
Committee of the IFLA Section on Cataloguing, 2009, p. 22). Further, the RDA framework lists 
such reorientations of data as an entirely new content type known as “notated movement,” which 
is content expressed through a form of notation for movement intended to be perceived visually” 
(Joint Steering Committee for Development of RDA et al., 2015, sec. 6.9.1.3). The Catalogue of 
Life has six browsing interfaces for accessing the data, including: a Browse Taxonomic Tree 
interface, which allows a user to drill down into the management hierarchy to locate a particular 
species (see Figure 9); a Browse Taxonomic Classification, which allows for specific searching 
within taxa levels (See also Figure 9); and four searching functions: searching by all names, 
scientific name, common name, or by distribution. Each of these new graphical manifestations 
produces a new data document of the text—a new physical embodiment of the text—that can be 
downloaded for personal use.  
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Figure 9. (Left) Catalogue of Life Browseable Tree Interface; (Right) the Browse taxonomic Classification search 
screen, one of four possible search interfaces available with the Catalogue (Species 2000, 2015c).  
 
The item, on the other hand, is the single object of the exemplar (or manifestation). If 
there is only one exemplar, then it is also the item. Items are generally what we intend to retrieve 
(or the instances we actually do retrieve) when we query some system or seek out a document—
some thing (book, recording, dataset etc.) that will satisfy a particular need (unless of course the 
need is to retrieve the entire set of items for, say, a comparative study, in which case the 
exemplar set is what would satisfy that need). Often, in the case of the Catalogue, a person is 
seeking out one instance of a dataset that comprises one document-object—one snapshot of the 
Catalogue at a given moment in time. For Wilson, items can be both events and objects, which 
means that impermanent performances are distinctly part of Wilson ontology: “if I recite a poem, 
I utter sounds that are instances of particular types” (1968, p. 7). Items need to be experienced in 
some way, and while they certainly need not be physical (like a book), they must be enacted in a 
certain space within a certain “length of time” (Wilson, 1968, p. 7). This is crucial in a 
biodiversity database space, for the item, within the Catalogue, is only that data that is retrieved 
within the “performative act” of using the database at any given moment (using any of the 
browsing mechanisms described above).  
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On a practical level, the Catalogue has had to manage documentary contingency and 
constant data change with intermediary moments of fixity. Yury Roskov, Executive Editor, 
conveyed,  
Another thing which we introduced were fixed and dynamic editions. The Catalogue of Life actually has 
two products. One product is continuously built and updated … The Catalogue of Life, and we release 
monthly editions. Every month we are changing [the] database [with] some corrections ... from month to 
month we are growing and changing our content. But again, whether it's convenient for the community of 
users is the question. So if you talk to young people working with IT technologies they are saying, I need a 
dynamic resource. If you are talking to scientists who would like to cite resources and cite some particular 
taxonomic view or taxonomic content or name usage, they need fixed edition. That is why we are making 
an annual snapshot. So from this dynamic Catalogue of Life, every year we are publishing [a] snapshot as 
an annual checklist. We started in 2000 and every year we publish this fixed database online (Roskov, 
2016a). 
  
The CoL manufactures exemplars to make activities like citation possible, as well as to ensure 
persistent web linkages to the Catalogue in various online infrastructures.  Dynamism defines 
“The” Catalogue, but it is the “fixed” versions that provide a mechanism by which we can 
consider the Catalogue a cohesive, stable, and systematically descriptive ‘whole.’ The text of the 
Catalogue, in Roskov’s statement, is conceptualized as the contingent ideal; the exemplars make 
the text stable, functional, and traceable within a distributed digital environment. 
Returning to Figure 7, on the left side of the diagram you see the entity map for the 
Annual, “fixed,” version; on the right you see the dynamic “constantly evolving version” 
(Species 2000, 2015f).  The entities at the exemplar level and below are the documentary objects 
of record for the Catalogue of Life, which preserve all of the text associated with those species 
within the system at a fixed point in time, inscribed as they are on different material forms 
(Blanchette, 2011) and delivered in different graphical data arrangements.  
First, the Annual dataset version is available in eight forms: as a downloadable online 
data set, in a physical compact disk (CD) form, through two taxonomic browsing interfaces, as 
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well as in four browse-able graphical orientations (described above).42 In this case, there are only 
two exemplars of the full Annual dataset: the CD and the data set available online. The CD 
version consists of multiple object/item entities, which are distributed to individuals around the 
globe. There is only one authoritative instance of the Fixed (Annual) dataset43 that can then 
precipitate numerous items, or what I have termed ‘download instances’ in Figure 7. The search 
interfaces provide an orthogonal entry point into the dataset, where various search criteria can be 
used to retrieve only those portions of the data required by the user. Each of these queries 
produces a download instance (item). The taxonomic tree interface provides an interactive 
browseable hierarchy, but no download option is available from this exemplar. 
 The dynamic, monthly version of the Catalogue, is only available online. But the 
documentation associated with this version is limited: “anything can change as the [species] list 
develops: names, their associated details, and their content providers - and there is no tracking of 
those changes. For that reason, the monthly edition is not the one to quote if you wish to cite a 
verifiable source” (Species 2000, 2015f). Downloading a full copy of the Monthly edition is 
somewhat more difficult than the annual version, but possible.44 Query results from the 
Catalogue’s monthly browsing tools and the taxonomic tree interface are now downloadable are 
downloadable (as is the case with the Annual version). Two key points about the dynamic 
version are important to note here: the monthly data set is not archived for future access, nor are 
the changes made from month-to-month tracked in any detailed way (the ephemerality of these 
                                                
42 The CD was initially produced to provide access to the Catalogue to parts of the world and scientific communities 
that did not have ready and consistent access to the internet, though in reality, most of the users of the CD have been 
scientists and scholars within the United States (myself included!) who wanted ready access to the Catalogue 
archives for comparison and citation. 
 
43 The Catalogue data set is located on the Naturalis Biodiversity Center servers in Leiden, Netherlands. 
 
44 The Catalogue of Life has to be contacted directly for a monthly version, but this practice is not generally 
supported since the Annual version is the citable database of record.  
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dataset are indicated by the dotted boxes surrounding these exemplars in Figure 7). Even 
dynamism is a relative term in this context, for the dynamic version is updated on a monthly 
basis, and isn’t truly ‘dynamic’ in the formal sense of moment-by-moment updates. This said, it 
was conveyed to me that (very minor) changes have been implemented in the past through 
interstitial update periods that were not documented online.  While a web page that lists general 
changes to the monthly editions (back to July 1, 2010) is available (Species 2000, 2016g)—
including newly added (or removed) databases as well as database updates—specific changes are 
not catalogued in any persistent form. Some of these database changes stem from the annual 
update cycles for particular databases, which are staggered throughout the year. This is why it is 
especially important that Wilson included both objects and events in his bibliographic universe 
schema. These dataset are transitory documentary events of data that require intervention to 
permanently document. The ‘download instance’ of the dynamic dataset, of course, can serve as 
a permanent item, but the initial data set as it exists on Species 2000 servers is, indeed, dynamic 
and unfixed in practice. 
Conclusion: Prioritizing Documentary Entities 
 
This chapter was intended to describe the kinds of entities that inhabit the documentary 
universe of biodiversity databases, and to deconstruct the Catalogue itself as a document to its 
component parts. Part I provided the terminology for the basic building blocks of the Catalogue’s 
documentary universe, beginning with the concept of information, then moving to data, 
documents, and, finally, to contingent database-documents. This model will help us situate the 
increasingly more polished and meaningful nomenclature and species concept informational 
forms that occupy the database space. Part II then took Patrick Wilson’s entity model and 
postulated how we can understand the functional entities within the document of the 
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Catalogue—identifying those units that help us understand what is unique about its documentary 
production model and makes it work as a circulating resource for scientists. Now with this 
foundation in mind, the next question to ask is, What is the text of the Catalogue, and how can 
we better understand how this text is produced? This takes us into the realm of species concepts 
and nomenclature.  
At the terminus of Patrick Wilson’s chapter on “The Bibliographical Universe” (1968, 
Chapter 1), Wilson cautions those that feel the fundamental—and, thus, most important—item 
within a text is its content, the “separate pieces or items of ‘knowledge’ that may be found in 
them” (1968, p. 15). Among the reasons he provides for this position is that some texts are not 
necessarily valued only for the information they contain; some books serve no factual 
informational purpose (a fictional novel, for instance); texts themselves, as cohesive units, 
present emergent knowledge far beyond the sum of the singular pieces of information that 
constitute their full composition; pieces of information lose some of their value when wrested 
from their context; and finally, how we understand the relevance, veracity, and truthfulness of a 
text is entirely dependent on the text’s “original habitat” (1968, pp. 15–19).  
What we seek, generally, according to Wilson, is not merely information, but the network 
of knowledge that makes information informative in its most basic sense. While this is certainly 
true on the one hand, on the other, databases are textual environments designed for the extraction 
of selected information that can then be recombined in external environments toward a user’s 
desired outcome. Sometimes the information and content is all that matters. Wilson certainly 
acknowledges this quality of data storage systems:  
It will not be advantageous to make our account of bibliographical control apply generally to units smaller 
than whole texts and copies of them. This does not mean that we are interested only in whole texts….Nor is 
it meant to question the obvious utility of assembling all ‘known facts’ about some range of phenomena 
into handbooks or compendia of ‘data.’ It is however, to deny that writings can be adequately viewed as 
consisting of discrete items of the sort appropriate for handbooks of ‘data.’ The problem of bibliographical 
   96 
control is not simply one of locating items of information, and not one to be solved by attempting to 
analyze writing of units of information (1968, p. 19). 
 
Unlike the traditional “text” of the documents Wilson has in mind, the text of biodiversity 
systems are individual names—names that arise from a very particular process of nomenclature 
rules and standardization. In other words, documentary control is happening on multiple levels 
within the documentary universe, not only over the derivative document entities that are 
produced by the Catalogue. There is a sense in which the units of information within these 
biodiversity systems do have an evidentiary heft quite separate from the lists and taxonomies in 
which they are embedded. The “statements” (Wilson, 1968, p. 18) the Catalogue contains—
species nomenclature and the concepts they represent—do and can subsist without the database 
text as a whole.  But, true to Wilson’s assertion, it is not quite that simple. The names that 
comprise the text are situated within a checklist that verifies name authority and a taxonomy that 
both facilitates information retrieval and situates that name in a larger classification schema (a 
kind of narrative). As a species checklist and taxonomic entity, the text of the Catalogue is 
valuable precisely because of its completeness as a documentary unit. A certain level of 
“relevance, veracity, and truthfulness” does indeed come from the context in which names are 
situated.  
In the end, the division between information and text is perhaps an arbitrary one—they 
are interdependent, comingled as they are in one technically facilitated network. Wresting them 
apart for the purposes of this examination, however artificial the activity may be, is necessary to 
uncover the full documentary complexity of the Catalogue’s space. The dividing line between 
the space of the text (nomenclature), and the space of context (classification or taxonomy), is a 
cause of great schism in the biodiversity world. How these two spaces intersect to create a fully-
integrated biodiversity system will dictate for whom, and what purposes, a particular system is 
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useful. The next chapter will describe the relationship between names and the species concepts 
they represent—the text-space and evidence of the Catalogue. What are names evidence of? How 
is text accumulated and verified for inclusion into the Catalogue? Nomenclatural “veracity” 
means something very specific in this context. Furner’s information hierarchy (Figure 6) will 
help us understand this complex territory in disciplinary terms: how undifferentiated names 
strings become valid forms of scientific discourse. Then, once the role of nomenclature is 
established, in chapter four, I will delve into the Catalogue’s management taxonomy and see how 
this approach is epistemologically distinct from other, more scientifically articulated structures.   
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Chapter 3: Complex Concepts and Nomenclatural Control 
 
[Suzanne] Briet's notion of documents as evidence can occur in at least two ways. One purpose of 
information systems is to store and maintain access to whatever evidence has been cited as evidence of 
some assertion. Another approach is for the person in a position to organize artefacts, samples, specimens, 
texts, or other objects to consider what it could tell one about the world that produced it, and then, having 
developed some theory of its significance to place the object in evidence, to offer it as evidence by the way 
it is arranged, indexed or presented. In this manner information systems can be used not only in finding 
material that already is in evidence, but also in arranging material so that someone may be able to make 
use of it as (new) evidence for some purpose. 
—Michael Buckland 
“What is a Digital Document?” (1998) 
 
“Documentary systems” are, at least in some cases, what we would now call in some disciplines 
“discursive systems.” However, the common documentary element of these discourses and their 
accompanying social networks is that of naming objects according to some institutionally or socially 
normative systems. In cataloging, objects are placed in relation to other objects based on shared and 
essential properties and, so, the objects are named accordingly. In formal systems such as library 
catalogues, indexes, and so on, these names are composed out of formal classes. The relation of the 
catalogued name to the object is descriptive within classes. In brief, the naming of an object within Briet’s 
notion of indice has a double indexical relationship: the name points to the object and the name reflects the 
networks in which the object first appears as a named thing, that is, as an example of something, (for 
example, as a new type within the class “antelope”)  
—Ronald Day 
What is Documentation (1951/2006, p. 49) 
Introduction: The Evidence of Organization and The Organization of Evidence 
In the previous chapter, the basic units of the documentary universe were described: 
information, data, documents, works, texts, exemplars, and items. These entities have helped set 
the foundation for my broader argument about how an information organization system within 
the discipline of biodiversity studies constitutes what I see as two levels of documentation—or 
evidence of some “physical or conceptual phenomenon” (Briet, 1951/2006): First, and already 
discussed, the Catalogue database itself becomes an emergent and contingent document by virtue 
of the defining practices, standards, organizational efforts, formal materialities (Kirschenbaum, 
2012), and conceptual boundaries that are imposed onto its ontological construction. And how 
such documentation arises, in part, due to the tension between the contingency of databases and 
the necessary usefulness and practicality of fixed documentary forms. Secondly, recall Floridi’s 
assertion that information is made up of data (2011, p. 84), as well as Furner’s claim that all data 
   99 
are made up of documents (2016a). One can reasonably extend these notions to state that, 
information within databases are merely aggregations of documents, and there is no reason to 
assume that scientific and biodiversity databases are any different. We will now look more 
closely at the organized documents contained within the Catalogue and how these documents are 
specifically represented and controlled.  
I will now look inward at the textual components of biodiversity systems. That is, what 
kinds of concepts, intellectual phenomena, and evidence are represented by the text within the 
boundaries of the Catalogue? I want to think about the evidence cited in the Catalogue system, 
and what kinds of assertions about knowledge are being made by fixing and organizing them 
within the space of a structured species checklist.45 Quite simply, we are asking the question, 
What are the documents within the Catalogue, what are they about, and are they controlled to 
circulate effectively? These represented documents constitute what I am calling the second level 
of documentation: those taxon entities that are intended to be described, organized, and accessed 
within a certain system for retrieval. Fundamentally, in the Catalogue this is a “species” (or more 
specifically, a species concept), but as I will expand upon below, a species is a document concept 
far more complex than it initially appears, represented as it is within a computational system 
referencing numerous external sources (David J. Patterson, Remsen, Marino, Norton, & Page, 
2006). A species is both a name string in a technical system, as well as the compilation of 
evidence that make that name valid as part of scientific discourse and representative of a species 
concept. The ties that bind these two aspects of represented documents, however, are shifting. 
Represented documents are no less contingent than the emergent document. As this work has 
argued thus far (and will continue to argue more stringently as the manuscript progresses), 
                                                
45 The Catalogue’s taxonomy forms the focus of the next chapter; here we are more interested in species names and 
concepts as they are represented by text. 
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emergent and represented documents work together, and recursively affect and influence how the 
other is defined as each evolves within its own set of practices, standards, and reinterpretations. 
And they must be analyzed separately in order to understand how they function together as an 
analytic unit, for each concept of the “document” is subsisted by different epistemological and 
ontological underpinnings and social processes. Each of the interpretive assumptions about these 
documentary layers operates on a different notion of what the “object” of analysis is and how we 
can best represent it as cohesive unit.  
To this end, this chapter of the dissertation is broken up into two parts: In Part I, I 
examine the ‘unruliness’ of the species concept that names represent. The phrase complex 
concept is used to describe the difficulty with which names can document the various changes 
species concepts undergo over a long period of time; concepts, too, are contingent. In 
informational terms, a species concept must remain a static information thing in order to inform 
users in a consistent fashion; however, due to the shifting and evolving nature of the species 
concept as a kind of information-as-scientific-knowledge, consistency is difficult to attain over a 
prolonged period of time. I will illustrate how taxonomists define species concepts (the primary 
unit of information for biological taxonomies) as an amalgam of three basic concepts: a species 
name token that represents a concept in computational systems46; a publication that contains the 
species description as well as other vital diagnostic information to identify the characteristics of 
a taxa; and finally, a type specimen, which is a physical type sample (or set of samples) upon 
which a taxon description is based that exemplifies a class of real world organisms. These three 
components of a species concept work together in flexible (yet bounded) ways to create a fluid 
semiotic system: a type specimen (or specimens) is (are) identified, a type is subsequently 
                                                
46 Of course, name tokens are used to represent species in all formats; computational systems are emphasized here 
because of the focus on the Catalogue of Life. 
   101 
described in a formal publication to delineate a species concept, and then that species concept is 
codified in a naming act according to strict nomenclatural codes. Problems arise, however, as 
species concepts change, taxa are reorganized or melded together, as species bifurcate, etc. Thus 
the limitations of names to track these changes are exposed. 
In Part II, I turn my focus to the workflow process by which names get structured into 
progressively more knowledge-based, authoritative forms based on my field work at the NAMES 
in November meeting in Leiden—a closed meeting designed to assess the nomenclatural needs 
in the biodiversity taxonomic sector. If names are complex and contingent concepts, 
nomenclature specialists need to find ways to organize and track these changes to the best of 
their ability. I begin this discussion with Patrick Wilson’s (1968) notions of descriptive and 
exploitative power. I argue that the management of names moves us from the ability to collocate 
documents (descriptive power) to the ability to use those documents most effectively at the point 
of usage (exploitative power). I then map-out how the Catalogue validates and codifies 
nomenclature through a systematic process of disambiguation and concept refinement. Recall 
Jonathan Furner’s schema for information in Figure 6, where he traces the hierarchy of 
information from phenomena to truthful, refined information forms. Floridi also places an 
emphasis on the importance of “well-formed” and “semantic/meaningful” data as part of his 
General Definition of Information (2011, pp. 83–84). Well-formed data is formed in such a way 
that it corresponds to the particular rules of the system in which it is to be circulated; meaningful 
data is when a unit of information’s structure corresponds to meaning (and semantics) within the 
system. Names follow this same pathway toward becoming meaningful information units in 
scientific discourse; what Thomas Orrell of the Smithsonian NMNH, called being “known to 
science.” Finally, the Catalogue of Life Plus, a newly proposed infrastructure add-on for the 
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Catalogue is introduced. The Catalogue Plus is designed to manage the complexity of names 
over time as the pool of potential nomenclature grows, mixed as it is with tokens that do and do 
not conform to valid scientific name forms and conceptualizations. The Catalogue Plus provides 
a structured mechanism to hold invalidated and alternate name forms, tag them for examination 
through user feedback, and, once validated, names can be ingested into the core Catalogue for 
systemic use. The Catalogue Plus is indicative of an exploitative power—the potential for users 
to contribute to a cache of “writings” that function most effectively at their local level.  
 Hope Olson once stated, “presumptions have long been made about naming and the 
language with which we perform the task of naming. Philosophers of language have always 
recognized the subjective nature of language, but most have identified the resultant diversity to 
be a stumbling block to mutual comprehension” (2002, p. 5). Scientific names certainly 
exemplify these issues. Olson is recognized for reminding us that subject representation in 
library systems matter, and that language is both a necessary vehicle for access, as well as a 
homogenizing agent that obstructs subject complexity in smoothly-functioning systems that 
construct seamless ontological realities (Olson, 2002, p. 238). Mutual comprehension and 
communication of biodiversity information is certainly the goal for systems like the Catalogue, 
and while strict rules have been articulated to control the name-space as objectively as science 
can articulate, the concepts they represent are subjective by their very nature. This fact is not lost 
to any practicing scientist intimately familiar with the standards and processes of their 
professional craft; it is part-and-parcel of doing scientific work. Olson proposes eccentric 
techniques of classification in The Power to Name (2002, pp. 238–240), which include 
permeability and dynamism. The Catalogue, and the nomenclature environment that now 
surrounds it, then, exemplifies one way in which the scientific community is articulating a 
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recursive technique aimed at solve these long-standing, acknowledged limitations on scientific 
nomenclature.  
Part I: Documents Within Documents: Unruly and Complex Concepts 
In September of 2016, a call for papers was delivered to my email associated with a 
working group session titled, “Resembling Science: The Unruly Object across the Disciplines.” 
In the description of this meeting it was said that,  
We might even argue that the history of consolidating and communicating scientific thought is structured 
by a tension between two kinds of unruly objects: the objects we seek to represent, and the objects 
produced by representational media. Scientific media instantiate a wide range of representational modes, 
from drawings, tables, and diagrams to printed text and script in various languages (Latham, 2016).  
 
As Geoffrey Bowker (2008, Chapter 4) makes readily apparent, the systems that we create to 
represent and circulate the collective memory of biodiversity science are unruly at best—
fragmentary, incomplete, and forgetful at worse. The mechanisms that biodiversity professionals 
craft and implement to circulate knowledge in space and time—in Bowker’s case, he focuses on 
scientific names and classification—are difficult enough to manage within the domain of 
biodiversity itself, let alone as these mechanisms get absorbed into other domains of discourse 
that further obfuscate and rearticulate how that knowledge is constituted in the first place. 
Biodiversity database nomenclature and taxonomies are such important spaces of discourse 
because they strive to mediate, locate, and fix unruly species concepts within systems that are 
fundamentally also plastic and sites of intellectual contention. The unruly-ness of scientific 
infrastructure arises, in part, because science itself is a process (D. L. Hull, 1988) that depends 
upon the progressive building of knowledge over time (D. L. Hull, 2001, p. 225).  
The unruly nature of concepts within the database realm became readily apparent when, 
in April of 2016—at the very beginning of my fieldwork—I was invited by the Catalogue of Life 
Global Team to present my dissertation work at their Annual Symposium in Crete, Greece. One 
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of the central themes of my presentation was how we could begin to think about what constituted 
the “work” of the Catalogue of Life—what its boundaries were and how we, in Information 
Studies, can begin to think about its identity as a persistent, published object on the one hand, as 
well as a dynamic resource on the other. Naively, a comment I made focused on the volume of 
data that was being aggregated in these systems, and how that volume was one impediment 
toward control. At the end of the presentation, a prominent taxonomist raised his hand and 
commented, “The distinction here is that we don’t just deal with just big data. We deal with 
complex data, complex concepts that change over time. The question is how you capture that 
process” (my emphasis). What this taxonomist was hinting at was that my model of “the work” 
was predicated on the notion that the work documented concept-objects that could be easily 
located, and that the data elements were relatively stable throughout the process of organization 
and information collection. It had nothing to do with the quantity of data—or least it didn’t 
insofar as even smaller sets of data present the same problems of complexity and change—but 
had more to do with the balance between providing systemic flexibility (to account for the 
shifting nature of concepts) and the fixity required of a system used for organizational purposes.  
This response got me thinking about how taxonomists define complexity as a part of their 
practice. How could I locate and unpack that complexity within the biodiversity management 
process? Particularly as it relates to the fundamental unit of information in biodiversity work—
the species—and how the process of its articulation interfered with the basic, procedural aspects 
of data management. What is complex about the process of articulating biodiversity concepts that 
makes them so difficult to manage in a technical environment? What follows is a breakdown of 
what constitutes the species concept and how it becomes adhered to a certain set of 
documentation. The result is such that the document of the database (a name string) is comprised 
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of external documents upon which its validity and constitution depends, but these external 
documents do not adhere to a stable network of related meaning.  
Material stabilization: Types. 
On a very basic level, biodiversity databases are trying to locate, track, unify, and 
represent one of the most fundamental discourse units, as well as one of the “discipline’s oldest 
and most vexing [intellectual] problems” and constructs (De Queiroz, 2005, p. 196): the species. 
In practice, identifying this basic unit of analysis is no easy task for its concept is subject to 
expert construction. ‘Species’ in practice are an amalgam of basically three different intellectual 
formulations which we will discuss sequentially (the ‘botanical trinity’ as one scientist called 
it)47: a type specimen, an individual instantiating a class of entities (Daston, 2004), that acts as a 
material ground and “the name-bearer of the specimen associated with a name by the act of 
description and publication”); a publication (that includes the circumscription, or description, of 
a species); and, a name (articulated based on a series of rules codified by international 
commissions) (Winston, 1999, p. 173). “Specimens are the basic operational taxonomic unit 
(OTU)” of (Berendsohn, 1995, p. 208) systematics and biological classification. The term 
“operational,” arising from the tradition of numerical taxonomy (Sneath & Sokal, 1973), is used 
in this context because species represent the “evidence and operations used to recognize species 
in taxonomic practice,” (K. D. Queiroz, 1998, p. 59). 48 Species as operational units are “testable 
concepts” (Wiley & Lieberman, Bruce S., 2011, p. 29, my emphasis), concepts that are 
                                                
47 While there are a number of differences between the botanical and zoological codes, the “trinity” still stands for 
zoological species concepts. 
 
48 In the context of the many meetings and discussions I’ve had in fieldwork, OTU as a representative token for 
species is used both specifically (to mean an operationalizable concept arising from numerical taxonomy and 
phylogenetics), as well as generally, to mean a unit that is based on a set of hypothesized circumstances (see 
discussion of Catalogue of Life Plus, below, for extrapolation of this general use of the term). 
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contingent on the repeatable articulation of a species at any given point and time as sources of 
evidence and interpretation change.  
 On the one hand, it is easy to think that the primary document of biological taxonomy is 
the type—the one physical thing that presents itself as a stabilizing node that acts as evidence of 
the existence of some external group of biological individuals. A type is Briet’s ubiquitous 
museum-residing antelope, representing the concept of antelope in the wild that can then be 
circulated in any number of environments: museums, databases, zoos, etc. After all, when a 
“species” must be verified in practice, one must “look at the actual specimens of the potential 
members of the species in question” to truly remove any doubt, because as Smithsonian 
Research Associate, Judith E. Winston states, “There is no substitute for the specimen” (1999, p. 
96). Types are the source material that “settle disputes over species identification” (H. C. J. 
Godfray, 2007), and also the voucher specimens upon which molecular examination of species 
are based (Seberg et al., 2016; Smithsonian Institution, 2017). 
Type specimens also regulate taxonomic nomenclature (Witteveen, 2015, p. 570) and 
prevent the chaotic inflation of names that occurs when there is no stabilizing mechanism for 
their application. The type is nowhere near “typical” in the sense that it represents the variations 
inherent in an external organismic class (Daston, 2004; Ereshefsky, 2007, p. 261; 1988, pp. 496–
498). When Linnaeus began using binomial nomenclature, the formal identification of types was 
not standard practice, though Linnaeus certainly based his descriptions on samples (Ereshefsky, 
2007). It was not until the late 19th century that types entered into common usage, along with the 
codification of types in various codes of nomenclature (Daston, 2004, pp. 159–161). Daston 
identifies the early twentieth century as the period in which “types” start getting cited in 
publications and journals  (2004, p. 160) to ground concepts descriptions. Initially, the 
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assumption that the type be typical led to an inflation of the application of types, as well the 
frequent replacement of types for newer exemplars that more adequately matched phenotypic 
observations (D. L. Hull, 1988, p. 498). “The resulting confusion led systematists to rule that 
once a specimen is designated as the type specimen of a species, it can be replaced only in cases 
of duplication or accidental destruction. The sole function of the type specimen became to serve 
as the name bearer of its species” (1988, p. 498). The unbreakable bond between type and name 
is clearly articulated in the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants, by 
the formal phrase “nomenclatural type” to describe the type specimen: “the application of names 
of taxa of the rank of family or below is determined by means of nomenclatural types (types of 
names of taxa)” (2011, sec. 2.7). The result is that regardless of how a taxon is described over 
time, it remains what Joeri Witteveen calls a “necessary truth that the taxon’s type specimen falls 
within its boundaries” (2015, p. 569).  
Type specimen collections are “some of the most precious holdings of major natural 
history museums around the world,” but relatively little seen in public arenas (Daston, 2004, p. 
158). Types form the core collection of institutions and are kept indefinitely so as to maintain 
control over the nomenclatural space (see Figure 10). Specimens also stand at the center of sound 
and verified taxonomic work, playing a major role in correctly (as in, according to stated rules) 
assigning names to taxa, or reassigning a species to an updated location in the hierarchy. As 
Timothy Utteridge, Head of Identification and Naming and Senior Research Leader at Royal 
Botanic Gardens, Kew, articulated,  
[Taxonomy] is not about just names. We use names to identify real things in forests. So behind every name 
there is an organism and vice versa, so to know what that organism is … you have to go back to the original 
[type and descriptions]. The original sources. And what is great about [the Biodiversity Heritage Library], 
[is that it’s a] camera copy ... it's there you can see it ... It feels [like] something that is not being fiddled 
with. When you look at BHL you are fine with that; but when you look at a plant list you might think that 
they scan the page number in wrong. So, even though the plant list might have the full citation, you will 
still click that link to take it to BHL (2016). 
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As is elicited in the narrative that Dr. Utteridge presents, aside from its purpose in controlling the 
production of names, a type also bridges the abstraction of concepts with the material and natural 
concerns of taxonomy—the species themselves. In another, unrelated conversation, a scientist 
remarked, “types remind me what I do this [biodiversity] work for.” Secondly, Utteridge also 
implies a sense in which the physical material of species is more verifiable and trustworthy as a 
kind of circulating knowledge within the discipline, rather than that of biodiversity database. 
Databases, effective though they may be in storing and communicating information, provide no 
mechanism to directly assure the accuracy of the information they contain. Mistakes occur within 
database environments, and secondary compilation sources can never serve as a replacement for 
the original types and supporting documentation.49 Taxonomy in the professional scientific world 
is a process of manual verification, and in the database environment, there is no way to 
immediately judge the veracity of information with such distance between the documented 
instance of evidence and the evidence itself. Certainly, some mechanisms have been 
implemented to assist in this verification process, such as indicating the date of the “latest 
taxonomic scrutiny” (Species 2000, 2017a) or providing a quality indicator status for taxa 
information. This is one reason why it is so essential to have all database content linked back to 
original source; by doing so, it provides the bread trails necessary to locate and verify 
contributed information. Type specimens provide the most authoritative means available to 
ensure the production of valid and comprehensive taxonomic knowledge at a local level. 
 
 
                                                
49 This potential unreliability of taxonomic and nomenclatural databases is explored in much more depth in chapter 
five. 
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Figure 10. (Left) Original East India Company Type Specimen Cabinets. (Right) A type specimen folder from the 
East India Company Cabinet. Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew. Photo by author.  
Documentary warrant: Publications.  
 The second component of the species concept ‘trinity’ is the publication. While type 
specimens bear the name and control the inflation of its use, the publication provides many 
qualitative data points of interest, including the description of the species (its circumscription); 
known synonymic variants; type material examined to ground the description; a diagnosis (the 
identification of characters that differentiate a species from its relatives); if necessary, 
distribution information and illustrations, as well as a host of other potential descriptive 
information points (Winston, 1999, pt. 3). Very particular requirements must be met in order to 
qualify as a valid publication that places libraries and other public documentation institutions at 
the center of biodiversity and taxonomic practice. Within the ICZN, in order to qualify as valid, 
publications must “be issued for the purpose of providing a public and permanent scientific 
record” and “be obtainable, when first issued, free of charge or by purchase” (1999, sec. 8.1). An 
amendment was later added, due to the introduction and proliferation of digital media, that a 
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publication must also encompass “widely accessible electronic copies with fixed content and 
layout” (1999, sec. 8.1.3). In order for names to enter the communication stream of scientific 
discourse, they need to be within the domain of “public knowledge” (Wilson, 1977) so that any 
and all elements related to a species concept could be confirmed. Good biodiversity and 
taxonomic work rests on Patrick Wilson’s notion of the “complete library”—a biodiversity 
descriptive library “containing a copy of every published record” (1977, p. 87), not unlike the 
aims set forth by the Biodiversity Heritage Library in their coordination and digitization of 
biodiversity literature for global access (refer to Timothy Utteridge’s comment above about the 
importance of primary source literature in verifying species concepts). With all the documents at 
their disposal, taxonomists can then prioritize name instances and retrieve those instances for use 
in taxonomic databases (more on the latter below). 
The date of a particular publication is crucial here. Publications also provide a 
mechanism by which accepted names are officially brought into scientific discourse as 
representing a taxon (D. P. Remsen, 2010, p. 152), and the imprinted date on the document is 
used to assess the priority of any given name over another. “The problem is that, in a widely 
distributed literature—across all the continents and a number of disciplines, each with their own 
sets of journals—you need a rule to decide which name you are going to standardize” (Bowker, 
2008, p. 159). Even if distributed literature is in different languages, the use of Latinate forms for 
names helps collocate that information nonetheless. In contemporary terms, finding specific date 
information is relatively simple and usually quite straightforward, given that bibliographic 
information is readily available. However, in conversation with zoologists at the Smithsonian 
National Museum of Natural History (NMNH), finding an accurate date for older publications is 
often quite difficult. Many of the zoological journals held in the NMNH dating from the early 
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twentieth-century, for example, have an accession date stamp (the date a journal was added to 
the NMNH collection), but do not have an imprinted published date on the issue themselves, be 
it by design or by a missing copyright page. Sleuthing, then, becomes a paramount task for 
nomenclaturists attempting to assess nomenclatural priority. Interpolating dates from the 
historical record surrounding the establishment of a date is not uncommon, especially before the 
implementation of codes that required publications for the instantiation of the new name. 
Timothy Utteridge describes one such example, 
The genus I work on, Maesa that was recognized by, I think a Danish guy ... [on] an expedition into Saudi 
Arabia. And then at the same time, the Forsters went around, I think with Cook, and came back with 
another [sample] and they called it Baeobotrys. And they published this and it's exactly the same time as 
Maesa. But the only way they can work out which one takes priority is that someone worked out when their 
ship landed in Portsmouth, how long it would take them to dock, how long the post carriage took from 
Portsmouth to London; [and] how long the editor would have taken to write it up. So, they've [assessed] to 
the day, which one has priority and it came out that one [Maesa]. So, sometimes a bit of detective work is 
required (2016). 
  
In terms familiar to the field of Information Studies, these publications provide the 
documentary (bibliographic) warrant necessary to include any given name as part of the 
constellation of other accepted terms. The function of such standardization systems, as Claire 
Beghtol makes clear, is that it provides the classificationist the authority “to justify and 
subsequently to verify decisions about what classes/concepts to include in the system” so the 
system “will be helpful and meaningful to classifiers and ultimately the users of the documents” 
(1986, p. 110). One of the warrant “perspectives” that Beghtol lists is literary warrant, which 
generally speaking, describes the inclusion of concepts and the building of “classification based 
on the collection, … the ‘literature in the sense of a body of works” (Kwasnik, 2010, p. 107). 
Warrant, in essence, assures that the units of information included in the system (species 
concepts on the abstract level, names on the practical, token-specific level) maintain a certain 
degree of purchase and semantic usefulness within the system. As was evidenced in Utteridge’s 
quote above, biodiversity knowledge databases—and knowledge sources in general—gain their 
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cognitive authority (Wilson, 1983) from these established standards and their implementation 
within systems such as the Catalogue.  
Name tokens and species concepts. 
 
“Naming information is the term I use for creating document surrogates…I choose the word ‘naming’ 
because it connotes the power of controlling subject representation and, therefore, access…Theories, 
models, and descriptions are elaborated names. In these acts of naming, the scientist simultaneously 
constructs and contains nature”  
—Hope A. Olsen 
The Power to Name: Locating the Limits of Subject Representation in Libraries (2002) 
 
But the ‘type specimen’ of the physical world, on which the stability of the 
communication of taxonomy depends, as well as the publication that codifies a species concept’s 
described identity (its circumscription), is functional only in the form of a name in database 
systems (and, really, in a system of any format—print included). Our discussion of both types 
and publications could not have transpired without the concept of a name to represent the 
comingling of these documentary units; names bring the data together. As Lorraine Daston 
states, “Indeed, it is the name of the species, rather than the species itself, that is directly attached 
to the type specimen” (Daston, p. 162). Names are the vehicle by which “species” become, as 
Ronald Day states in Indexing it All, “meaningful things” within a larger network of relationships 
(2014, p. 6). “Taxonomists use ‘names’ as tokens for concepts of species (and other taxa)”(D. J. 
Patterson, Cooper, Kirk, Pyle, & Remsen, 2010, p. 3), and “are a part of a 'taxon concept' 
(Kennedy, Kukla, & Paterson, 2005, p. 82). “Tokens are said to instantiate types; they exemplify 
embody manifest, fall under, belong to types they’re occurrences, instances, members of types” 
(Furner, 2016b, p. 120). Names as tokens, therefore, merit more examination in these taxonomic 
spaces, given their pivotal role in documenting species concepts within information systems. The 
general assumption might be that, as tokens, names are stable entities, and that each token, being 
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unique, correlates to a clear set of documents and concepts, but this could not be farther from the 
truth.  
One of the fundamental problems with using names to convey information is that they are 
incredibly slippery notions, not only in computational environments, but in general: names 
cannot always easily be paired with the species concept that it is intended to represent, nor can 
they “be used to unambiguously identify a concept” (Kennedy et al., 2005, p. 82). Even with the 
advent of globally unique identifiers (GUID) for name strings, it is often the case that specimens 
and names are given new GUIDs once they are brought into various local systems. Doug 
Yanega, of the Department of Entomology at the University of California, Riverside, relates such 
as case,  
Every [Entomology Research Museum] specimen has a global unique identifier, which is on the label, 
which is a combination of our institutional code plus an actual specimen number. We accommodate 
anybody's [GUID]. There are databases with different in house things that won't accommodate foreign 
GUIDs. Then they have to reassign their own internal and then you have two GUIDs for exactly the same 
thing. If it's globally unique then you don't have two of them! (2016). 
 
Indeed, other taxonomists and biodiversity informaticians I spoke with recognized this general 
problem as well, and that given this practice, names, by default, become the one binding agent 
for disparate information. Yet, as Nico Franz conveyed, “names are not good enough” (2016). 
With the shifting concepts these names represent, even GUID’s cannot use machine algorithms 
to correctly map the connection between species concepts and name transformation over time. 
How is this the case that names lose stability over time? As David Remsen, biodiversity 
informatician and Director of Marine Research Services at the Marine Biological Laboratory in 
Woods Hole, Massachusetts, notes, “there is no direct relationship … between symbols (i.e., 
names) and the real-world objects (the referent) they represent. Meaning, or the relationship 
between the name and the object, is conveyed only through a concept that exists in the mind of 
the user of the name…. In biological taxonomy, a species name refers to a concept anchored by a 
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specimen but created in the mind of a biologist … The function of the name is to facilitate 
communication. Communication is facilitated, however, only when the concepts (not the objects) 
are approximately congruent” (2016, pp. 210–211). Such congruence is difficult enough to verify 
within museum repositories where the type is right in from of you, but once you enter names into 
an interface system, such correspondence becomes nearly impossible to verify. Names are 
neither stable, nor “unique identifiers for taxa” (2016, p. 210). 
Despite rules dictating the application of names to taxa, the species concept that it 
represents is nothing if not static. Names change readily and normally as part of scientific 
descriptive and taxonomic work. Any number of variations and updates can occur to the concept 
of the species over time. Richard Pyle, Associate Zoologist and Database Coordinator, at the 
Hawaii Biological Survey and Bishop Museum, jokingly remarked during the 2008 annual 
Biodiversity Information Standards/Taxonomic Databases Working Group (TDWG) meeting, 
“taxonomy is the perpetual classification of mis-named species,” and noted that this 
circumstance is “a necessary evil … that is fundamentally necessary for, not only biology, but 
particularly for biodiversity informatics” (2008). Multiple names can represent the same taxon 
concept (synonyms); one name can be used for many entirely different concepts (homonyms); 
and one name can refer to two or more concepts whose circumscriptions overlap (usually 
resulting when taxa are split or merged over time) (D. Remsen, 2016). And to add on top of this, 
each circumscription applied to a name and type is, by definition, an approximation (and 
operationalization) “equivalent to generating a new hypothesis in other branches of biology,” 
and such a hypothesis is always open to new interpretations as new forms of evidence or new 
modes of data analysis (computational or otherwise) are introduced (Gaston & Mound, 1993, p. 
139).  
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Richard Pyle (2008) provides the following example that I will reformulate slightly and 
summarize somewhat to fit my purposes.50 Though on the long side, this example illustrates how 
complicated the correlation between species names and concepts can be as part of practice, and 
will help clarify some of the finer points made from this point forward. It will serve as an 
example that I can point to when describing particular issues related to name complexity.  
Imagine two hypothetical species of fish are extracted from the a pool of water in the 
wild believed to be part of the same genus, named as: 
Fish 1: Holocanthus fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Barnthouse 190451  
Fish 2: Holocanthus acanthops (Subramanian 1922) sec. Subramanian 1922 
 
Then Myers comes along and decides that Holocanthus fisheri is actually part of another genus, 
Xiphypops, so he renames it with a new combination moving the genus: 
 Fish 1: Xiphypops fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec Myers 1933 
  = Holocanthus fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Barnthouse 1904 
 
But notice that the concept hasn’t changed; it has the exact same circumscription (description) as 
Barnthouse 1904.  
Then imagine a third scientist described another fish from that same pool, and describes the 
following as part of a new genus: 
Fish 3: Centropyge flavicauda (Van Winkle 1933) sec Van Winkle 1933 
 
But Van Winkle also thinks that all of the fish from this pool are from this same new genus, so 
she decides to move all of the others into the same genus as well: 
 
                                                
50 The scientific species names and years used by Richard Pyle in his original PowerPoint presentation have been 
retained, however, the author designations have been changed. 
  
51 Where the italicized name is the valid scientific name (genus and species) that a scientist, Barnthouse, described 
and published in 1904. Sensu (often abbreviated sec) is a Latin term that means “in the sense of” and is often used at 
the end of names to indicate that the author used the species concept “in the sense of” whoever is cited. Thus, above, 
since Barnthouse described the species for the first time in 1904, it is also Barnthouse’s concept.   
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Fish 1: Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec Van Winkle 1933  
= Xiphypops fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec Myers 1933 
= Holocanthus fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Barnthouse 1904 
Fish 2: Centropyge acanthops (Subramanian 1922) sec. Van Winkle 1933 
 = Holocanthus acanthops (Subramanian 1922) sec. Subramanian 1922 
 
Pyle continues to describe how yet another individual comes along and decides that Fish 3 is 
actually a synonym of Fish 1, and proceeds to bring those two species groups under one genus: 
Fish 1 and Fish 3: Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Brown 2003 
 > Fish 1: Holocanthus fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Barnthouse 1904 
  > Fish 1: Xiphypops fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec Myers 1933 
  > Fish 1: Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec Van Winkle 1933 
> Fish 3:Centropyge flavicauda (Van Winkle 1933) sec Van Winkle 1933  
= Fish 1: Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec Van Winkle 1933 
 +Fish 3: Centropyge flavicauda (Van Winkle 1933) sec Van Winkle 193352 
 
And herein lies the problem, according to Pyle, “so now [Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 
1904) sec. Brown 2003] applies to this whole circumscription of organisms [the species groups 
that originally represented the populations of Fish 1 and Fish 3]. So it’s a different concept using 
the same name…that’s the problem we have … names don’t match perfectly to concepts. 
Sometimes the same concept goes by different legitimate names and sometimes the same name 
can refer to different legitimate concepts” (my emphasis) (2008). Taxonomist Nico Franz, et. al. 
highlight this disjoint between “names and taxonomy” and the problems it causes when a “name 
and its meaning evolve independently” (N. Franz, Peet, & Weakley, 2008, p. 64). As is seen 
above, the token for any given species is entirely dependent on the metadata attached to the name 
itself—information that is, at best, occasionally included as part of a name as it circulates within 
technical systems. But in order for a system to work, congruence between names and concepts 
must be solidified in some mechanized way. Expanding on this issue in particular for a moment, 
please refer to Figure 11 below, which is from David Remsen’s article, “The use and limits of 
scientific names in biological informatics” (2016). He notes how there is no direct relationship 
                                                
52 Where “>” means “the synonym of,” and “+” indicates that the two species concepts melded coming together to 
form one larger concept (in this case, that of Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Brown 2003). 
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between the symbol (the name) and the referent (the real world object), which is indicated by a 
dotted line. 
 
 
Figure 11.  The Semiotic Triangle. “The semiotic triangle describes how names communicate meaning” (D. 
Remsen, 2016, p. 211). 
 
 In this article Remsen draws our attention to two “sub-domain of semiotics, semantics 
(“the relationship between signs and things…their meaning”) and syntactics (“relation among 
signs or symbols within formal structures”) (2016, p. 210). Remsen makes the argument that 
taxonomy has two essential concepts that mirror this distinction: that of taxonomy (semantics) 
and nomenclature (syntactic) (pp. 210–211). Names work in formal systems (in this case, 
technical systems), while taxonomy is concerned with the relationships between the described 
concept of the species and its nomenclatural representation. The former will be discussed in 
more detail below, but here I’ll focus on the semantic relationship between word and concept. In 
Figure 11, Section A, Remsen illustrates the basic Piercian “triadic relation” (Short, 2007, p. 30): 
the sign, the object, and the interpretant. The goal of the taxonomist is to interrelate these 
concepts as tightly as possible to facilitate ready communication of concepts. Nomenclature (the 
sign or sign-bearing) must, through the careful and diligent description (the referential 
extensions” (N. M. Franz et al., 2016, p. 646)) of a type specimen (the object), “translate” (Atkin, 
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2013), as accurately as possible, the “mental equivalent” of the concept as it was originally 
conceived to another scientist (the interpretant) (see Section B, Figure 11). The interpretant must 
then be able to work in the opposite direction: looking at the name, as well as its associated 
circumscription, the interpretant must be able to conceive of the original species concept as close 
as possible to as it was imagined by the original describing taxonomist (see Section C, Figure 
11).  
This “communication is facilitated,” however, “only when the concepts (not the objects) 
are approximately congruent” (D. Remsen, 2016, p. 211). This is no easy task, especially when 
the “cardinality between syntax and semantics … is one-to-many” (2016, p. 211), meaning that 
any one name can reference an innumerable set of valid (and invalid) species concepts. Thinking 
about Pyle’s fish example above, the articulation of a species concept is far more than one 
document and one type. In the simplest case, it may be that one type specimen and one 
publication are all that is necessary to reconstitute a concept. Things can get far more 
complicated, however, when multiple type specimens are taken into account in the production of 
a species circumscription (a holotype, along with a collection of paratypes, for example).53 
Which says nothing of the emergent complexity that is produced when names and concepts 
develop over time; in the case of the Centropyge fisheri (Barnthouse 1904) sec. Brown 2003, the 
newly created genus and species taxon concepts constitute at least five publishing and 
                                                
53 A holotype is the “single specimen used by an author, either the only specimen he found or one of several found, 
but the only one designated as a type” (Winston, 1999, p. 104). A paratype, on the other hand, “are specimens that 
the person making the original material examined while carrying out the work” (1999, p. 104)—so when a group of 
organisms are examined to establish a species concepts, the paratypes are those types that are not the holotype. 
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nomenclatural acts and potentially dozens of types specimens that were used in all of their 
original genus and species descriptions.54  
Infrastructures such as the Catalogue of Life are designed to facilitate the conveyance of 
concepts by controlling nomenclature. As Paul Kirk, Senior Biosystematist and Mycologist at 
Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, conveyed, “Stability [is] the single most important thing about 
nomenclature: 'this name calls out the provision of a stable method of naming taxa avoiding 
ambiguity and confusion,’” but stability is contingent on a number of factors (2016). “Customers 
don't like name changes ... medical mycologists don't like name changes...governments, [IUCN] 
Red List people ... every customer of the products of taxonomy with the nomenclature behind it 
don’t like name changes. Unfortunately, taxonomists like changing names….” (2016). The 
Catalogue, and nomenclaturalists in general, go through a great deal of steps and processes to 
document all of these name changes over time in order to provide ready and (as) accurate (as 
possible) access to names data. The next section will document the process of controlling names 
within technical structures and professional standards.  
Part II: Nomenclature: Toward the Appraisal of Knowledge 
From bio-documentary description to exploitation.  
 Managing names requires a system of control. One of the fundamental contributions of 
Patrick Wilson’s Two Kinds of Power (Wilson, 1968) is his articulation of exploitative power in 
addition to the already-familiar notion of descriptive power as it applies to bibliographic practice. 
As I will illustrate below, the production and management of names within the Catalogue of Life 
can be seen as exemplifying a spectrum between these two theoretically distinct phenomena: as 
                                                
54 See also Nico Franz’s article, “On the Use of Taxonomic Concepts in Support of Biodiversity Research and 
Taxonomy,” for an in depth discussion on the evolution of taxonomic perspectives (2008, pp. 63–65). 
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names move from pools of undifferentiated lists and nomenclatures, toward more structured and 
taxonomic formats, they become linked in knowledge discourses that are created to allow for 
more effective retrieval and user-oriented mediating interfaces. Further, the imposition of 
taxonomic frameworks in biodiversity studies exemplifies how descriptive and exploitative 
frameworks cannot, in practice, be seen as distinctly separate intellectual activities. I will first 
briefly situate the concepts of descriptive and exploitative power as articulated by Wilson then 
move toward a concrete example of how such concepts are at play in the Catalogue. 
Descriptive power, as described by Wilson, is “not a very adequate term for an ability to 
line up a population of writings in an arbitrary order, to make the population march to one’s 
command. The wielder of perfect bibliographic descriptive control can have summoned up every 
writing that fits his arbitrary description, so long as the applicability of that description to 
particular writings can be discovered without any consideration of virtues or vices” (1968, p. 25). 
What Wilson calls an “evaluative neutral” approach is what others have identified as the 
“traditional” descriptive practice of cataloguing rooted within the field of librarianship (Coyle, 
2016, p. 39; Morris & Van der Veer Martens, 2009, p. 224). In particular, this approach takes 
textual entities (documents broadly construed), and as indicated by Svenonius, “requires that 
bibliographic descriptions be constructed to reflect the way bibliographic entities represent 
themselves” (2009, p. 71). The attributes, terms, subjects, etc., applied to any given object can 
then be used to collocate disparate resources; Wilson uses the examples of wanting to bring “all 
of those writing by Hobbes, all those discussing the doctrine of eternal recurrence, all those 
containing the word ‘fatuity’ (1968, p. 22). This concept has had considerable impact within 
classification and knowledge organization research, especially since its primary aim is “to 
provide a complete listing of all members of a class” (Morris & Van der Veer Martens, 2009, p. 
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224). But the act of descriptive power can only take a system so far. Optimally, the task of 
information control within documentary spaces is also to help individuals retrieve those 
documents that are most suited to their individual needs. Wilson articulated exploitative control 
to satisfy this expressed need as a function of bibliographic systems. 
Exploitative control is “the ability to make the best use of a body of writings … the 
wielder of perfect exploitative control has merely to say what he wants writings for and is then 
provided with what will suit the purpose best, whatever it is” (Wilson, 1968, p. 25). If descriptive 
power was the intellectual act of creating bibliographical representational structures, exploitative 
control allows that power to be put into practice within systems in ways that meet individual 
needs. Scholars have also made the reasonable leap to say that exploitative control is a way in 
which we can think about information retrieval within the area of information science (Coyle, 
2016, p. 40; Smiraglia, 2007). That one can “have the power to procure the best textual means to 
ones end” (1968, p. 22, my emphasis) is a vital contribution by Wilson to Information Studies, 
not the least of which because it brings a focus onto the user and has helped refine the ways in 
which we conceptualize and sharpen our information systems for specific uses. That is to say: 
information and knowledge organization systems are made for communities to use information 
that best suit their information needs. Finding sets of documents is one thing, but it is quite 
another to say that said information is useful as a function of its contextualized use. Karen Coyle 
articulates the importance of this concept within the discipline of bibliography: 
[Wilson] begins by stating something that seems obvious but is also generally missing from cataloging 
theory, which is that people read for a purpose, and that they come to the library looking for the best text 
(Wilson limits his argument to texts) for their purpose. This user need was not included in Cutter’s 
description of the catalog as an “efficient instrument.” By Wilson’s definition, Cutter (and the international 
principles that followed) dealt only with one catalog function: “bibliographic control” the second is the 
appraisal of texts, which facilitates the exploitation of the texts by the reader. This has traditionally been 
limited to the realm of scholarly bibliography or of “recommender” services (2016, p. 39). 
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Richard Smiraglia also notes that the concept of exploitative power “gave succeeding 
generations of researchers a means of measuring efficacy of systems for knowledge organization. 
Whatever enabled exploitative power was efficacious; whatever obfuscated exploitative power, 
and this was most of the bibliographical apparatus, was not efficacious” (2007, p. 1). Retrieval is 
the “operationalization” (Tennis, 2006) of purpose predicated on the extensive and effective 
establishment and implementation of descriptive structures. And indeed, as Wilson makes quite 
clear, while the “two sorts of power have been contrasted as sharply as possible, as is desirable in 
an exercise in analysis,” “no doubt the limited power actually possessed by people are complex 
mixtures of the two” (Wilson, 1968, p. 29). The process of nomenclatural control is not different 
in kind from that of documentary retrieval. The ultimate goal is to call up a name, and all of its 
associated conceptual documentation, and to use that information for scientific and taxonomic 
work. 
Systematizing nomenclature. 
So then, how can we frame the concepts of description and exploitation within the 
Catalogue of Life? By examining the process of nomenclatural management within this system, I 
can illustrate how these two principles play-out as part of the practice of building authoritative 
databases. In November of 2016, the Catalogue of Life invited me to a closed workshop titled, 
“NAMES in November” (Global Biodiversity and Information Facility, 2016b; Global Names 
Architecture, 2016b; Pape [@fleshflies], 2016) hosted by both the Catalogue of Life and the 
Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) in Leiden, Netherlands. The function of this 
gathering was to “to discuss classification, taxonomy, nomenclature, and vernaculars in context 
of the practical aspects to develop a single fully open-access and 'all encompassing' taxonomic 
backbone maintained and owned by the taxonomic community that will serve the needs of the 
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broader user community” (Schalk, 2016a). Even while the Catalogue, GBIF, and other 
participants of the iLife consortium have certainly made incredible strides in coordinating 
nomenclatural and taxonomic work, a concerted and clear effort needed to be made to refine 
service interoperability based upon this vision of a single, sustainable taxonomic backbone, and 
to be able to maintain this structure into the future. As previously discussed, names are a 
foundational part of not only taxonomic work, but biodiversity work in general. Without an 
adequate pool of authoritative and controlled set names, accurate scientific work cannot proceed 
adequately, and the proliferation of data sources compounds the generalized problem (Boyle et 
al., 2013). As Brian Heidorn has indicated, huge volumes of data, the “primary outputs of the 
scientific enterprise,” are still unavailable to scientists, meaning they are “dark data” and thus 
unavailable, or invisible, to the scientific community for the production of new knowledge 
(2008, p. 280). The first order of business for taxonomic databases is to get all possible names 
aggregated so that taxonomic authorities have the basic building blocks available to them. In 
order for biodiversity information to become semantically meaningful and truthful (Floridi, 
2010, p. 20) all the generalized data needs to be consulted at the outset.  
Given these non-trivial issues, partitioning and coordinating the management of names is 
a top priority for these biodiversity scientists and informaticians. One fact was clear about the 
NAMES meeting: the problems posed, and the solutions articulated, were to remain focused on 
the intellectual, theoretical, and policy needs to satisfactorily coordinate knowledge, and not—as 
usually seems to be the case—to concern itself with “technical solutions” or computational 
capacities. The technical issues were to be handled at a completely different meeting currently 
unscheduled within the 2017 year.55 What follows are the salient issues that were raised by this 
                                                
55 The outcome of this NAMES meeting will be a position paper that delineates the general impediments to 
nomenclatural and taxonomic coordination. 
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group of professionals, as well as some preliminary schematics for how the nomenclatural 
landscape can be adequately managed given the various temporal and professional complexities 
related to species concepts that were described above.  
 In order to gain a sense of the scope of the meeting, here are some select questions the 
meeting was intended to ponder: 
• What does the world need as a nomenclatural resource? 
• How can we (sustainably) get the content we need? 
• How can we build on existing databases and expertise? 
• What models may work for curation of these data? 
• Should crowdsourcing be used some form? 
• How should we handle newly-published names? A central repository? 
• What about vernacular names, manuscript or informal names (“Carabus sp. Leiden”), Barcode 
Identification Numbers, etc.? 
• How do we deal with conflicts? 
• Who should be allowed to contribute, and how should these rights be partitioned across datasets? 
• How do we credit contributors? 
• How to deal with (living) data quality indicators? 
• What need is there for different national, regional or thematic views? 
 
As can be seen, many of the questions relate to our previous discussion of contingent 
documentation. Two primary documentary issues at hand are: (1) how this ecology is going to 
delineate clear boundaries between one entity and another given similar and overlapping 
nomenclatural needs within each organization, and (2) how will the Catalogue of Life, if indeed 
it were to continue as the central nomenclator and resource for validated taxa, manage its porous 
boundaries given the necessity of ongoing contributions, necessary re-combinatory views 
(national, regional, thematic), and (though the subject of a later chapter) the increasing 
production of barcodes that are not “meaningful” within the system (in the sense in which Floridi 
discusses above with regard to information). 
In Figure 12, below, you will see the general parameters (and their overlap) between all the 
potential names (the entire namespace) and the Catalogue of Life (with structured names into 
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taxonomic knowledge) as articulated by Thierry Bourgoin.56 This schematic illustrates a birds-
eye view of the stages and steps of nomenclatural (and taxonomic) management for scientific 
purposes, as well as the intellectual and editorial spectrum by which all undifferentiated name 
text strings become organized into valid taxa and become associated with valid concepts. Dr. 
Bourgoin outlines five general actions within the biodiversity knowledge continuum that merit 
addressing: Stage 1: Names as Strings (all names); Stage 2: Scientific names; Stage 3: Potential 
taxa/Chresonym (Names+Reference+Usage); Stage 4: Valid Taxa; and Stage 5: Alternative 
Classifications and Phylogenies. Note the orange circle labeled “Management classif.” toward 
the right of the illustration—this is where the Catalogue of Life management classification fits 
within this schematic. For the purposes of this chapter we will only concern ourselves with the 
procedural space to the left of the production of valid taxa and the management classification, or 
Stage 1 through Stage 3.57 
 
                                                
56 It should be noted that the terminology used in this figure conforms to the International Code of Nomenclature 
for algae, fungi, and plants, which is clear by Bourgoin’s usage of basionym, which is defined in Article 6.10 of the 
ICNAFP (International Association for Plant Taxnomy, 2011). The equivalent in the ICZN is “original 
combination.”    
 
57 Taxonomic production and the Catalogue’s management classification and its multifold issues will be the subject 
of our next chapter after the nomenclature landscape has been adequately described. 
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Figure 12. Global Names-Catalogue of Life Parameters. Source: Thierry Bourgoin (2016). 
Toward a universe of all possible tokens: Global Names Index to Nomenclators 
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biodiversity world than in the bibliographical, though in the former’s case, names become the 
extensive agent and portal by and through which database environments can point to and access 
any particular document within the biodiversity domain. Fundamentally, the nomenclatural act is 
both a representational object as well as a descriptive one. In the bibliographic world, subject 
terms, facets, controlled vocabularies, etc., all serve a collocative function, but in the biodiversity 
world, this function rests almost completely on the name itself. 
“Names as String”/‘all names,’ the first stage in Bourgoin’s schematic, is the entire 
hypothetical pool of undifferentiated names produced around the world—those in scientific 
form, vernacular/common form, etc. Due to their un-validated status, names in this space are text 
strings of potential significance. I mean significance here in two sense: (1) in terms of well-
formed units as that will function with a computational ecology of specific name formulations, 
and (2) in terms of whether or not it is the valid use of the name. The Global Names Architecture 
(GNA) (Global Names Architecture, 2017c) has arisen to serve a vital name-differentiating 
function in the biodiversity world. The Global Names Architecture has been implemented as “a 
system of web-services which helps people … register, find, index, check and organize 
biological scientific names and interconnect on-line information about species” (2017b). It 
should be noted that the GNA’s strength lies in names that derive from the zoological or 
botanical codes of nomenclature, so as has been the case, my examples and general statements 
refer to the rules that manage the production of names within these two broad domains. The 
name-space within the GNA that represents the entirety of all possible name instances is called 
the Global Names Index (GNI). The GNI is “an index of name strings in the broadest sense 
(including code-compliant scientific names, vernacular names, surrogates, identifiers and 
erroneous versions of names), with links to sources that have the names and to the associated 
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data or metadata associated with names. GNI is a core element of the GNA. This is referred to as 
a ‘dirty bucket’ because it is a raw list; but every item in it has a scientific context or indexes 
scientific content” (2017d). Content for the GNI is contributed by many organizations and 
collected from online sources (Global Names Architecture, 2017a). As was previously indicated, 
the Biodiversity Heritage Library (BHL) is an enterprise that has cropped up to manage the 
digitization of historical documents in order to contribute names to the global names-collecting 
enterprise, and is currently attempting to coordinate the contribution of their contextualized name 
data to the GNI space. Libraries including the Natural History Museum, London, and the 
Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History in Washington, D.C., contribute digitized 
literature that are then made available to the global biodiversity community as a central source 
for historical taxonomic literature. As names are collected with the assistance of optical character 
reader (OCR) software, a good deal of errors are introduced to the text, which is another task 
facing those differentiating this namespace.  
As of August 2015, the GNI data bank contained upwards of twenty-three million names 
strings which contains a mixture of both “good” and “bad” names (Global Names Architecture, 
2016a)—a combination of current, outdated, valid, and invalid scientific names. The process of 
assessing this namespace, orthographic format, adherence to nomenclatural codes, and, 
ultimately, getting “[endorsement] by a taxonomist” brings us to Stage 2 of the GN-CoL 
Parameters scheme produced by Bourgoin: that of assessing which of these name strings qualify 
as well-formed scientific names.58 Given the Catalogue’s functional estimate of 2 million total 
global species, actions need to be taken to differentiate what should be allowed to proceed in 
                                                
58 Dr. Bourgoin, aside from scientific name, notes that Stage 2 also includes the aggregation of canonic and 
trinomial names. Canonic names are names stripped of any other information aside from their Latinate components, 
while trinomials are formed when “when a subgenus or a subspecies is added to the species name” (Global Names 
Architecture, 2017d). 
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their checklist system and what is deemed “bad” (invalid, not agreed-upon) name data (See also 
Pyle, 2016, pp. 270–271).59 Thus, after all name strings have been aggregated, the next step is to 
decide which are correctly formed scientific names in this sense.60 The GNA provides an 
overview of what qualifies a term as being “scientific”: 
Scientific names are latinized [sic]. Alternative names are common names (also referred to as vernacular or 
colloquial or familiar or informal - such as cat, dog, crow, maple); there are surrogates for names (being 
name-strings that may refer to a culture, or some term by which an organism is widely known in, for 
example, research settings) … A species name is distinctive. It is made of two parts, a genus and a species 
part (Homo sapiens, Drosophila melanogaster). These are binomial names. Not all latinized [sic] binomial 
names that have a capital letter at the front are organisms: ‘Anorexia nervosa is an eating disorder, and 
Habeas corpus is a legal term’) (2016a). 
 
Lists endeavoring to collect all names, across all kingdoms of the biodiversity world, must 
contend with hundreds, perhaps thousands of database index lists, many of which are far less 
curated than the examples we’ll cite from Kew below. On top of these many data sources, each 
list contains potentially thousands or hundreds of thousands of names, which quickly makes for a 
rather onerous and messy process of disambiguation and error reconciliation for the governing 
body/bodies that attempt to take on this management role. Both the distributed nature of these 
various database sources, and the multiple formats in which these lists exist, present multifold 
issues for nomenclatural organization. Richard Pyle articulates the main issues associated with 
names within the computational arena, especially with regard to digitizing analog material: 
                                                
59 Even if we take a more generous approach to the global species count, estimating upwards of 8.7 million species 
(Mora, Tittensor, Adl, Simpson, & Worm, 2011), the GNI name pool is still comparatively large.  
 
60 Bourgoin’s model presupposes a nomenclature pool that contains only scientific names. Discussions were had 
during the NAMES conference concerning whether or not the Catalogue should also include common names and 
various other non-formal iterations of the valid scientific version. While the CoL contains common names as part of 
its data set, the question becomes whether or not comprehensive coverage of common names should be a general 
aim of their efforts. NAMES participants voiced support for both opinions: those that articulated a need for 
comprehensive common names pointed to their importance as mechanisms for retrieval; those that preferred 
common names as optimal, but not priority, pointed to the pure volume of possible common name instances. One 
issue here is that common names—produced as they are in local contexts—can be expressed in a number of 
languages, so any given scientific name produces any number of common forms. Scientific names are more 
manageable in this context because language is not an issue since they need to be expressed in Latinate formulations 
regardless of the country in which they originated.  
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The rapid evolution in recent decades of computer database management software, and of information 
dissemination via the Internet, have both dramatically improved the potential for streamlining the entire 
taxonomic process. Unfortunately, the potential still largely exceeds the reality. The vast majority of 
taxonomic information is either not yet digitized, or digitized in a form that does not allow direct and easy 
access. Moreover, the information that is easily accessed in digital form is not yet seamlessly 
interconnected in an effort to bring reality closer to potential, a loose affiliation of major taxonomic 
resources, including GBIF, the Encyclopedia of Life, NBII, Catalog of Life (sic), ITIS, IPNI, ICZN, Index 
Fungorum, and many others have been crafting a “Global Names Architecture” (GNA) (2016, p. 261).  
 
Bourgoin’s first stage is, as mentioned previously, primarily orthographical, ensuring that the 
GNI pool is pared-down to terminology that generally match the spelling, language, and formal 
conventions of the scientific nomenclature system. To perform these kinds of text differentiating 
activities, however—especially when dealing with data sets with over twenty million text 
strings—is a nearly impossible task for any group of individuals to achieve, particularly since 
new names are being constantly added into the GNI. Name matching services, based on various 
lexical algorithmic software, are available to help facilitate this process (Pilsk, Kalfatovic, & 
Richard, 2016; Vanden Berghe et al., 2015). GBIF has its own open source name parsing tool 
that “can be used to automate some processes while digitizing or curating lists of scientific 
names” (GBIF, 2011, 2017). GNA also has its own Global Names Resolver (2017b) that 
examines text strings to assess whether a name is a scientific name, correctly spelled, currently in 
use, and a host of other variables (2017a). But algorithms and name resolvers have their 
limitations, especially given the name-to-concept mapping issues that were described above. 
Minute differences between nomenclatural codes can also present some issues for automated 
resolvers, since orthographic conventions between the botanical and zoological codes sometimes 
call for different (and conflicting) nomenclatural conditions that must be assessed individually to 
come to a decision. One example, noted by Richard Pyle (R. L. Pyle, 2008, n. 11:53) is the “ex” 
designator in a name such as Anthias ventralis Randall 1979 ex Thompson, which in the 
zoological code indicates that ‘Randall 1979 published a new name Anthias ventralis, “but based 
it on the intellectual work of Thompson”’ (2008). In the botanical code, however, Pyle notes the 
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same concept is conveyed in the exact opposite manner and order as dictated in the zoological 
code: ‘Anthias ventralis Thomp. Ex. Rand.’ Such inconsistencies plague the nomenclatural 
landscape and illustrate the extent to which names-as-tokens are less than optimal and consistent. 
The next step in the process, as Patterson, et. al, have articulated, is that scientific names 
must also be “compliant with the relevant code of nomenclature, or, if the codes do not apply to 
them (for example, because they are names of high ranking taxa), they are written in a 
comparable form consistent with the expectations of biologists” (2016, p. 3).This is the task of 
nomenclators. Nomenclators provide a listing of “code governed facts” (T. Orrell, private 
communication, February 6, 2017)—the sandbox space where well-formed and scientifically-
valid names can be aggregated for subsequent taxonomic use. As conveyed by David Patterson, 
et al., nomenclators must first “indicate the correct orthography of each scientific name, [then] 
accompany it with the name of its author, the date when the name was introduced, and a citation 
pointing to where it was first used. This may be in the form of a condensed micro-
citation…Nomenclators develop lists of scientific names of taxa, but are not lists of taxa because 
a nomenclator makes no evaluation as to the taxonomic status of a name” (2014, p. 2). 
Nomenclators and listings such as International Plant Names Index (IPNI), located at Royal 
Botanic Gardens, Kew, live in this name and text space. Lists serve a variety of “requirements” 
(Croft et al., 1999, p. 320) within the biodiversity world, and ultimately must meet the following 
needs: 
• they contain names at each rank with their places and dates of publications, 
• they employ consistently community standards for data and abbreviations, etc., 
• they represent authoritative expert knowledge, 
• they are exhaustive, 
• they are kept current, 
• they are freely accessible, 
• they can be queried in a variety of ways, with any needed information being downloadable, 
• and they entail minimum effort and cost to the systematic community for their upkeep (1999, p. 320). 
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Many of these articulated requirements, when inserted in distributed infrastructures, become 
problematic to control for any number of reasons, including apportioning responsibility for these 
activities within the iLife platforms; being able to gather all names in some unified fashion’ 
managing communication of feedback between platforms to maintain database currency; 
establishing long-term cooperative funding, etc. Some of these issues formed the core questions 
and concerns posed to the NAMES in November group in Leiden. 
Nomenclatural listings are generally maintained as databases in contemporary practice, 
especially if one wants to remain relevant and share information beyond local labs or sites. Lists 
dating back to the 18th century, however, are equally valid for today’s research given how 
important historical knowledge is to the contemporary taxonomic community. Into the early 
1980’s analog lists were the most prevalent and only form of data used in taxonomic practice 
(recall here the brief discussion of data types and data siloes in the opening chapter of this 
manuscript). Once nomenclator listings started making their way into the digital arena, all of 
these legacy documents needed to be converted into digital, tabular form. Index Fungorum 
(Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 2017c), an initiative that initially began at the Centre for 
Agriculture and Biosciences International (CABI), is an example of such retroactive conversion. 
While interviewing Paul Kirk, current editor of Index Fungorum, at his Kew office in London, he 
began our meeting by pointing to a row of books sitting on the shelf above his desk that 
collectively formed the core text for the now-digital Index Fungorum. When the Mycology 
Institute integrated information technologies into their work processes, Paul Kirk and colleagues 
meticulously transferred the Index of Fungi (Petrak, 1969), a 625-page dictionary of fungal 
terms, as well as numerous index cards inherited from subscription-based index listing services 
prior to the 1980’s, into digital form in the late 1980’s and 1990’s (Kirk, 2016). These now 
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aggregated print sources form the historical core of Index Fungorum, which as of April 2017, 
holds 532,288 online records contributed by over 1,000 individual authors (2017b).  As is 
evidenced by Index Fungorum, lists are usually created for specific domains (for plants, fungi, 
lichen, beetles, and other species a biodiversity specialist may emphasize and records as an 
organic result of working practices) for use at some local and institutional level. The Royal 
Botanic Gardens, Kew’s International Plants Name Index (IPNI) (Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 
2017e) is another prevalent example, the composition of which is bounded, generally, by those 
organisms governed by the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants.  
Building networks: Linking tokens and documents. 
 I would now like to more closely examine the linking activity that is undertaken by 
nomenclators, essential as it is in connected various forms of biodiversity evidence. In reality, 
the orthographic cleanup described above happens in tandem with this step, but for illustrative 
and analytic purposes it makes sense to discuss them as distinct activities. The GNA provides a 
mechanism for this kind of linking activity, a service called the Global Name Usage Bank 
(GNUB). The purpose of GNUB “is to index and assign persistent globally unique identifiers 
(GUIDs) to Agents, References, and Taxon Name Usage (TNU) instances (among other relevant 
data objects). Agents are people and organizations, and in the context of GNUB mostly represent 
Authors of References. References include all published literature, as well as many forms of 
unpublished documentation (e.g., unpublished reports and manuscripts, specimen labels, 
herbarium sheets, field notes, etc.)” (R. Pyle, 2016, pp. 270–271). In other words, the GNUB 
documents all usages of names so that they become part of an interconnected network of 
collective biodiversity meaning. Further, the TNU might also be associated with any number of 
metadata elements relevant to the nomenclature process (or part of the species concept and 
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taxonomic articulation process), such as type designation (which may include a set of 
specimens—holotypes, paratypes, syntypes, etc.—from which the circumscription was 
articulated), geo-coordinate estimations, molecular data, figures, etc.61  
Recall that any name must be validly published in order to be deemed in circulation as 
known scientific information, and the specific date in which a name is coined is used to assess 
the priority of one naming act over another. It is one thing to list well-formed names, but it is 
quite another to be able to give those names context and conceptual heft by indicating how that 
name has been invoked as part of the discourse of biodiversity knowledge. The validation and 
hierarchy of term usages cannot be completed without understanding the “infinite network” 
(Deleuze, 1987, p. 587) of signs and how these signs refer to the objects that give them 
credibility as part of the rules that govern nomenclature. Returning once again to Figure 12, there 
are two faint boxes surrounding Stages 1-3 of the diagram, as well as Stages 3-4—the box to the 
left is the domain of entities like the GNI, GNA, and nomenclators (entities that govern the more 
objective assessment of valid “factual” forms of names), while the box on the right is the domain 
of the global species databases, regional species databases, and the Catalogue of Life (where 
more subjective assessments about taxa are made). The center area, Stage 3, where linkages 
between “Names+References+usages” occurs, is the start of where “knowledge” begins to play a 
role in nomenclatural spaces. Note also the red arrow and red circles running at the bottom of 
Bourgoin’s figure, and how we are slowly moving away from organizing entities according to 
prescribes rules to more subjective modes of knowledge-making. As the GNA articulates, “All 
such usages [of the name statement] of all species in all documents make up humanity’s 
knowledge of the biosphere” (2015). To be part of collective knowledge in this sense, terms 
                                                
61 Syntypes are “two or more specimens selected from the available material to serve as types” (Winston, 1999, p. 
104) when no holotype is designated.  
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themselves must be semantically meaningful, according to Floridi, in that names are given 
meanings that allow them to circulate as defined components within the nomenclatural system. 
In order for any taxonomic assessment to take place during the latter part of this process, all of 
the basic tokens must be properly linked to the descriptions (circumscriptions) of the concepts 
they represent, so they can then be recombined and altered relatively easily moving forward.  
Calling out two specific issues in mapping historical name usages in Stage 3, Bourgoin 
identifies the assessment of basionyms and chresonyms as particular kinds of nomenclatural 
complications that occur in this indexing space. Disambiguating basionym and chresonym use 
requires more expert taxonomic knowledge to categorize within the name space (certainly other 
issues present themselves as part of this process, though given space constraints, I will only be 
focusing on those mentioned by Bourgoin). In the first instance, chresonyms are “references to 
the use of a name. They can be presented in many formats … Problems arise when the format is 
simply "Name + user" (such as Homo sapiens Smith, 2005). This is intended to indicate Smith's 
use [not designation of the original concept] of Homo sapiens in an item published in 2005. This 
form is not distinguishable in form from code-compliant names” (David J. Patterson et al., 2006, 
p. 371) (which follows the form, Name + species concept designator). The problem in this case is 
that, without careful attention, these names can often be mistaken as a synonym for a validly 
published name, but this is not the case, as a chresonym is not code-compliant (Global Names 
Architecture, 2017d). Such instances require “the need for taxonomic intelligence to 
disambiguate them from homonyms” (David J. Patterson et al., 2006, p. 371) (an instance of two 
names identically spelled representing two different taxon).  
Given the continual updating of the relationships between species concepts and the names 
that represent them, close attention must be paid to how these two evolve in tandem over time. 
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Leading to the second complication, that of the basionym,62 which is a linkage between name 
forms that indicate “the relationship between a new combination and its original combination 
…really just a pointer back to the original combination of a name” (R. L. Pyle, 2008). The 
basionym often forms part of the new name combination in some way. For example, Micromussa 
amakusensis Veron, 1990 (World Register of Marine Mammals (WoRMS), 2015) is the current 
scientific name for a species of marine coral most frequently found around Japan, but the 
previous name, Acanthastrea amakusensis Veron, 1990, is the previous combination of species 
when it was re-classified in the Acanthastrea genus and removed from the Micromussa genus. 
Thus, mapping out basionym designations within a nomenclator refines the networks of semantic 
units. Closely mapping out transformation of name forms over time, spurred on by changing 
interpretation of species circumscriptions, makes for more accurate communication of scientific 
knowledge. The NAMES meeting made it very clear that combinations and names usages were 
of high priority in an idealized nomenclator system. 
Finally, the homotypic synonym (for the botanical code)—or objective synonym (for the 
zoological code)—refers to two names for the same taxon that share a type specimen(s) as well 
as a basionym (Global Names Architecture, 2017d). As Patterson et al. have indicated, “The 
most significant known challenge with the use of names as metadata is the ‘many names for one 
taxon’ problem” (2016, p. 3). In all of these cases, the purpose is not merely to connect the 
names within these index spaces, but also to connect the various circumscriptions, references, 
and historical variations to facilitate the accurate and efficient application of taxonomic 
structures using the metadata surrounding these name tokens.  
                                                
62 Or original combination as it is expressed in the zoological code (Rapini, 2014). 
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On another level, synonyms are essential tools in making an information system 
exploitable in the sense that Patrick Wilson uses the term. Thomas Orrell of the Smithsonian 
National Museum of Natural History made the point, on numerous occasions, how important 
“synonymic amplification” was for the discovery of information (T. Orrell, personal 
communication, June 15, 2016). The more synonyms that are mapped and documented within 
the system, the more likely an individual will find the information needed. “Relationships are at 
the very heart of knowledge organization,” as Rebecca Green has astutely noted (2008, p. 151), 
and in specific, interconcept relationships are of particular interest here. “With equivalence 
relationships, synonymy (e.g., dog, canine), quasi-synonymy (e.g., lexical relationships, 
paradigmatic relationships), and occasionally antonymy (e.g., good, evil) are expressed by 
choosing one of the set of terms as an authorized descriptor and using it in lieu of all others” 
(2008, p. 156). This description sounds quite familiar to the ways in which we can think about 
the relationships between a valid scientific name, its basionym, chresonym, and so forth. Gerald 
Guala (2016), also of the Smithsonian NMNH, examined the role of synonyms for searches in  
PLoS, PMC, PubMed or Scopus. Using scientific names from ITIS that were mapped to 
synonyms, Guala found significant increases in citation recall and precision rates when 
synonyms were used. Synonymic amplification, then, serves both a descriptive purpose within a 
nomenclator system (in that it allows scientists the ability to line up relevant documents), but it 
also provides an exploitative purpose (in that it also helps facilitate the best use of said 
information).   
Before proceeding to Bourgoin’s next stage of biodiversity taxonomic knowledge 
creation in the next chapters—that of articulating valid taxa, taxonomies, and, ultimately, 
phylogenies—it makes sense to stop and think about how all of the aforementioned name-token 
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control might be dealt with within the Catalogue and iLife’s ecology. Granted, the NAMES 
meeting in Leiden was meant to focus on the theoretical aspects of nomenclature, but 
nonetheless, there was some discussion about how nomenclature might be handled procedurally 
and institutionally given its distributed nature and current challenges. In the end, this brief foray 
into technicalities allowed the participants to draw boundaries around what nomenclature issues 
they should and should not attempt to manage within each of their organizational boundaries.  
Controlling complexity: The Catalogue of Life Plus. 
 One of the clear outcomes of the NAMES meeting was that there needed to be a focus on 
utilizing present infrastructures and existing informatics tools to streamline the process of 
nomenclatural control. The general consensus of participants was that the Catalogue of Life 
could manage this complex nomenclature activity given its already-deep investment in an edited, 
high-standard global checklist, its long-standing partnerships with global service databases, and 
its current initiative in progress known as Catalogue of Life Plus. Peter Schalk, Executive 
Secretary for the Catalogue of Life and Governing Board Chair for GBIF, explains the 
Catalogue’s extension as follows: 
The Catalogue of Life has ten or eleven fields that we ask for from the [contributing] databases, which is 
fine if you, say, want to find out about the name, want to know the major synonyms (we don't have all of 
them), or want to know the hierarchy... then you can find what information you need. But there are people 
that want to have other, more-detailed information in those databases. Actually, the idea behind the 
Catalogue of Life is that you go to find a particular species and then you have the ability to drill down into 
the contributed databases where all the information is living. There is actually a demand for a Catalogue of 
Life that has a lot of information living at the bottom that is already indexed ... This kind of service would 
encompass a broader definition of the Catalogue of Life with more fields. Another thing is they would 
basically like to find all the names. Because you can’t type in a name that we don't have because it hasn't 
yet been processed. But [taxonomists] do generally have an idea where it belongs—that's what GNA [has] 
done. They harvested all the names, threw [them] into a system, and made relations between the names so 
you know more or less where it belongs. But it hasn't yet been vetted by experts, and edited. That is where 
the Catalogue of Life Plus comes in. The idea is that you take the Catalogue of Life, and you create around 
it a cloud of all of the names that haven't been processed by the GSDs, but that can be linked to certain 
sectors. So when you do a search you can either say, hey, my name has been found, this is a valid name or a 
synonym vetted by that-and-that person in the gold standard core of the Catalogue of Life; or no, your 
name lives in the outer cloud, it belongs in this corner and it's probably a synonym of that-and-that species 
but it hasn't been checked yet. But I do get an answer and I know ... where it most likely belongs. And that's 
where we go wrong. So there is, in total, about, we have I think, 4 million names in the [Catalogue of Life] 
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and there must be about 20 million names floating around in GNA and I would like to map them against a 
central concept, even if it is vaguely. And if there are a lot of questions coming in from the outside that say, 
I would like to know about the species, and they are in the outer cloud, I can actually direct my GSDs to 
process this part and bring it in. And the idea is to slowly consume that cloud and bring it into the gold 
standard so everything has been mapped. So the Catalogue of Life Plus has to do that. It has to be complete 
[with] all the species, about two million, and to have on board all the names that are floating around in 
literature (2016b). 
 
To reiterate once again, quality taxonomies and checklists depend upon the linkages of names to 
documents (Taxon Name Usages) and names/concepts to names/concepts (historical variances, 
synonyms, etc.). All amid a word-hoard that is steadily growing and iteratively updated. The 
sheer size of the task, and the human-power necessary to disambiguate nomenclature 
ambiguities, is beyond the reach of any one organization—coordinated approaches are absolutely 
necessary. Organizations such as the Catalogue of Life have taken it upon themselves to collect 
all possible tokens and to provide a mechanism whereby user feedback can refine the 
nomenclatural system. What Peter Schalk’s quote above shows is that exhaustive documentation 
and differentiation of names—while a theoretical endpoint and an ultimate goal—is not practical 
given both the current circumstances and the relative infancy of these projects.63 Schalk, and by 
extension the Catalogue, is advocating for a multi-tiered approach, where carefully curated 
namespaces can exist in tandem with the created capacity to identify the range of variables in any 
instance of use.  
In order to manage this contingency, a workflow needs to be established to stagger 
biodiversity knowledge according to the extent it has been curated and examined by taxonomic 
professionals. If we think of Bourgoin’s Global Names-Catalogue of Life Parameters figure once 
again, we need to know exactly what name tokens are in each stage of the differentiation process 
at any given point in time. The Catalogue also needs to ensure that each of these ‘holding spaces’ 
for vocabularies are distinct enough that name transfers between them are carefully controlled 
                                                
63 It should also be noted that computational biodiversity methods is also a relatively recent occurrence given much 
nomenclatural practices trace their origins with the work of Linnaeus in the 18th century. 
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and documented. As a GBIF representative at the NAMES meeting conveyed, “[what I want is a] 
mechanism [whereby] I can give a name to some system (a name string, including those that 
come with a genus and barcode id) [where] I can get an appropriate taxa for it [and] tie to other 
data sources … [and] be given back a [vetted] token… The names are nothing to me in their own 
right. Names to workable concept[s]. Names linked to taxa are what are important.” (personal 
communication, November 10, 2016). The Catalogue of Life Plus Layer Schematic (Figure 13) 
is a draft illustration of what Dr. Schlock describes above, and one that provides the workflow 
mechanisms necessary to manage the nomenclature process as described by this GBIF 
representative. 
The outer level of the Catalogue of Life Plus Layer Schematic is the pool of Operational 
Taxonomic Units (OTU) designations and various other genetic sequences that haven’t yet been 
readily reviewed and matched to traditional Linnaean species concept name designations. An 
OTU is a computationally taxonomic unit—somewhat equivalent to a species name in the 
Linnaean sense in that the token represents a conceptual taxon unit—quite common in the 
examination of microbial biodiversity (He et al., 2015), but also used within other biological 
domains to designate species sets within a group of genetically tested individuals. An OTU 
name, or designator, represents a “taxa yielded by grouping of specimens through a set of 
[genetic] markers” (Blaxter, 2004, p. 2). The issue here is that an OTU name (represented by a 
genetic code token, for example) cannot easily be corresponded to species concepts as they are 
expressed in Linnaean nomenclatural forms (in traditional scientific names) or the taxonomies 
these names are embedded within. For the Catalogue of Life Plus to be able to match these OTUs 
with their traditional scientific name counterparts, the system will require a kind of informational 
“hook” attached to it, such as a “code, sequence, specimen, or mixture of specimens” that can be 
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connected into the already-existing knowledge network. This activity will take a great deal of 
intervention, but is seen as quite essential if the Catalogue of Life is going to be able to move 
forward as the nomenclatural core of the iLife ecology. As one NAMES meeting attendee 
indicated, “In the past we have used a paper based approach to catalogue life. If we want to 
accelerate that and carry out this work forward, we need to give [taxonomists] a robust 
framework to deal with concepts. Some of this stuff around the edges, particularly sequence-
based, is essential.” And even though scientists are decades away from applying names to this 
(growing) set of data, building a mechanism for solving the widening gap is key. If true 
exploitative power is going to be gained from the system of documentation these issues needs to 
be rectified.64 
Another group of textual objects mentioned by participants that can live in this outer 
“OTU” space of the Catalogue Plus are vernacular and common names. Up until now, while the 
“common name” field is “obligatory, if available” (Species 2000, 2014) in the Catalogue 
standard dataset (see Figure 8, chapter 1), questions remain as to how much effort should be 
focused on the exhaustive completion of vernacular names as a priority for the Catalogue (or any 
global nomenclator for that matter). Some meeting participants indicated that the system “should 
accommodate them when important, but not prioritize it general,” while others felt the task was 
far too complicated to take up as part of this initial planning effort. One scientist noted that 
informal, vernacular names shouldn't be treated as just another OTU identifier, especially given 
the fact that any formally named species would have multiple common names in numerous 
languages. Additionally, there would be no way to assess how many names potentially constitute 
this vernacular space, so thus no proper goals, or assessment of progress, could be articulated. 
                                                
64 See chapter five for more discussion of taxonomic systems that fall outside the boundaries of the Catalogue of 
Life. 
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Even as scientists disagree on the number of species currently on the planet, at least some 
mechanisms are in place to estimate these numbers. It was generally decided that vernacular 
names should be left as-is and connected to the validated data when/if the occasion calls for such 
linkage at the point of use. The point of having an outer pool of text strings is so that potential 
linkages can be made in the future without having to set in place expert time and effort in less 
prioritized data points.  
 
 
Figure 13. Catalogue of Life Plus Layer Schematic  
 
Moving progressively inward in the Catalogue of Life Plus Layer Schematic, the middle 
section is “Col Plus/Linnaean names” section, which contains Linnaean/scientific names that 
have not yet been brought into the formally curated center section. This area “represents all 
scientific names (Linnaean names) that would be covered in a nomenclator and are either 
available or unavailable and also all subsequent name combinations. The reference to Linnaean 
names, [is] to separate it from names that aren’t Linnaean (i.e. OTU names)” (T. Orrell, personal 
communication Feb 3, 2017). Though much of this landscape was already covered in the 
   143 
previous section of this chapter, this is the nomenclature infrastructure component that overlaps 
with Bourgoin’s Sections 2 and 3 in Figure 12. One essential difference here is that names in this 
middle layer of Catalogue Plus may not already be contained within GSDs that are currently 
contributed into the Catalogue. Recall that the Catalogue is built by the compilation of over 160 
global databases—all of which already have a certain level of nomenclatural and taxonomic 
curation. There are species and whole taxon groups, however, that have no GSD actively 
examining their status—perhaps a GSD has not yet been created for that particular taxon (less 
charismatic species get less attention), or perhaps a just discovered species hasn’t yet received 
any research coverage. This middle-layer provides an opportunity for the Catalogue to collect 
scientific names that would not otherwise be collected through currently existing GSD sources, 
certainly important as they strive to address gaps in taxon coverage and geographic regions. 
Finally, the inner-most circle of Figure 13 is the Catalogue of Life in its current form and 
“represents scientific names in standing (available or valid based on code) that have been 
organized taxonomically” (T. Orrell, personal communication Feb 3, 2017)—what Peter Schalk 
referred to as the “gold standard core” of the Catalogue’s structure. The end result of this full 
schematic is that names could progressively move from the outer layer to the inner-layer over a 
period time, taking advantage of both the Catalogue of Life’s editorial and scientific staff as well 
as the users of the system, many of whom are experts in their particular areas of study.  
Conclusion: Fixing Complex Concept Objects 
The process of nomenclatural control, then, is the process of merging the power to 
describe documents for adequate collocation with the power to exploit those same documents for 
one’s own scientific knowledge-generating purpose. And while names may not be the “perfect 
instruments for indexing” (David J. Patterson et al., 2006, p. 370), the Catalogue is certainly 
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making a good deal of headway by structurally networking complex concepts to the shifting 
formulations of nomenclature. The documents that represent species concepts within databased 
infrastructure, however, will always be evolving and contingent, and the mechanisms scientists 
create need to be equally as flexible to account for this continuing shifting. As it stands, and as 
we saw in the previous chapter, intermittent database documents must be fixed to make them 
function as citable, circulateable entities. An inherent tension arises from these two documentary 
states. 
In Bernd Frohmann’s “Revisiting ‘what is a document?’” (2009), he points to Linda 
Zirelli’s assertion—channeling Wittgenstein— that the concept of a document need not be fixed 
in order to function effectively and properly as units of communication. Frohman states, “our 
concepts can lack fixity…what counts as following a rule can be multiple, yet we can still 
communicate and speak meaningfully” (2009, p. 294). The context in which specificity functions 
here is important, especially given such production of meanings are “as we speak” (2009, p. 
294). Systems—taxonomic or otherwise, but certainly computational—cannot interpolate minute 
divergences of meaning as part of the process of communication and retrieval. The tripartite 
interplay between names-publications-and-types must be fixed in the Catalogue in order to 
facilitate ready use. Relevance, as we well know, must be constructed by some logical 
formulation of recall and precision (algorithmic, descriptive, etc.). Fixity, rules, and, in specific, 
a well-bounded species concept is absolutely essential in the biodiversity computational field. 
But such fixity is in contradistinction to the fluidity of names, as Remsen makes clear,  
Identifiers such as names have utility in information discovery and retrieval that is directly proportional to 
the degree of correlation between the term and the associated meaning or, in the semiotic context, in the 
correlation between syntax and semantics. Laypersons may think of scientific names as stable and unique, 
where a single Latin binomial name refers to one species and remains that way for all time. In other words, 
that there is a stable one-to-one relationship between a name (syntax) and the taxon (semantics) that it 
labels. This is an important informatics pre-condition if we are to rely on names as a means to search for 
and retrieve relevant information related to taxa (2016, p. 211). 
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One of the goals of the Catalogue is to impose a sense of order within a nomenclatural landscape 
that is defined by conceptual fluctuation. Names (and thus the species concepts these names are 
associated with) are preserved and fixed within an ontologically distinct system. Such knowledge 
facilitation, however, even with the best nomenclator mechanisms in place, distances a name 
from the complex, organic concept as it exists at the conceptual level, making it incredibly 
difficult to reconstruct what Remsen called the “congruence” (2016) between a name and taxon 
concept. Such distance also precludes us from being fully able to assess the veracity of any one 
system as it applies to a particular purpose at the point of use. Recall Timothy’s Utteridge’s 
ultimate statement about databases: you still need to go to the source. The Catalogue (and any 
database) necessarily flattens and rearranges names in order to share more adequately and 
seamlessly. A core issue in understanding how this flattening is taking place is to acknowledge 
that biodiversity taxonomic systems do not deal with just one document when we speak of a 
species, but rather must conflate multiple entities that together constitute a nomenclatural 
complex concept object.  
The problems with the delivery of information at scales as large as the Catalogue is not 
only a technical hurdle to be solved by biodiversity informaticians, but it is also a theoretical 
hurdle that must be overcome by taxonomic experts. Theory circulates socially and is translated 
into practices, and biodiversity taxonomists have to reckon with the Catalogue’s unique 
epistemological position as a data management tool more than a space of taxonomic 
hypothesization. Within the culture of biodiversity science, taxonomies are understood to be a 
theoretical position about relationships, phylogenies, and ecologies. The Catalogue upsets this 
view that taxonomies must be internally consistent, for it is a taxonomic mélange concerned 
more with data collection toward the goal of easy access to the sum of global knowledge.  
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Thus, we must now discuss the Catalogue’s taxonomic identity. The next chapter 
addresses the taxonomic instrument in which the Catalogue’s name-tokens are embedded, 
borrowing from Patrick Wilson’s notion of the bibliographical instrument from Two Kinds of 
Power (1968). The Catalogue’s consensus-based management hierarchy provides the structure 
by which names become exploitable, but it also articulates a particular position about how 
biodiversity knowledge can and should be shaped and interpreted for effective information 
management. However, unlike the nomenclature discussed in this chapter, taxonomy has no 
unified code to guide its production; they are subjective productions that assert positions. 
Taxonomies inhabit a hybrid space by being both information retrieval structures and intellectual 
(hypothetical) scientific formulations. By including a species concept into a taxonomic 
framework we force that concept into the form of a unified document that presents a particular 
point of view. Is such exploitation favorable over descriptive-oriented taxonomic modes? How 
can we articulate the differences between the two structures? What are the implications of this 
schism on how we understand the context of taxonomic document-as-instrument? 
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Chapter 4: Documentary Instruments: Taxonomic Specifications, Consensus, and 
Interpretive Flexibility 
Introduction 
 Up until this point I have spoken primarily of “units” of information—the Catalogue-as-
document, the functional documentary entities and productions of the Catalogue, as well as the 
documents that are used to collectively create the species concept represented as a name-token 
within the database. Specimens and descriptive literature provide the primary evidence for the 
species concepts, while names anchor that information within a system of well-formed and 
accepted scientific tokens. Knowing now that the documentary units of biodiversity databases 
can be understood to inhabit a scale from data to documents to nomenclature (as a document 
representation) to taxonomy, I would like to switch our focus to what it means to call a taxonomy 
a document, and how we can begin to frame its structure as a kind of knowledge production that 
is central to the delivery and interpretation of biodiversity information. To do this I want to 
expand upon Patrick Wilson’s concept of the instrument of bibliography articulated in Two 
Kinds of Power: An Essay on Bibliographical Control: 
I cannot tell how much bibliographical control I have or could have simply by introspection, by memory of 
past success and failures, or by flexing my muscles. To discover what I can or might do if I would, I must 
discover what arrangements there are of which I can take advantage, what bibliographical instruments…are 
at my disposal. Which objects are bibliographical instruments? … Any text that refers in any way to any 
other text or copy of some text might be considered a potential bibliographical instrument; the set of texts 
referring in some way to other texts and copies might be identified with the entire potential bibliographical 
apparatus, which would then be identified with the entire potential bibliographical apparatus, which would 
then be a very sizeable portion of the bibliographical universe…  
 
…the essential characteristic of a bibliographical instrument is that it consists entirely or primarily of 
descriptive works, texts, and copies … [The] formal apparatus consists of bibliographies, lists of abstracts, 
catalogs (published and unpublished) of collections of writings, inventories and calendars of manuscripts, 
book review journals, guides to literatures and to repositories of copies, indexes to periodicals, review 
articles, and (now or in the future) bibliographical machines or the physical apparatus … that makes 
machines into bibliography producing machine (1968, pp. 55–57). 
 
In our documentary universe, instruments take the shape of classifications, into which names can 
be organized and classified in order to be functionally accessible. In no uncertain terms, 
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taxonomies form the basis for biodiversity discovery; they are the primary mechanisms by which 
we collocate evidentiary documents, frame those documents into an interpolated (intellectual) 
context, and then subsequently act as the access structure for information discovery and the 
production of new knowledge. The species lists, and the taxonomies that they are embedded in, 
are essential because, without them, Wilson’s powers of description and exploitation would have 
no apparatus in which to function and circulate. As a scientific instrument, the Catalogue serves 
as an “apparatus for registering, measuring, or recording a physical quantity, property, or 
phenomenon” (“instrument, n.,” 2017), of biodiversity knowledge collocated from numerous 
sub-instruments (GSDs and RSDs) throughout the globe. The previous chapter displayed the 
rather detailed intellectual, professional, and organizational apparatus necessary to control the 
creation, proliferation, and use of nomenclature. 
But, as Wilson makes clear, in order to make full use of these instruments, we must 
understand how they work and the reasoning of their complex internal structures and 
compositions. The ordering and imposition of structure onto names is, as we have seen, a 
controlled, iterative process. Rules regulate the ways in which names connect to, and are formed, 
by concepts—based on literature and types—and while any reasonable set of biologists may 
disagree as to the interpretation of these assessed documents, clear rules are in place by which 
names/concept can be reinterpreted, assessed, and validated. Far more problematic are the final 
steps in Dr. Bourgoin’s schematic (again, See Figure 12), which are a) the structuring of names 
into groupings of valid taxa (the act of classification), b) the imposition of a management 
classification (the Catalogue of Life itself), and c) the use of the management classification data 
to hypothesize and understand and postulate broad evolutionary and phylogenetic trends. These 
final steps mark the clear demarcation between organizing names into circulateable species 
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concept units, and how these units get subjectively aligned and composed within instruments of 
taxonomic knowledge and expertise. Steps a) and b) are the subjects of this chapter, while the 
latter step will be reserved for the next.  
Some pertinent questions here are: In what forms do classificatory schemes take in 
different taxonomic subdomains and what kinds of emergent information do they communicate 
as new forms of documentation? What are the resultant structures by which this information can 
be browsed and accesses? How does the Catalogue’s structure, as a system primarily defined for 
information retrieval and access, differ from traditional taxonomies that document and describe 
internally-consistent taxonomic positions? And finally, how does the Catalogue’s management 
classification, intended to be reused, shared, and manipulated into various new contexts, extend 
Wilson’s understanding of bibliographical instruments and the power they provide a user of 
information? 
Taxonomic practice is defined by competing approaches, methodologies, and theoretical 
views; such divergence of opinion facilitates the growth of scientific knowledge over time. 
Given the multitude of methods by which similarities and differences are assessed between 
species concepts, and the extent to which (stringent, dedicated) individual judgment plays a role 
in any taxonomic schematic, it means that consensus on one unified approach is, if not 
impossible, incredibly unlikely. As A. Broadfield aptly stated,  
It is said that the classification of the sciences has ‘proved to be a peculiar baffling problem of mountainous 
magnitude and of many point of view. Many thinkers had supposed from their several viewpoints that they 
had surmounted the problem; yet none had quite succeeded according to the consensus of scientists and 
philosophers regarding the order of nature.’ A consensus of scientists and philosophers regarding the order 
of nature would be a miracle in itself, especially if achieved without presupposing classification, which is a 
principle method of science and philosophy [emphasis added] (1946, p. 70). 
 
Due to this methodological and interpretive fragmentation, the biodiversity world is in need of a 
system to bring these disparate sources of knowledge together. It is these distributed taxonomic 
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instruments scientists use to organize (and ultimately access) names, often built at a local level, 
for local purposes, which we will now examine more deeply. The global success of the 
biodiversity discipline depends on being able to examine and assess knowledge collectively. As 
taxonomic expertise dwindles (Hopkins & Freckleton, 2002), and as positions supporting 
‘traditional’ taxonomy are reduced within institutions, it is all-the-more important that data is 
aggregated in order to maximize its functionality and potential. 65 Taxonomies are produced 
everywhere, and this segmentation makes it difficult to assess the state of the discipline—how 
much progress has been made toward documenting biodiversity and what taxa need more 
attention given historical and contemporary scholarship.  
 In order to do this, we will again invoke Wilson’s framework for the specifications of 
bibliographic instruments. Wilson identifies five specifications of bibliographical instruments 
that aptly apply to our documentary notions as well: 
1. The domain of the instrument, the set of items from which the contents of the work, the items actually 
listed, are drawn; 
2. The set of all items considered for addition to the library collections; 
3. How it is determined what is to count as a unit for listing and description; 
4. What information can we expect to find out about an item, given it will be represented as a unit, and 
finally; 
5. We must understand the frequently extraordinarily complex system of arrangement or organization: we 
must know where items of a given sort will be found, and what it means to find an item at a given place 
(1968, pp. 59–62). 
 
This dissertation has thus far examined the first four elements to a great or lesser extent–we 
looked at what items constituted the Catalogue’s work, what kinds of documents the Catalogue 
                                                
65 My discussions with numerous biodiversity professionals made it clear that, while there is an increase in 
molecular and genetic approaches to taxonomic and phylogenetic organization, taxonomists trained in the careful 
description and naming of species are becoming less common. Chapter five of this manuscript will touch upon some 
of the issues that arise from this disjoint—namely, that the production of computationally- and numerically-based 
taxonomic knowledge is becoming divorced from the nomenclature-dependent taxonomy that comprised most of the 
past practices of biodiversity taxonomic and descriptive work.  
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collected, and what kinds of evidence these documents pointed to.66 It is the fifth specification 
that we will now strive to unpack. To disentangle these complex systems, I have broken up this 
chapter into four parts. First, a brief section will bridge our discussion of nomenclature in the 
previous chapter with the concept of taxonomic instrumentation. This transition is defined by the 
increasing necessity of professional scientific judgment as part of the collocation process. This 
shift marks our entrance into what Bourgoin calls the domain of “taxonomic knowledge” (my 
emphasis).  
Part II will center on the traditional role of biodiversity taxonomies in the sciences, and 
examines what kinds of knowledge they represent as coherent systems that express a set of 
assumed and implemented epistemological and classificatory commitments. Using Jonathan 
Furner’s notion of “identity” in knowledge organization (2009), I detail descriptive-oriented and 
retrieval-oriented systems. While all classificatory systems contain elements of both, I contend 
that traditional biodiversity taxonomies can be characterized as descriptive-oriented systems, 
encompassing as they do the motivations to describe biological relationships in idiosyncratic 
ways and take a particular (hypothesis-driven) position about how organisms are related. These 
relationships represent an epistemological position about what constitutes the networked, 
representational (interpreted) ‘reality’ of a given organismic taxon or ecology. I then describe a 
few basic taxonomic approaches (or classificatory constructs) prevalent in taxonomy: 
evolutionary taxonomy, cladistics, and phenetics. This examination will illustrate how vastly 
different these taxonomic approaches are in practice, and how these diverse theoretical and 
methodological positions manifest themselves in contrasting graphical representations that can 
be interpreted in multiple ways. The result of this situation is that these distinct taxonomic 
                                                
66 Incidentally, these steps overlap quite readily with Bourgoin’s schematic of incrementally more well-formed and 
truthful and scientifically available information. 
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representations are fundamentally incommensurable in consensus structures as-is, and require 
modification to collocate with other sources of taxonomic knowledge.  
Acknowledging that all GSD and RSDs ingested into the Catalogue of Life represent a 
similar set of instrumental assumptions, Part III then switches focus to access-oriented systems, 
illustrated by structures such as the Catalogue of Life. These systems are motivated not 
necessarily (or rather, only) by a coherent argument about biological relationships, but rather by 
the need to communicate information among many taxonomic traditions. The result of this 
approach is a composite taxonomic instrument: a taxonomy that merges multiple taxonomic 
schemas into one coherent structure. In specific, I will examine the Catalogue’s management 
hierarchy, which in biodiversity terms, is a rather drastic departure from the traditional 
descriptive-oriented schematic. The management hierarchy is driven by an encyclopedic ethos: it 
strives to chronicle the state and breadth of extent knowledge about global taxa.67  
The concluding section of this chapter proposes to expand upon Wilson’s two powers 
associated with exploitative and descriptive control. I argue that there is a third power that is 
exemplified by the Catalogue: the power of extensive flexibility. The terms the Catalogue has set 
deviate from many of the expected norms of classificatory practice, in that they are designed to 
be downloaded, integrated, and manipulated, into any number of online infrastructures (within 
                                                
67 In assessing bibliographic instruments, Wilson notes that the “the organizational component of the Specifications 
[consist] of the implicit or explicit specification of a number of available positions” (Wilson, 1968, pp. 62–63), into 
which things are placed according to pre-determined, articulated sorting mechanisms. Things are meant to refer not 
just to “physical objects, taking up space and time, but anything: objects, events, qualities, relations, real or 
imaginary” (1968, p. 65). These things also include taxonomies, which themselves represent a complex arrangement 
of relationships, qualities, and negotiations. Wilson provides two general kinds of lists in which documents can be 
organized: the first according to descriptions, assuming that a particular subject term matched that document’s 
general content; the second is focused on utility, which “requires an estimation of what the writing is good for” 
(1968, pp. 66–67). Wilson equates the former kind of knowledge organization to that of a (library) catalogue, while 
the latter he equates to an encyclopedia. The Catalogue, built with the purpose of providing a collection of 
taxonomies (in the guise of GSDs) based on expert opinion, designed to provide access to many taxonomic 
interpretive approaches, can be seeing as falling into the latter category.  
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the iLife ecology and beyond). This intended ability to be implemented and repurposed in a 
variety of networked environments is a powerful and unique aspect of biodiversity management 
classifications. In Wilson’s universe the instrument was not, necessarily, seen as a repurposable 
document, but in the networked ecology of the biodiversity world, the instrument itself becomes 
a circulating structure. This is a very powerful aspect of the Catalogue, and a space that situates 
it to influence the shape of biodiversity knowledge in radiant and deeply rooted ways. The 
control of the taxonomic space in the Catalogue is less about internal consistency and more 
about the ability to forfeit this consistency in an attempt to maximize its en bloc usefulness in 
other systems. Paradoxically, the relaxation of control also increases the exploitative power to 
the entire documentary universe.  
In Two Kinds of Power, Wilson states,  
“There is a distinction between not finding what we are looking for, and finding what we are looking for is 
not there; the former is a failure, the latter a negative success. I do not discover the full extent of my power 
by reflecting on my positive successes, my occasional finding of what I seek; I must be able to recognize 
negative success as well as distinguish them from failures to do what might have been done. I cannot make 
the distinction accurately, however, without knowledge of the Specifications of the instrument, the rules 
according to which it was constructed. (1968, p. 59) 
 
With this in mind, let us now examine the biodiversity taxonomic instrument in some detail with 
the ultimate hope that it can help us better understand their specifications. Such an understanding 
can help us see the potential power of consensus-based systems as vehicles for more integrated—
and, ultimately, pluralistic—knowledge organization systems.  
Part I: From Nomenclators to Instruments of Knowledge 
Before speaking of taxonomies in particular, I would like to bridge our discussion from 
the last chapter—that of nomenclatural control based on objective rules of priority—with the 
stages in Thierry Bourgoin’s model (Figure 12) that constitute more knowledge-based activities 
requiring subjective assertions about taxon. Moving along the Global Names-Catalogue of Life 
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Parameters schematic, the point at which information control begins to make this transition is 
between stages 3 and 4, when the creation of “valid” taxonomic knowledge begin to take shape 
in the form of classifications. Up until stage 3 the focus was on nomenclature, and as stated by 
an interview participant, “Nomenclature is not really interesting, it's full of rules. It's like [the 
law]—[lawyers] defer to a set of rules. [They] get [a] book out and in 1925 so and so is 
precedent for this.” The core sentiment of this statement is that names, built as they are for 
stability and consistency of use, are created and accepted based on very clear guidelines: a name 
is either published or it is not, a type is either described in relation to that name or it is not, one 
name was either published before another or it was not, etc. Nomenclaturalists do not make 
judgments; they follow a set of rules. As the ICZN makes clear, “The Code refrains from 
infringing upon taxonomic judgment, which must not be made subject to regulation or restraint” 
(International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, 1999). This distinction is crucial to 
understand, for it is within the spaces created between nomenclature and taxonomic judgments 
where biodiversity instruments take their shape.  
As part of this transition from nomenclature to taxonomy, names are concatenated into 
groups that, after reconciling potential species concepts, assure one instance of a species concept 
per scientific name based on the rules from the applicable code of nomenclature as well as the 
application of evidence to decide upon the boundaries of taxa. Deciding that one species concept 
is correct over any other, however, is a matter of expertise. As has been illustrated, different 
names can be applied to taxa depending on the taxonomist that sets its boundaries (International 
Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, 2016b). Recall Richard Pyle’s example in the last 
chapter illustrating the complex development of what began as the Holocanthus fisheri 
(Barnthouse 1904) species. Over time, different scientists provided different specific boundaries 
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around taxa, and each of these interpretive acts resulted in the production of an equally-valid and 
available name and species concept. The nomenclators that collect these various nomenclatural 
acts are simply “definitive listings of code-governed names, their orthography, and bibliographic 
citations” (D. J. Patterson et al., 2010, p. 3), and nothing more. Taxonomy, however, is a distinct 
and separate process altogether. Simply put, taxonomy is a science. While nomenclature follows 
clearly articulated procedures to produce a set of circulating facts, taxonomy orients these facts 
in different argumentatively meaningful ways. 
As Bourgoin’s schematic helps us understand, the informed judgment of a scientist 
becomes more important as names and taxa begin to get mapped and related. Not all token 
relationships, however, are equally easy to assess. Taxonomists can negotiate the transition 
between nomenclature and taxonomy well enough because they have access to documentary 
evidence and are trained in their craft—this, after all, is what defines their work. Biodiversity 
informaticians, however, “are encountering unfamiliar problems that confound the merger of 
distributed data” (D. J. Patterson et al., 2010) since these taxonomic reconciliations cannot be 
easily mediated and solved computationally.68 Managing these variances within a biodiversity 
database is a difficult task. Both the “many-names-for-one-species” and one-name for-more-
than-one-taxa problems (D. J. Patterson et al., 2010, pp. 3–5) test the limits of what databases 
can handle given the vast amount of data being coordinated in database infrastructures such as 
the Catalogue. As a general rule, what falls outside of the domain of a nomenclator are 
“subjective assertions of heterotypic synonyms and higher (above genus) classifications – 
                                                
68 We will see an example in chapter five of how GBIF is creating taxonomic hierarchies with the use of algorithms.  
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basically the arrangement of taxa in a classification” (T. Orrell, personal communication, 
February 6, 2017).69 
The difference between homotypic synonyms (or objective synonym) and heterotypic 
synonyms (subjective synonyms) can help illustrate this general issue. Homotypic synonyms, as 
was briefly mentioned in the last chapter, are different names that refer to the same type of 
material(s) at the same taxonomic rank. So long as unambiguous type information is clearly 
identified in contributing GSD fields, creating a database relationship between the name-token 
entities that represent them is relatively straightforward. Within the ICZN, homotypic synonyms 
are appropriately called “objective” synonyms, primarily because their identification is 
contingent upon the objective use of the same type specimen; there is no special expertise 
necessary to make this connection within the database.  
Heterotypic synonyms are another matter entirely. Heterotypic synonyms within the 
ICZN (or “taxonomic synonyms” in the botanical code) require more specific and expert 
judgments. Heterotypic synonyms occur when a scientist infers that two “code-compliant 
scientific names … are thought to refer to the same species” (Global Names Architecture, 
2017d). Heterotypic synonyms are referred to as “subjective synonyms” (International 
Commission on Zoological Nomenclature, 2016a) because they are based on the independent 
judgment of a scientist who has examined both the type specimen documentation, as well as the 
published circumscriptions that denote the identification of that species concept; and concluded 
that two species are, in fact, the same (or different, at which point a new name and 
circumscription must be applied to one of the taxon groups).  It is this balance between 
nomenclatural control and taxonomic opinion that allows taxonomic work its flexibility 
                                                
69 See also (Blake, 2011, pp. 468–469). 
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(exhibited by Pyle’s fish example in the previous chapter). Controlled concept vocabularies, type 
specimens, and publications, provide the concept-tokens that can be subsequently re-combined in 
flexible ways as taxonomists delimit concepts within specific arrangements (see Figure 14).  
 
 
Figure 14. Overlap between the task of nomenclature and of taxonomy, with the type and circumscription being 
used for both assessments, though in vastly different ways.  
 
The result of this synonymic differentiation is the production of a hierarchy of terms that 
differentiates an accepted name from its synonyms and other associated nomenclatural data (See 
Figure 15, below).70 Name hierarchies provide token groups that delineate valid taxa that can 
then be combined and situated alongside other taxa to create a taxonomic classification for the 
organization of life. For example, Sabella discifera Grube, 1874 in Figure 15 is a curated unit of 
scientific taxonomic knowledge that is surrounded by a number of synonyms and sources that, 
together, constitute an interpretation of how this taxon concept was intellectually constructed by 
a taxonomist. The World Register of Marine Species (WoRMS) (2017b), a self-described 
“authoritative and comprehensive list of names of marine organisms,” is careful to note that 
                                                
70 A number of other nomenclatural issues arise as part of the taxonomic process—which can be seen in Figure 15 
with the identification of “invalid combination” and “original name”—but I have chosen to focus on only a couple 
of examples to illustrate my general point.  
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“taxonomic experts” and not “database managers” are involved in the editorial management of 
the platform. Such a designation is important since curatorial intervention is seen as far more 
precise and accurate process than computational methods.71  
 
 
Figure 15. Nomenclature hierarchy for the sedentary Annelid (phylum consisting of segmented or ringed worms), 
Sabella discifera Grube, 1874, provided by the World Register of Marine Species database. Note the synonymized 
heterotypic names, each of which required expert examination to determine that these were, in fact, the same species 
(World Register of Marine Species, 2017a). 
 
Referring back to Floridi’s sense of truthful information, while names have codified 
mechanisms by which they can be accepted as “known-to-science” factual statements, once 
concepts start getting paired to them, opinion and hypothesizing take over as the dominating 
paradigm. Taxonomies are not facts in the sense that names represent validly circulating 
concepts—they are hypotheses (Thiele & Yeates, 2002), and mechanized, well-crafted 
suppositions. A species concept, as well as the relationship between them, are always bound to 
change as new interpretations are postulated, as new methods of assessment are introduced, as 
                                                
71 WoRMS is highly-respected in the field of biodiversity taxonomy, precisely because it is an RSD that spends a 
great deal of time curating its content with support from a number of experts from around the world. 
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new species are discovered and described, etc. The challenge then becomes how to construct a 
biodiversity taxonomic database that manages to mimic the flexibility of practice within the 
technical infrastructures themselves. Taxa bring knowledge to database domains as distinct 
packets of historical and expert negotiations; taxonomic databases like the Catalogue of Life 
structure that information in ways that make it easy for individuals (and systems) to navigate and 
share that information on a wider level.  
Some distinctions need to be made here before we proceed, however, since I have woven 
together a discussion of ‘traditional’ taxonomies with that of the Catalogue above. There are two 
kinds of taxonomies that will be discussed here on quite separate terms: first there are those 
taxonomies that do, in fact, represent particular unified, consistent phylogenic and taxonomic 
opinion. These taxonomies exemplify a descriptive-oriented paradigm. Within this project, 
descriptive-oriented taxonomies are generally represented by the global species databases 
(GSDs) that come together to form the Catalogue’s taxa content.  These coherent structures can, 
theoretically, be represented by any number of classificatory schools, including evolutionary 
taxonomy, pheneticism, cladism, etc. These different approaches will be ever-so-briefly 
described below to illustrate how their individual productions conflict with each other, both in 
theory, as well as in their resultant representational structures. In other words, in addition to a 
documentary universe, there is also a universe of all taxonomic interpretations and documentary 
instruments. Instrument specifications are also contingent, much like the documents that they 
contain. Second, there are classification systems such as the Catalogue of Life that attempt to 
reconcile these numerous taxonomic opinions into one coherent structure as a means of data 
access. These taxonomies exemplify a retrieval-oriented paradigm.  
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This chapter will now focus on these two types of classifications to distinguish what is 
unique about the Catalogue’s status in the biodiversity community. But first, a brief sojourn to 
help situate what the primary functions of taxonomies are in practice, and the essential 
differences between descriptive-oriented and retrieval-oriented approaches to classification. To 
do so, I will invoke Jonathan Furner’s notion of descriptive-oriented and retrieval oriented 
approaches to the goal of knowledge organization systems (2009). 
Part II: What is the Function of Classification?  
Entire monographs and numerous textbooks in Information Studies have and will 
continue to be dedicated to what kind of an instrument a taxonomy is, how they are built, and 
how they can be maintained. Classification, as Henry Evelyn Bliss indicated, is an action (to 
class… “Assigning a thing or several things to their respective classes”); an act (to classify, as in 
to conceive of “classes in some order and relate them in some system”); and a product (“a series 
of system of classes arranged in some order according to some principles or conception, purpose 
or interest, or some combination of such”) (1929, pp. 142–144).  My focus in this section is 
merely to provide the briefest entrée into this arena of discourse, by thinking about what the 
functions of a taxonomic instrument are within a domain like biodiversity studies using these 
general concepts. The basic premise for this distinction lies in the fact that each approach—
descriptive- or retrieval-oriented—to building a distinct taxonomy requires a different 
epistemological understanding of how a taxonomic classification is supposed to function in 
biodiversity spaces, and how it is that we can judge whether or not they succeed at what they are 
designed to accomplish. It is important to emphasize that there is not one unified approach to 
producing a biological classification; a classification is the scientific argument, and therefore 
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each production is a unique structure, layered with assumptions at every minute level that we’ve 
so far discussed. Documents arranged are only documents-proposed.  
Taxonomic arguments change over time. Taxonomic knowledge systems are products of 
contextually specific historical, cultural, and philosophical circumstances that evolve over time. 
Insofar as the broader purpose of KO systems is to organize any given domain of knowledge or 
documentary production, their aims are also “to achieve consistency—to produce identity—
between (i) the KO systems designer’s representation of reality, which basically amounts to the 
aggregate of all extensions of all subject classes and the relations between them, and (ii) the KO 
system user’s model or image in the world” (Furner, 2009, p. 12). The end result of a KO system 
is inextricable from the epistemological and classificatory commitments and expectations of both 
those who build these systems for the organization and retrial of information, as well as those 
who wish to harness the “exploitative power” (Wilson, 1968) that KO systems provide. 
Taxonomies are artifactual in this sense, in that a close examination of the way they compose 
and document knowledge can tell us something about the “the social organization of knowledge 
on the one hand, and on the other hand the intellectual or cognitive organization of knowledge” 
(Hjørland, 2008, p. 86). But how do we assess this artifice? 
Jonathan Furner proposes one way that we can potentially assess knowledge organization 
systems by asking how accurately they represent the external world, as well as its internal 
coherence and simplicity, 
I think it is possible to distinguish two conceptions of the goal of the practice of KO, and this distinction 
corresponds roughly to the one Raya Fidel draws between two conceptions of the goal of indexing. On the 
one hand, we have the document-centered view that indexers should aim to assign index terms to 
documents (or documents to index terms) in whichever way it is that produces the most accurate 
representation of that content. On the other hand, there is the user-centered view that indexers should aim to 
associate documents with those terms that are most likely to be used by searchers looking for those 
documents. Similarly, I think that, on the one hand, we have a description-oriented conception of the goal 
of KO, being to build systems that do well at helping people produce accurate descriptions and 
representations of documents. And on the other hand, we have a retrieval-oriented conception of the goal of 
KO, being to build systems that do well at helping people find the documents they think they want to find 
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(2009, p. 9). 
 
This distinction between descriptive- and retrieval-oriented approaches to knowledge 
organization seems to me an apt way to think about the kinds of taxonomies that flourish within 
the biodiversity world. As Tony Rees, Manager of the Divisional Data Centre, CSIRO Marine 
and Atmospheric Research in Tasmania, articulated on the Taxacom biodiversity: “I look upon 
biological classifications as serving two purposes - first, to illustrate our current best guess/es as 
to the relationships between organisms, and second, to provide a recognisable navigation 
structure so that persons entering the classification can (hopefully) find their way to their 
particular organisms of interest” (2009). This quote brings to light the two distinct aspects of the 
biodiversity instrument. For Furner, these two approaches are rooted in the larger question about 
how one is to evaluate (Furner, 2009, p. 4) knowledge organization systems as systems that 
“represent relationships of identity between classes of documents,” and “help people find the 
right labels for classes of documents that about those identities, and help people find those 
documents” (2009, p. 4). While there exists no standard by which the true “goodness” of a KO 
system can be quantitatively assessed, there are number of qualities that have been identified in 
order to critique the effectiveness of KO schemes. Furner indicates that the basic role of a KO 
system is to adequately represent the identity of some external reality: “The main claim that I 
would like to make about the importance of identity for KO is not that an understanding of 
identity is helpful in analyzing the structure of aboutness and relevance. It is that there is a sense 
in which identity is actually the goal of KO” (2009, p. 12). The rubric for assessing whether or 
not KO systems ‘work well’ can be distilled to a series of factors within either a “description-
oriented” or “retrieval oriented” notion of KO (2009, pp. 9–10).  
According to Furner, description-oriented KO asks two basic questions of a designed KO 
system: (1) How correct, just, and fair, is any given ontology in relation to the natural, real 
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world, and (2) How internally coherent is the infrastructure itself is in exemplified a unified 
ontological system with an internal logic (2009, p. 9). In the biodiversity realm this means 
creating classification that provides a consistent model that includes a fair and accurate 
representation of biological organisms, and that provides a classificatory system that depicts 
things the “the way things really are, or the way somebody thinks things are” (20019, p. 9).  
Retrieval-oriented KO, on the other hand, focuses on the KO infrastructure’s ability to facilitate 
the location of documents or required information (2009, p. 10). Terms Furner associates with 
this level of assessment include, effectiveness, efficiency, and usefulness to the user. In the 
biodiversity world, this would mean the ability to locate species concepts and the associated 
species documents easily regardless of their descriptive position relative to the user of the 
taxonomy. The methods by which these elements are measured against any KO system is an 
entirely different matter, and up for debate. “Different people see reality in different ways, and 
draw from that the conclusion that every KO system is necessarily and unavoidably ‘biased,’ in 
the sense that every KO system reflects the view of its designers” (2009b, 9). Nonetheless, these 
elements proposed by Furner provide us with a useful starting point by which we can 
conceptualize the efficacy of KO systems as both accurate tools for retrieval and spaces for 
hermeneutic articulations.  
The task for this section is to think about how classification systems function on two very 
basic levels: as a tool for retrieval (a product that has an intended purpose of maximizing a 
document’s exploitative power), as well as a taxonomy as a tool for description (a document as a 
series of classificatory actions that explicitly represents a particular view of how organisms are 
related). My intention in making this bifurcation is to emphasize two basic approaches to 
knowledge organization in biodiversity sciences: one as the product of individualized scientific 
   164 
work and hermeneutic development, and the other as a space for composite, unified information 
access and communication. This boundary tends to mark the divide between those that support or 
do not support a generalized taxonomic model such as the Catalogue of Life.  
To be sure, Furner notes the division between the descriptive and retrieval-oriented 
approach is artificial, for these approaches often comingle in practice. Nonetheless, it is a useful 
exercise to bring to the fore distinctions between these two kinds of circulating taxonomies in the 
biodiversity world and what they are, and are not, intended to represent and offer. The basic 
question becomes: What are taxonomies intended to represent as vehicles for producing and 
organizing knowledge? Referring once again to Bourgoin’s schema in Figure 12, it’s important 
to note that the production of valid taxa coincides with the production and act of classification, 
but that classifications are first imposed within the global species databases (GSD) before the 
Catalogue of Life even begins to enter the systematic workflow. Artificially dividing up 
descriptive- and retrieval-oriented modes of classification (as much as these functions comingle 
in practice) makes sense operationally within the biodiversity arena since GSDs and the 
Catalogue functionally serve purposes that correspond to this division. Thus, I am going to first 
describe the descriptive-oriented classification instrument outside of the Catalogue, as 
exemplified by Global Species Databases. I will then return to the Catalogue specifically to see 
how its structure veers from “traditional” modes of taxonomic expressivity in access-oriented 
articulations. 
Descriptive-oriented classification modes and inherited instrumentation. 
Traditional taxonomies can be defined as systems that invoke a unified methodology to 
provide a consistent model of the natural world. Such instrumentation must work as a functional 
system of arrangements so that a species location in a system tells you about how it operates in 
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relation to all other entities within that system. Descriptive-oriented taxonomies are exemplified 
by the Global Species Databases that functionally provide the core data for the Catalogues 
management classification. GSDs are those databases that (typically) collect a single taxon group 
(usually at the genus or family level), and attempt to do so on a global scale—all instances of 
that taxon regardless of geographic boundaries. The Catalogue of Life defines GSDs as 
“[aspiring] to the following properties”: 
• cover one taxon worldwide 
• contain a taxonomic checklist of all species within that taxon 
• deal with species as taxa, and contain synonymy and taxonomic opinion 
• have an explicit mechanism for seeking at least one responsible/consensus taxonomy, and applying it 
consistently 
• cross-index significant alternative taxonomies in their synonymy (Species 2000, 2015e). 
 
Because GSDs tend to cover one taxon (See also, Species 2000, 2014), and many are curated by 
small sets of individuals (or single individuals), they typically follow an internally-consistent 
taxonomic structure, and thus follow a formal set of directives as to how they should and can be 
structured (personal communication, November 10, 2016).72 Crucially, “taxonomic opinion” in 
the space of a GSD is unified and not subject to multiple points of view.  
While central databases such as the CoL collect subsidiary data structures to enlarge their 
taxonomic hierarchy, each of these taxa-specific taxonomies brings with them an inherited set of 
instrumental qualities. “The source databases are diverse in their origin, their purpose and 
                                                
72 Regional species databases (RSD), on the other hand, contain data that comes from specified regional boundaries, 
and the sources for these data comes from publications that document the flora of North American, the flora of 
China, European flora, and so on (Roskov, 2016b). ITIS is one example of one of these “mega-diverse regions” 
(Species 2000, 2015e), along with Species 2000 China (Species 2000 China Node, 2016), Atlas of Living Australia 
(“Atlas of Living Australia,” 2016), New Zealand Organisms Register (“New Zealand Organisms Register,” 2016), 
WoRMS (World Register of Marine Species, 2017b), and Species 2000 Europa (Species 2000, 2015e). GSDs are 
generally ontologically distinct databases that are internally cohesive in their method of representation, as well as in 
terms of how relationships are assessed between taxa (represented as name tokens). Unlike GSDs, RSDs, cover 
multiple taxa within one infrastructure. To this end, they are more akin to the Catalogue of Life model of taxonomic 
management: multiple taxonomic opinions comingle within one basic backbone infrastructure. Thus, the findings 
indicated below related to the CoL will apply to the RSDs as well, albeit at a more localized (geographic) level, so 
for the moment, the discussion will place RSDs on the backburner. RSDs will also be discussed as an important 
entity in bridging taxonomic gaps in the Catalogue’s structure.  
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therefore their structure. A key challenge for the Catalogue of Life has been the integration of 
this disparate data, and a standard dataset has been established for that purpose” (Species 2000, 
2015e). A key quality is the relationships that are created between names in the taxonomic 
environment, and what Wilson calls the “rules of assignment” for how certain concepts inhabit a 
specific set of positions within a bibliographic instrument (or documentation instrument in our 
case). In the previous chapter we saw how relationships were essential in disambiguating 
nomenclature (synonymic and otherwise) as a representation of numerous (potential) species 
concepts. Our focus here, however, is what Clare Beghtol calls the “theoretical constructs” 
(2001, p. 99), created by a network of concept relationships. Beghtol continues, “In general, 
relationships in bibliographic classification systems are functions of both the syntactic (i.e. 
structural) and the semantic (i.e. meaning) axes of the systems” (2001, p. 101). Thus, it makes 
sense to begin to think about how structure (hierarchies) and networks of meaning are 
constructed in the process of hypothesizing biodiversity taxonomic relationship schema.  
Reality as an evolving representation: No universals in biodiversity. 
First and foremost, because GSDs are “diverse in their origin,” it is important to note that 
no two GSDs are exactly alike; diversity of opinion is a natural part of the taxonomic landscape. 
Recall Clare Beghtol’s statement that “every classification system is a theoretical construct 
imposed on ‘reality’” (2001, p. 99).  On the one hand, taxonomies must maintain a certain degree 
of internal integrity with regard to how they represent the external world they intend to 
document. GSDs gain their credibility, after all, to the extent that their classifications maintain 
their classificatory commitments to their particular conception of what biodiversity structure 
represents, some notion of an external reality. As was identified by Furner (2009, p. 9), how we 
judge the success of a descriptive-oriented knowledge has been a question of great concern to 
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those seeking to classify knowledge, particularly in relation to how effectively they represent 
external world. Furner identifies a few more as possible criteria by which we can judge whether 
a particular organizing schema is successful: “coherence, richness, simplicity, or elegance,” 
(2009, p. 9). GSDs are coherent in that the approach to constructing relationships is uniformly 
used within the classification; they are simplistic and elegant to the extent that their taxonomic 
tree arguments are parsimonious and describe “the evolution of any particular set of characters 
using the smallest number of evolutionary changes” (Wiley & Lieberman, Bruce S., 2011, 
Chapter 6).  
These attributes aside, arguably, the most important quality with which we can assess 
classifications is the “degree of correspondence” between the model of relationships with “the 
way things really are” (Furner, 2009, p. 9). What are the real things in this case? The only 
“facts” that taxonomic science acknowledges in practice are those valid names that serve as the 
building blocks for classifications; the only “real” things are the taxa these names represent as 
delineated in the circumscriptions articulated in publicly-accessible journals. Everything else is a 
mere hypothesis (as well-supported, well-articulated, methodologically-controlled that 
hypothesis may be). And given the extent to which valid names (and their associated species 
concepts) are constantly changing and redefined in relation to the external species they represent 
(via a type specimen), a stable, functional reality is a shifting and elusive concept. As we’ve 
seen, taxonomies in the biodiversity world each bring with them their own set of epistemological 
approaches and idiosyncratic structure; no two taxonomies can be judged on the same merits or 
criteria. Reality is composed, individualistic, and, unique.  
Henry Bliss (1929) takes a somewhat broader, socio-cultural view of what classification 
strives to represent. To Bliss, accurate representational systems did not strive to match the real 
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world (that is to say, organisms as they are actually connected), but rather classification in the 
sciences strives to represent the production of scientific knowledge as it corresponds to the study 
some external reality. This distinction is significant. Classifications in this sense are intended to 
represent the identity of the social organization of science as a whole, for “the order of nature” 
(Bliss, 1929, p. 170) was a function of the output of the processes science implements to 
document it. As he stated in regard to the organization of knowledge in libraries, “ the more 
definite the concepts, the relations, and the principles of science, philosophy, and education 
become, the clearer and more stable the order of the sciences and the studies in relation to 
learning and to life; and so the scientific and educations consensus becomes more dominant and 
more permanent” (1933, p. 37). According to Bliss, accurate representation is the iteratively 
clearer articulation of the concepts science creates to understand nature. “A concept is …not the 
object of knowledge, but the form taken by the knowledge of it” (Broadfield, 1946, p. 75). 
Bliss’s approach to accurate representation in knowledge organizing systems is one where truth 
is based on the accumulated knowledge amassed as part of the general empirical endeavor: the 
“relative quality of knowledge veritably correlated to reality” (Bliss, 1929, p. 129; quoted in Mai, 
1999, p. 550).73 Jens-Erik Mai expands upon this, 
Since Bliss regards both the mental sphere and the external world as organized in some way, he defines 
truth to the “the relative quality of knowledge veritably correlated to reality.” This means that provided that 
more and more people have the same experience with reality, then this becomes the truth about the world. 
This implies that truth depends on external physical realities, and that the physical world is primordial to 
                                                
73 I should mention here that Bliss’s approach to knowledge organization was not originally intended to be used in 
relation to the individual taxonomies produced within the discipline of any science. “Classification of the sciences is 
distinguished from classification in the sciences,” Bliss states, “The system of the sciences comprises not only a 
classification of the sciences but many classifications within the several sciences. With these latter we are less 
concerned in this book” (1929, pp. 236–237). Bliss’s conception was to create a universal system of classification 
whereupon all produced knowledge could be scaffolded. Nonetheless, I think this general approach can tell us a 
great deal about one way in which we can go about approaching the organization of biological knowledge. Bliss’s 
approach is pragmatic; in the end what matters is how knowledge circulated in the domain of science, and how that 
collective endeavor got us closer to the “same understanding of reality” (1999, p. 550) as part of this process of 
negotiation.  
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mental understandings of it. Our mental understandings of the world and the truth of the world is derived 
from our perceptions of it” (1999, p. 550). 
 
One issue to note here, and something the study of the Catalogue specifically helps illustrate, is 
that our collective knowledge of the world does not only come from out perception of it. Our 
understanding also comes from the naming and knowledge structures we create to organize our 
previously recorded perceptions, for such structures ultimately influence and shape how and why 
we see what we do. The attributes we use to define a species change over time. As Gaston and 
Galison state,  
Linnaeus’s ways of looking at, describing, depicting, and classifying plants were openly, even aggressively 
selective. Botanists must school themselves to concentrate on characters that are “constant certain and 
organic”; they must not allow themselves to be distracted by the irrelevant details of a plant’s appearance 
and thereby unnecessarily multiply species (2007, p. 59). 
 
The tools we use shape our perceptions (the “ways of looking” that Gaston and Gaston 
emphasize), and integrally limit the constitution of our knowledge practices and their 
productions. Michel Foucault expands this point, emphasizing that our descriptions of nature are 
perpetually limited because they are necessarily filtered through the language and discourse that 
render it visible to contemporary discourse (1994, p. 135). “Natural history is a science,” 
Foucault continues, “that is, a language, but a securely based and well-constructed one: its 
propositional unfolding is indisputably an articulation” (1994, p. 136). 
Some theorists and practitioners of classification within the study of knowledge 
organization have taken Bliss’s notion of the “order of nature” to its (perhaps) logical extreme: 
organizing knowledge around the inherent order of the natural world. “The theory of integrative 
levels claims that the natural world is organized in a series of levels of increasing complexity: 
from physical particles and molecules, through biological structures, to the most sophisticated 
products of human thought” (ISKO Italia, 2004) (See also, Claudio Gnoli & Riccardo Ridi, 
2014; Gnoli & Poli, 2004; Rick Szostak, 2008). This adherence to a static understanding of 
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external phenomena (consistent enough, in practice, that the organization of all knowledge can 
perpetually be conformed to this schematic), however, are of little use in domains as specific as 
biodiversity taxonomy where the “reality” in question is a shifting ground of nomenclature, 
concepts, and taxonomic arrangements. Such empirically dedicated approaches to classification 
presuppose a permanence and consistency to our knowledge that just does not exist, and 
overlooks the socially situated, culturally defined “unfolding” of our knowledge production 
practices. As Mai has noted, the impulse of “modern” classification systems to standardize and 
universalize knowledge organization systems around notions of “exclusiveness” and 
“exhaustivity” overlooks the application of these standards in individual domains (1999, pp. 
548–551). In recent years, a more historically-informed notion of classification has taken shape, 
one where “unificationism” has given way to a “generation of theories, principles and methods 
that emphasize both the cultural and historical specificity of classification practices and their 
emancipatory function” (Furner, 2013a, p. 32).  
Biodiversity taxonomy, and science in general, is anything but unified and universal. 
Given the fluid and contingent nature of the species concepts and entity documents of 
biodiversity knowledge, there should also certainly be no expectation that the instruments that 
organize them will be any less so. And while Bliss’s general feeling was that science tended 
toward consensus (Bliss, 1933, p. 42), and “near equilibrium” (Beghtol, 1986, pp. 114–115), in 
the practical world of biodiversity taxonomy, nothing but the opposite could be truer of 
contemporary practice—even with the ‘real,’ natural world grounding the act of classification. 
Taxonomies bear the fingerprint of their producers—both theoretically (in terms of how they 
define a species and their relationships with other species), but also in the methodological 
approach they use to define those relationships. As John Dupré remarked, “the idea of science as 
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a project that might ultimately be completed in some grand synthesis of all natural knowledge is 
an understandable and perennial dream…the disunity of science is not merely an unfortunate 
consequence of our limited computational or other cognitive capacities, but rather reflects 
accurately the underlying ontological complexity of the world, the disorder of things” (1993, p. 
7).  
Amid this taxonomic disorder, then, one of the main goals for the Catalogue is to try to 
take this taxonomic disorder and comingle these instruments in some space that manages to 
harmonize this complexity for the purposes of access—embracing this complexity as an essential 
part of the identity of the classification itself. In characterizing the postmodern turn in 
classification Mai points to the understanding of classifications as being based on two general 
assumptions: “The first … is that there is no key denominator to understanding the world, neither 
in nature, truth, God, or future … the second assumption is the belief that there is nothing, ideas 
or thought, prior to language” (1999, pp. 551–552). This emphasis on language—echoing 
Foucault’s notion alluded to above—the meaning of words, and the use of this nomenclature 
within the taxonomic community, certainly rings true for the biodiversity community. 
Classificatory constructions in biology are only as good as the source of their nomenclature. 
Mai’s assertion that “language, therefore is not a tool to speak with, but the very social and 
cultural context in which the language is situated,” takes on a great weight in the domains of 
biodiversity studies, and classifications more broadly construed. Words shift, and the taxonomic 
structures that relate those words in a classification need to be equally as plastic as the theories, 
methods, and organisms that circulate through time. Our next task, then, is to think about what 
kinds of expressed relationships we see as a product of descriptive-oriented taxonomic practice, 
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and how taxonomies construct particular biological realities via different methodological 
approaches.  
Internal constructs and inherited interpretation. 
Each global species database that makes its way into the Catalogue of Life has a 
particular structure that represents the opinion of the taxonomic experts that contribute them. 
Each GSD is produced under a set of social conditions. The distinctions between one condition 
and another represent deeply seeded theoretical and philosophical divides about how 
relationships can and should be built within classification systems, and how species are lumped 
into nested and hierarchical taxa. Below I will provide a glimpse into some of these possible 
conditions. The purpose here is not to provide an in-depth analysis of each school, or an 
exhaustive comparison of each, but is rather to show how taxonomic productions in-and-of-
themselves furnish a unique set of classificatory relationships based on theoretical and empirical 
assumptions.74 And these approaches are merely possible arrangements; over time, one approach 
will hold dominance over others. And more, other arrangement methodologies will be articulated 
as science proceeds forward and continues to build on past knowledge. How we understand the 
internal constructs of taxonomic instruments is also contingent on historical and cultural 
circumstances. The classificatory outputs of each approach represent commitments to these 
theoretical assumptions and create different arrangements and relationships that are 
fundamentally incommensurable to each other in a one-to-one relationship model.75 In other 
                                                
74 The main distinctions drawn here are selected and summarized from Marc Ereshefsky’s, Poverty of the Linnaean 
Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy (2007). Readers should review his chapter titled, “A 
Primer of Biological Taxonomy,” for a more holistic view of these traditions. See also (D. L. Hull, 1988, 2001; 
Mishler, 2000) for some canonical and excellent broad overviews on the subject. 
 
75 I want to be clear here that I use the term incommensurable to indicate that these differing classificatory schemas 
produce classifications that cannot and should not be reconciled with each other. Diversity of taxonomic opinion is 
essential to the evolution and creation of more accurate taxonomic methods as new species are discovered and new 
   173 
words, the theoretical approach to a biological classification changes the way we interpret 
collected data and relate together the subjects of classification, and thus, in turn, produces an 
idiosyncratic view of what constitutes knowledge in biodiversity studies. The “subjects” of 
classification in these taxonomies are those species concepts represented by names in 
databases.76  The production and depiction of relationships in tree and hierarchical forms is 
fraught with a number of challenges, complications, and decisions (R. D. M. Page, 2012; Wiley 
& Lieberman, Bruce S., 2011, Chapter 4), which means that no two trees or hierarchies are alike, 
let alone can they be interpreted with the same set of assumptions. Acknowledging this fact is an 
important part of the story for a thorough discussion of the Catalogue of Life.  
Marc Ereshefsky identifies four general schools of thought that have been prominent in 
the 20th (and now 21st) centuries: evolutionary taxonomy, pattern cladism, process cladism and 
pheneticism (2007, pp. 50–51). For the purposes of this discussion, I will lump pattern cladism 
and process cladism into one large cladist school, but the reader should know that I am glossing 
over very significant differences between these factions for the purpose of this analysis. I am 
sensitive to the minute differences between these analytic taxonomic approaches.  
Broadly construed, evolutionary taxonomists believe that the emergence of new species 
(taxa) can occur through two distinct processes: cladogenesis and anagenesis. Cladogenesis is the 
splitting (branching) of a “single genealogical lineage” (2007, p. 52) through, for example, the 
process of occupying of new adaptive zones (a population of a species becomes geographically 
                                                                                                                                                       
methods are produced. In other words, the goal should never be the creation of commensurable structures, for such 
an endeavor erases and obfuscates the importance of diverse approaches in the production of scientific knowledge. I 
thank Johanna Drucker and Jonathan Furner for brining this fine, but essential, distinction to my attention.  
 
76 Matthew Hull (2001) notes that even the concept of species is a theory-laden concept, inherited from Darwin’s 
notion of evolutionary development (Darwin, 1859): “the basic units in evolutionary classifications—species—must 
be the things that evolve as a result of the interplay between mutation and selection. Hence, our understanding of the 
evolutionary process enters into the formulation of classification right from the start…Evolutionary theory as a 
process theory determines the basic units of classification” (D. L. Hull, 2001, p. 22). 
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isolated from the rest of the population and adapts new genetic characteristics) (SæTher, 1979, 
pp. 308–309; Ereshefsky, 2007). Anagenesis, on the other hand, is the gradual change 
(divergence) (Ereshefsky, 2007, p. 52) over time of a species until it becomes distinguishable as 
a new species. The mechanisms and qualities that are used by taxonomists to assess “significant” 
(Ereshefsky, 2007, p. 52) enough changes to warrant a new species for anagenic change is a 
subjective and somewhat arbitrary process (Vaux, Trewick, & Morgan-Richards, 2016) and a 
source of much debate in the taxonomy arena. Such assessments on what constitutes a new 
species are the product of certain theoretical positions held by practicing scientists, much of 
which is based on whether or not they subscribe to the notions of paraphyly as part of an 
evolutionary schematic. Cladogenesis produces monophyletic taxa: a taxa that includes an 
ancestral species and all of its descendants (Grant, 2003). Anagenesis, however, produces 
paraphyletic taxon groups: a taxon that does not contain all of the descendants of a particular 
taxon (See Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16. Example of monophyletic (outer, red box) and paraphyletic groups (inner, purple box). Evolutionary 
taxonomists would define the class Reptilia as only containing lizards, snakes, and crocodiles, excluding Aves as 
part of this schematic; thus, it is paraphyletic. Cladists, on the other hand, would be unwilling to exclude Aves 
because groups should include all of the descents of a taxon, and thus a Reptilia group that includes Aves is 
monophyletic. Figure adapted from Marc Ereshefsky’s, Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study 
of Biological Taxonomy (2007, p. 54) and The Reptile Database (Uetz, 2016). 
 
Aves Crocodilia 
 
Lepidosauria Chelonia 
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One might look at the above figure and ask why this seemingly minute distinction matters. After 
all, the tree is essentially the same, regardless of whether or not you understand the class Reptilia 
to contain birds or not—these differing beliefs produce the exact same tree diagram. What does 
differ is the ways in which each school interprets this diagram to represent some argument about 
how animal groups form taxa—the basic levels of the biological kingdom that describe life on 
earth. And such taxa form the binding structural mechanism by which we communicate 
biodiversity information from person-to-person. Once taxa are listed in database environments, 
stating that these taxa occupy different class positions means they occupy vastly different spaces 
in the nested taxonomic hierarchy of the Catalogue (see Figure 17). In this figure an evolutionary 
point of view (according to Ereshefsky’s model) situates birds (Aves) as a different class. 
Theoretical and interpretive distinctions amplify themselves in online taxonomic structures that 
represent relationships more rigidly than in traditional tree forms. 
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Figure 17. Catalogue of Life 2016 Annual Checklist taxonomic tree depicting the separate placement of the Class 
Aves from Class Reptilia in the tree structure (Species 2000, 2016d).  
 
Cladistics, on the other hand—a school initiated by Willi Hennig in his publication, 
Grundzüge einer Theorie der phylogenetischen Systematik (1950)—in contrast to evolutionary 
taxonomy, does not accept paraphyly as part of their construction of taxa.77 They would balk at 
separating Aves from the Reptilia group. Cladist's base their apportionment of taxa on the 
concept of genealogy and common ancestry:  
Cladists believe that classification should be strictly genealogical. However, membership in a paraphyletic 
taxon is not defined merely by common ancestry but also how much divergence has occurred among an 
ancestor’s descendants. Because both of these factors are used for constructing paraphyletic taxa, cladists 
reject the existence of paraphyletic taxa. Membership in Reptilia, for example, requires being descended 
from a common ancestor. Yet according to evolutionary taxonomists, that common ancestry is not 
sufficient for membership in Reptilia: birds have significantly diverged from Reptiles, so they should be 
excluded from Reptilia. Cladists, on the other hand, deny the existence of the paraphyletic taxa Reptilia 
(Ereshefsky, 2007, p. 55).  
 
                                                
77 See also (W. Hennig, Davis, & Zangerl, 1999). 
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Due to the inference by evolutionary taxonomists that a genealogical relationship is not enough 
to define a taxa (namely, that other factors are taken into account, such as the previously 
mentioned “significant” changes that qualify as divergence into a new species), cladists reject the 
decision to separate birds from the Reptilia group.  A major difference between evolutionary 
taxonomists and cladists, which lies at the heart of this essential conflict, is the extent to which 
evolutionary taxonomists and cladists understand, and choose to represent, the relationships 
between phylogeny and classifications. Every classification is but one way to represent a 
phylogeny that is altogether too complex to represent in any one graphical structure (D. L. Hull, 
2001, p. 227)—there are far too many variables (known and unknown) involved in the process of 
evolution. As Hull states, “any one phylogeny can be classified legitimately in many different 
ways…only the most generic and impressionistic inferences about phylogeny can be drawn from 
an evolutionary classification” (2001, p. 227). For evolutionary taxonomists, this meant being 
willing to accept paraphyly as one way in which that complexity could be managed 
representationally via divergence.  
Hennig chose “to represent only one—the sister group relation as it is exhibited in 
cladograms” (D. L. Hull, 1988, p. 131) in an effort to make the process of classification as 
“unambiguous” as possible: 
Two taxa are sister groups if they are more closely related to each other than either is to a third taxon. The 
evidence for this relationship is the presence of characters that the first two taxa possess but the third 
lacks—synapomorphies (D. L. Hull, 2001, p. 224).  
 
Synapomorphies are traits derived from an ancestor and present in all taxa from that ancestor 
onward. This is in contrast to symplesiomorphies, which are characters that are found “in an 
ancestor and some but not all of its descendants” (Ereshefsky, 2007, p. 69). As Mishler reiterates,  
Hennig's central ontological advance was that homologous similarities are of two kinds, those due to recent, 
shared-derived homologies (synapomorphies) and those due to distant, shared-primitive homologies 
(symplesiomorphies). Only the former are useful for reconstructing the relative order of branching events in 
a system that is changing by descent with modification (Mishler, 2000, p. 662).  
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For example, if you look at Figure 16, above, Aves and Crocodilia actually share a more 
common recent ancestor, thus rejecting their relationship in the paraphyletic interpretation makes 
no sense according to Hennig’s sister-group advancement. The result of this differing approach is 
that the tree diagrams each of these approaches produce say qualitatively different things and 
must be interpreted accordingly. Cladograms, such as those produced by Hennig and his 
adherents, “are not phylogenetic trees” (Ereshefsky, 2007, p. 71) in the formal sense. In a 
phylogenetic tree, the branching node represents a speciation event, while in the cladogram the 
branch represents the “joint possession of synapomorphy” (Eldredge & Cracraft, 1980, p. 212). 
The two trees between these different interpretive positions mean completely different things 
entirely. As noted by Hull, “The forks in cladograms do not represent species at all. Only 
terminal twigs in cladograms represent species” (D. L. Hull, 2001, p. 224). Further, true 
phylogenetic trees will also “depict genealogical history over time correctly” (Podani, 2013, p. 
322), meaning that they have “additional information, in that edge lengths are drawn 
proportional to some attribute such as amount of change” (the evolutionary distance from one 
organism and another).  
 The final approach mentioned by Ereshefsky that that will be discussed here is phenetics, 
which produce a distinctly different representational hierarchical arrangement. In 1963, Peter 
Sneath and Robert Sokal popularized numerical taxonomy, a purportedly empirical method of 
constructing taxonomies based on statistical analysis of biological traits. Very much a 
classificatory method in reaction to “evolutionary taxonomy and other schools” (Ereshefsky, 
2007, p. 60), numerical taxonomy, or phenetics, is a probabilistic method that clumps organisms 
together based on the general premise that those with the most phenotypic overlap are 
necessarily more closely related. Numerical analysis takes advantage of statistical and 
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computational methods to assess “taxonomic relationships … purely on the basis of the 
resemblances existing now in the material at hand” (Sneath & Sokal, 1973, p. 9). While 
evolutionary and cladistic methods were based on a mixture of common descent, homology, and 
the inference of the degree of change in a species over time, numerical taxonomy set out to 
produce an atheoretical mechanism for assessing relationships.78 As articulated by Robert Sokal,  
Numerical taxonomists contend that evolutionary importance is undefinable and generally unknown and 
that no consistent scheme for weighting characters before undertaking a classification has yet been 
proposed. To weight characters on the basis of their ability to distinguish groups in a classification … is a 
logical fallacy. Since the purpose of employing the characters is to establish a classification, one cannot 
first assume what these classes are and then use them to measure the diagnostic weight of a character 
(1966). 
 
Numerical taxonomy was touted as an empirical science, particularly because such analysis, in 
theory, would always produce the same result from laboratory to laboratory over a period of time 
(Sneath & Sokal, 1973, p. 11). Codes were created for each particular object trait: “’hairiness of 
a leaf’ might be coded as follows: hairless: 0, regularly haired: 2, densely haired: 3” (Sokal, 
1966, p. 114). Of course, as is the case with any method deemed empirical, one must critically 
assess the choice of variables or characteristics that undergo analysis for clustering. A notable 
weakness of numerical taxonomy is the fact that a relationship between organisms is defined 
solely by “similarity … operating on the assumption that the total phenotype accurately effects 
genotype. [Numerical systematists] believe that an unweighted measure of overall similarity 
provides an accurate determination of relationship. In so doing, pheneticists ignore the possibility 
of evolutionary convergence” (a circumstance where unrelated organisms evolve similar traits 
due to environmental influence) (Pietsch, 2015). Theory aside, it is important to the note the 
                                                
78 Acknowledging here that “atheoretical” means less about not holding a theoretical approach to classifying (which 
all scientific practitioners do), but more about trying to produce classifications whose interpretive, diagrammatic 
output, and object positions are not influenced by minute decisions influenced by a particular theoretical approach. 
Biological traits and parsimony-based analysis should dictate how organisms are depicted as related. Once variables 
and measurements were chosen, interpretive intervention was minimized. It goes without saying, however, that even 
phonetic positions are incredibly subjective in terms of how they identify variables, weigh them, which analysis they 
decide to employ, etc.  
   180 
extent to which a numerical approach to classification would differ from an evolutionary or 
cladistic method of organization. As Sokal makes clear, “although close cladistics relationship 
implies close similarity this is not always the case” in numerical taxonomy (Sokal, 1966, p. 109). 
Phenograms (Figure 18) mapped out the operational taxonomic unit’s (OTU) similarity, which 
could then be articulated as species concepts.  
 
 
Figure 18. Cladogram. The output of numerical classification are phenograms such as this segment of a larger 
representation in Sokal’s original Scientific American article (Sokal, 1966, p. 12). The numbers on the right 
represent species (OTUs) and their clustering is based on the similarity of characteristics between specimens.  
 
While cladistics methods have become the more accepted standard in today’s taxonomic 
environment (Dayrat, 2005, p. 407), there is still no universal consensus-based standard on 
which approach to take in practice. And there are still semblances of this typological thinking 
that continues into the present (as we saw in phonetics).  As Doug Yanega indicated,  
Some people are more wired into [cladistics] than others; and mostly it hinges around parsimony. And not 
everybody buys into parsimony. And parsimony does not necessarily work for all types of data. That is why 
molecular people use different tools because molecular evolution doesn't necessarily have to work out to be 
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parsimonious and then you also need to have your clock models built in for like the rates of gene 
substitution ... long branch attraction—those are problems that traditional cladistics doesn’t deal with very 
well ... it comes down to how species are classified and how higher taxa are organized. A lot of traditional 
taxonomists, especially in Europe, they never really quite caught on to the whole bandwagon of doing 
phylogenies and understanding what monophyly and paraphyly were; they don't have a problem with 
paraphyletic groups. And you know, for a cladist, they would die in apoplexy if you try to make them 
accept a paraphyletic group. We still have people now that are happy to use paraphyletic groups and it 
drives other people crazy. 
 
Phylogenetics is evolutionary, it is not typological. There are the typologists, and that's the more traditional 
thing, and in a way we are almost coming full circle. Using barcodes for classification is getting very close 
to being typological about how your defining your [objects], and building trees by neighbor joining is very 
typological. And that's how this stuff worked when they first came up with numerical taxonomy and 
phenetic analysis. That was, you see which things are most similar to the others. And that's how a lot of the 
molecular barcoding stuff will work. And god, a lot of that is so much [like a] house of cards —you are 
trying to take the natural world and pigeon hole it in ways that are convenient and people see so many ways 
that they can do it and they don't always necessarily yield the same result (2016). 
 
Regardless of which method of taxonomic arrangement prevails in our contemporary climate, 
elements of these schools demarcate sharp differences in the ways classifications are constructed 
and interpreted as modes of argumentation.   
I want to emphasize that this admittedly reductive description of these taxonomic 
approaches is merely to make two basic points: that taxonomic approaches make (1) 
epistemological commitments to how they produce classifications—which is to say, that 
scientists make particular methodological decisions about what constitutes the creation of valid 
taxonomic knowledge and opinion; and (2) these decisions are based on various combinations of 
evidence that, in turn, force scientists to make particular classificatory commitments about how 
species types are fundamentally related in representational structures. These commitments 
permeate the entire structure of any given produced taxonomy. Taxonomies function on their 
own internal logic, and understanding the basic positions of objects within a taxonomy is 
dependent on the constellation of assumptions about what characteristics are used to define 
relationships, what theories inform the weight and importance of them, and how it is that the 
produced hierarchy should be interpreted as an argument. Classifications are not only theories 
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about how to create higher-level taxa; they are also diagrammatic representations that, in no way, 
can illustrate the true complexity of each approach.  
The Catalogue, however, unlike particular descriptive-oriented based approaches, is not 
concerned with any one approach to producing taxonomic knowledge. In addressing this 
difference in the Catalogue of life, Michael A. Ruggiero, et. al. (2005), notes,  
Biological classifications can integrate diverse, character-based data in a phylogenetic framework, which 
allows a broad user community to utilize the disparate knowledge of shared biological properties of taxa. 
Phylogeny is, therefore, the basis for these biological classifications but there is still strong debate over 
their accounting for evolutionary divergence or information content other than the branching pattern [3]. 
Accordingly, classifications have often been labeled either phylogenetic or evolutionary, depending mainly 
upon whether or not they reject paraphyletic groups (2015a, p. 2). 
 
The Catalogue must choose one management system to organize this taxonomic contingency. 
Let us now closely examine how a kind of consensus taxonomic structure is accomplished in this 
space.  
Part III: Retrieval-Oriented Classifications: Toward a Consensus-Based Composite 
Instrument 
I now want to shift focus and prioritize taxonomies, such as the Catalogue of Life, that 
serve primarily as access infrastructure. The underlying assumption of the Catalogue is that a 
data landscape that consists of multiple, fragmented taxonomies is a less than optimal retrieval 
circumstance. If, as Tony Rees indicates, a classification is intended “to provide a recognisable 
navigation structure so that persons entering the classification can (hopefully) find their way to 
their particular organisms of interest” (2009), then how is a user to understand, as Wilson makes 
quite clear, the instrument as a set of coherent relationships within the Catalogue? A user needs 
to anticipate the epistemological approaches to knowledge implemented and object positions 
within each of these systems in order to adequately harness their exploitative power. Knowing if 
a classification, taxonomy, or tree, was created using cladistics, evolutionary, or phenetic 
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approach certainly has an influence on how a user will navigate the system—and ultimately 
locate the particular position that taxa should occupy. The Catalogue, however, which consists of 
many taxonomies is a bit more complicated to understand in this sense.  
For the Catalogue, coming up with a unified method of assessment for an innumerably 
diverse set of taxonomic productions seems like a nearly impossible task, despite Bliss’s 
tendency to believe that equilibrium of knowledge is eventually reached. A model of the natural 
world is completely dependent upon the assumptions and metrics a taxonomist uses to make 
relationship judgments. As Kevin Thiele and David Yeates have stated, “Taxonomists routinely 
filter large arrays of observations through an extensive knowledge base to decide that this group 
of specimens or that set of prior taxa comprises a new taxon. Crucially, another taxonomist using 
the same knowledge base may validly arrive at quite different conclusions, and it may take time 
for thorough testing of the alternative concepts to arrive at consensus (itself subject to future 
challenge and refinement)” (my emphasis) (2002). Consensus is an appropriate word to use in 
this context, and one that merits more examination if we are to understand how hybrid systems 
such as the Catalogue of Life gain credibility (or not) as a taxonomic structure independent of the 
internally-consistent taxonomic opinion that we typically use to judge biological classifications 
(or classification in general). The key question becomes, what constitutes a consensus-based, 
valid representation of the external world? And, if universal classification (or unificationism, in 
Jonathan Furner’s terminology (2013a)) is not the answer, then what might be a way forward to 
aggregate these disparate epistemological taxonomic approaches?  
As we have seen, species concepts are contingent and fluid in their composition, and with 
such documentary contingency, it makes it difficult to define the relationships that connect them 
with a unified taxonomic instrument. David Hull, in Science as Process (1988), understands 
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scientific theories as kinds of types that themselves exist within particular historical lineages 
(1988, p. 515), prone to evolution and change over time. Kuhn (1996), too, acknowledges that 
competing paradigms (taxonomic or otherwise) were essential to structuring the punctuated 
normalcy of scientific practice. A. Broadfield understood consensus to be a core concept in the 
development of classifications, but one that was antithetical to the production of the scientific 
knowledge:  
But the scientific character of an age is a result of the way in which scientists classify their conceptions, not 
something to which they appeal in order to classify them. The active work of classifying scientific concepts 
cannot be an attempt at consistency with established knowledge, for to be established is to be almost dead, 
and long since classified…From the point of view of research, as soon as anything is agreed upon, it wanes, 
and ‘agreed knowledge’ is a signboard warning the seeker not to expect much in a territory whose 
possibilities have been largely exhausted. In [the hands of scientific workers] classification is a living 
study, and is part of their work of discovery…A scientist is often engrossed in and identified with a process 
on which he has been working on all his life…His interest is not so much in finding a ground of agreement 
with other workers on the comparative excellence of various processes, as in proving by demonstration of 
the superiority of his own reasonableness of descent. There would be no use in asking his opinion of the 
other processes, for he would say that of course their advantages were undeniable, but were outweighed by 
their disadvantageous” (1946, p. 72). 
 
This tension between personal preference and the broader goal of facilitating data sharing 
between these competing taxonomic approaches is one that stands at the forefront of the 
Catalogue of Life’s general efforts to consolidate taxonomic information. A lunchtime 
conversation with Thomas Orrell at the Smithsonian NMNH is a case in point, where we were 
discussing the importance of the Catalogue of Life as a taxonomic management tool. One of the 
biggest impediments to the ready communication of taxonomic knowledge, he articulated, is the 
adherence to taxonomic traditions as the only way to understand the organismic landscape. 
“Why does dogma overtake certain areas of the discipline?” Orrell asked, “Why is it that 
traditions can’t be seen as separate from functional classification of information?” For example, 
he said, there should be one code [of nomenclature], but there are many. Yet people remain 
dedicated to keeping their own methods and ways; they are taught to understand the discipline in 
one particular way. “Why can’t we agree upon a unitary classification? What is it that stops us 
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from doing that?” he further inquired. There are two issues of note to highlight in this brief 
conversation: first, one of the primary goals of the Catalogue is to provide a unified 
classification, not a universal one. The Catalogue wants to bring information together for access 
and rearticulation, not create a structure that has universal application in all circumstances. 
Second, the Catalogue is intended to provide a structure that can communicate, not (necessarily) 
one that argues a taxonomic opinion.  
 What Orrell is articulating, quite essentially, is that taxonomic classifications function on 
two very distinct professional levels: one that requires a taxonomy to facilitate data transfer and 
one that can (and must) be used to serve as the structure by which taxonomic arguments are 
made. How can we divorce the expectation that a taxonomy must be an opinion, from the idea 
that a taxonomy can serve primarily as a facilitator of information? Scientific communities (for 
any number of reasons) are divided as to whether or not such a goal can and should be met. The 
general methods by which classifications are conveyed in graphical forms (trees, cladograms, 
etc.), and the database environments that disseminate their information (browseable hierarchies, 
text searching mechanisms, etc.), give an impression of professional consensus that may not 
otherwise exist. What kind of consensus, then, does the Catalogue qualify as? And how can we 
understand such consensus to differ from the kinds of consensus necessary to create distinct 
internally-consistent taxonomic GSDs such as The Reptile Database (Uetz, 2016), or any other?  
Indeed, Broadfield makes a sophisticated distinction that exemplifies Orrell’s position: 
“to arrive at something by consensus is a rather different matter from organizing something in 
consistency with a consensus in which the logical order is supposed to be established, for the 
latter suggests a blind acceptance to dogma” (1946, p. 77). The Catalogue’s function is not to 
organize a consensus of biodiversity theory to influence the approach to taxonomic construction 
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at a local level, only to articulate that consensus-based approaches to aggregating information are 
necessary, even if their functionality at a local level are not yet perfected. I certainly do not want 
to give the impression that taxonomic opinions such as those represented by Global Species 
Databases are “blind” in any sense of the term. My reasons for invoking this distinction made by 
Broadfield is merely to indicate that there are two ways in which we can conceive of building a 
classification: one that expects a certain degree of classificatory adherence or commitment, and 
one that expects only that a classification serve as a functional tool for communication, 
regardless of the classificatory consistency it embodies. I take the Catalogue to be the latter, 
based on a top-down approach, while taxonomic opinions to inhabit that former space are seen as 
a bottom-up method of constructing a classification.  Rather than use the term consensus for 
infrastructures such as the Catalogue, which perhaps assumes complete coordination and general 
agreement within the domain on a unified structure and standard, I will use the word composite, 
which emphasizes more the production of a complex, compound structure (“composite, adj. and 
n.,” 2016) with individual taxonomies forming the distinct parts of a larger taxonomic structure.  
Articulating a composite taxonomic instrument. 
 
[“The Modernity of Classification”] interrogates the shift from classification-as-ontology, in which 
everything is defined as it is, to a more contemporary notion of classification-as-epistemology, in which 
everything is interpreted as it could be — or more precisely, the paper argues for a conceptual move from 
modern monistic ontology to late-modern pluralistic epistemological foundation for classification theory 
and practice.  
—Jens-Erik Mai 
‘The Modernity of Classification” (2011, p. 711) 
 
I would now like to focus on the Catalogue’s “access-oriented” classification specifically. 
Even as far back as Linnaeus, nomenclature and taxonomies were meant to improve information 
recall amid growing information stores (Müller-Wille & Charmantier, 2012) and to facilitate 
memorization of species (Ereshefsky, 2001, p. 366). This is to say that one way to look at 
taxonomies is that they are meant, primarily, to expedite information retrieval. Jonathan Furner 
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notes systems being judged as retrieval mechanisms should “enable access to documents in an 
effective, efficient, and easy” manner (Furner, 2009, p. 10). But even this is not so simple a task 
as it might initially seem in the Catalogue’s instance. A classification system must be easily 
negotiated by the user, meaning that documents (which, in the case of biodiversity taxonomies, 
are species name-tokens that represent certain evidentiary documents that, together, constitute a 
concept) must generally be in a part of the taxonomy to be suitably assumed and locatable by a 
user.  
 Referring back once again to our roadmap for this discussion, Bourgoin’s “Global 
Names-Catalogue of Life Parameters” (Figure 12), we have finally made our way to the 
management classification of the Catalogue of Life, represented between Stage 4 and Stage 5. To 
recapitulate: we began at undifferentiated text strings, disambiguated into scientific names, found 
name-network relationships (historical, homotypic, etc.), and then assessed the constructions of 
“valid” taxa in classifications (necessarily produced by expert opinion and exemplified in the 
GSD repositories that make up the Catalogue). As GSD repositories come together, mechanisms 
need to be implemented to integrate these structures. If we think back to Wilson’s differentiation 
between “The Catalogue” and “The Bibliographical Encyclopedic” instruments, the Catalogue of 
Life (despite its name) is less about a coherent taxonomic “subject” than it is an architecture that 
seeks to encyclopedically estimate “what the ‘writing [or, this case, a taxonomic document] is 
good for’” (Wilson, 1968, p. 67) among a host of options within the documentary universe. 
Executive Editor Roskov said as much, describing his primary purpose as being to “[collate] the 
‘encyclopedia’ chapter-by-chapter” as new information is added to the system (2016a). But there 
is not only one method to integrate and compile taxonomic information. 
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Integrative approaches. 
The first task toward creating a composite structure for taxonomic coordination is to 
define what kind of integration a platform should optimally strive for. One way to represent and 
coordinate numerous taxonomies in a digital space is to present numerous taxonomic opinions on 
any one given page in an enumerative fashion. An example of this approach is the Encyclopedia 
of Life, which, as a reminder, strives to provide “information for every named species on the 
earth” through a one-page-per-species website (“What is EOL?,” 2017). EoL identifies one 
taxonomic tree to display as part of its landing page, per species (Encyclopedia of Life, 2017c), 
which is chosen by a series of full curators that are either “credentialed professional scientists or 
EOL community members who have earned the respect of other curators through their work as 
assistant curators” (“EOL Curators,” 2016). Acknowledging that there is no accepted hierarchy, 
EoL also presents a subsection of each species website that lists a number of other curated 
taxonomies that treats all these entities the same without a scale of value attached to them—an 
approach they call taxonomic pluralism (personal communication, June 15, 2016). There also 
exists a page that provides an even deeper level of “unvetted” incidental taxonomies that “help to 
bridge gaps in EOL coverage for groups that are poorly studied and not well represented in 
community maintained nomenclators” (Encyclopedia of Life, 2017b).  
As an example, the species webpage for Ursus arctos (the brown bear) lists the “Species 
2000 & ITIS Catalogue of Life: April 2013” taxonomy as its default taxonomy, selected by 
curator C. Michael Hogan (Encyclopedia of Life, 2017c). Six alternate, curated taxonomies are 
available that contain the species name Ursus arctos, including the Paleobiology Database, 
NCBI Taxonomy, the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS), and the IUCN Red List 
(Encyclopedia of Life, 2017b) (see Figure 19, below, for an illustration of the Catalogue and 
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ITIS hierarchies). Additionally, one can dig even deeper to see a total of fifty-two classifications 
that include representations from Wikipedia, as well as other (quite reputable) biological 
information sites (Encyclopedia of Life, 2017a). The sheer volume of taxonomies listed for 
Ursus arctos gives us a sense of how much complexity taxonomic databases like the Catalogue 
of Life are trying to control within its designated set of parameters. As of June 2016, plans were 
being discussed to implement dynamic hierarchies within the EoL interface, which would 
provide a mechanism for users to submit suggested changes given current taxonomic opinion—
for both the variant taxonomies as well as the default taxonomy listed on the species home page 
of EoL. The goal here is to present the most up-to-date taxonomy for a given species at the cusp 
of cutting-edge scholarship. Given the constantly evolving nature of taxonomic opinion, 
however, it remains to be seen how this feedback mechanism will balance ‘currency’ with an 
interface that provides a relatively consistent browsing mechanism. Making all users happy with 
the chosen default taxonomic display, at any given moment, will be difficult to achieve, since 
current research is not typically universally agreed-upon. 
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Figure 19. Two different curated taxonomies displayed by the Encyclopedia of Life for the species Ursus arctos 
(Encyclopedia of Life, 2017b). (Top) The (default) classification hierarchy for the species provided by the Catalogue 
of Life. (Bottom) The classification hierarchy provided by ITIS. 
While the Encyclopedia of Life’s taxonomic representations are usefully aggregated in 
this space, making it quite easy to compare them for differences, what this structure does not do 
is merge these various taxonomies to get a clear sense of the entire global diversity of life in one 
coherent system. One reason for this is quite simple: EoL is not a taxonomic database, per se, in 
that taxonomy is not its primary focus; rather, species-level knowledge is what is emphasized 
here, and the collocation of data generated around the world at this level. While the organization 
of the EoL pages is certainly organized by some back-end taxonomic system, that system in-and-
of itself is not front-and-center as part of the browsing experience. And when users do need to 
browse, they have multiple taxonomic options by which to seek out information. Thus, EoL 
expresses what I call a divided plurality: the comingling of multiple taxonomies side-by-side to 
allow for a user to choose that taxonomy most suited to their purposes. The taxonomies 
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themselves remain intact as they are created at the source database level. And while the 
taxonomies technically constitute the “backbone” of the species in the EoL, because those 
taxonomies are always shifting (due to curatorial intervention), any given species may change 
position over a period of time. This makes it incredibly difficult for non-expert users of the site 
(Species 2000, 2016c). 
Hierarchies in hierarchies: “Ornaments on a tree.”  
 In order to circumvent the unavoidable and irreconcilable issues that arise from these 
different taxonomic factions, the Catalogue has a team of experts that have decided upon some 
basic formats that structure all incoming taxonomic data purely on the assumption that 
taxonomic compromise is necessary for data collection and reuse. Choosing between multiple 
taxonomies, as you do with EoL, is a virtue in one sense: you get an impression of the 
overwhelming variance in expert opinion, and thus you have the potential to make a more 
informed choice as to how you wish to experience the interspecies information flow. 
Discriminating between a more- and less-optimal, situationally-relevant (Wilson, 1968, 1973) 
arrangement for most individuals, however, requires scientific knowledge that most individuals 
do not have. In order to facilitate the long-term data management of species-level data, reduce 
taxonomic redundancy across the biodiversity landscape, and broaden the user base of system 
that requires expert differentiation of multiple taxonomic trees, a new mode of taxonomic 
arrangement was needed to enable communication among these many fragmented systems. 
Adherence to taxonomic opinions based on internally-coherent hierarchies will never be able to 
serve this purpose, plastic and idiosyncratic as they are as scientist’s opinions changes over time. 
“The phylogenetic and classification work is always shifting and it is different kind of work than 
that of trying to communicate” (T. Orrell, personal communication, June 15, 2016).  
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The Catalogue of Life staff, thus, took it upon themselves to try to bring a sense of 
taxonomic stability to the biodiversity infrastructure/iLife consortium by implementing a 
management hierarchy, specifically built as a data communication mechanism to make 
organizational control of intellectual (documentary) assets more cohesive. The management 
hierarchy merges multiple taxonomies into one functional system. Unlike EoL, where divided 
plurality was defined by the choice between many options, the Catalogue’s integrated plurality 
comingles many hierarchies in one system. The Catalogue’s founder, Frank Bisby, believed that, 
in order to truly understand the extent of biodiversity knowledge, there needed to be a 
mechanism to aggregate data in a unified and coherent manner. Then, and only then, would 
scientists be able to address gaps in species knowledge on a global level. Thus, the Catalogue has 
had a broader mandate than most taxonomies from its inception: rather than argue a specific 
methodological structure, this taxonomy would chronicle the breadth of extant taxonomic 
knowledge. The Catalogue’s Executive Editor conveyed,  
We were firmly dedicated to the position that we should provide users [with] a single view of taxonomy. A 
single, simplified, unified view. Unified through different codes—zoological, botanical, bacterial codes of 
nomenclature. Frank [Bisby’s] idea was to make a single index. A kind of Yellow Pages, if you like. A user 
could locate a name and … look where that name is in the classification, [find] synonyms, accepted valid 
names, etc., and where species [are] placed within a genus, family, and so on (Roskov, 2016a). 
 
While the Catalogue began as only a list, it soon became apparent that the list format overlooked 
the more holistic view necessary to gauge what biodiversity segments were least documented 
and studied.  But how was this aggregation to be achieved in a practical sense? Merely bringing 
together datasets and placing them side-by-side would leave a great deal of overlaps and 
redundancies between taxonomies, along with juxtaposing organizational schema that conflicted 
on some basic structural levels. Adding even more complexity to this task, not all databases 
included the appropriate higher-level taxa categories (for example, above order) necessary to 
easily assemble the taxonomic ‘blocks.’ Scientists who build their own databases often have no 
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need to include higher ranks since they built it and thus had no need to indicate what, to them, 
was implicit knowledge about their particular species data set. The Catalogue’s management 
classification, then, was created to provide a basic organizing structure for these taxonomic 
misalignments. The management hierarchy “disjoints” taxonomic practice “from the desk” of 
individual scientists (Schalk, 2016a). 
The management hierarchy uses the “standard formal [higher] categories” of the 
Linnaean-based ranking system (phylum, class, order, family, etc.) most suited to accommodate 
the largest amount of taxonomic information derived from contributing databases. “The 
classification recognizes two superkingdoms, Eukaryota and Prokaryota, and seven kingdoms: 
Animalia, Archaea, Bacteria, Chromista, Fungi, Plants, and Protozoa. The classification also 
includes 1,467 orders of living organisms in 351 classes. Where certain taxonomic associations 
are still unresolved, the panel provides an interim recommendation” (Species 2000, 2016c). The 
Catalogue’s ultimate goal,  
Is to provide a hierarchical classification … that (a) is ranked to encompass ordinal-level taxa to facilitate a 
seamless import of contributing databases; (b) serves the needs of the diverse public-domain user 
community, most of whom are familiar with the Linnaean conceptual system of ordering taxon 
relationships; and (c) is likely to be more or less stable for the next five years…Beyond the immediate use 
for the CoL, the hierarchy is valuable as a reference for taxonomic and biodiversity research, as a tool for 
societal communication, and as a stable “classificatory” backbone for biodiversity databases, museum 
collections, libraries, and textbooks, to name a few applications (Ruggiero et al., 2015a, p. 2). 
 
Like ornaments on a holiday tree, the Catalogue of Life attaches GSDs to the management 
classification above the node of attachment of each database (See Figure 20, below) (2015a; 
Gordon, 2009). From this node downward, the general composition of the GSD is maintained in 
its entirety—the expert (that provides the GSD) serves as the final authority for its composition. 
Each species database sector is linked only at one node in the classification. “The taxonomic 
rank of the highest taxon at this attachment node varies from one GSD to another,” depending on 
how the Catalogue’s editor sees this source database interacting with the other adjacent 
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taxonomic entities “(e.g. [the] Conifer Database is attached [at the] phylum [level], [the] sector 
of Cercopoidea Organised Online is attached as superfamily [level], [and the] sector of [the] 
ILDIS World Database of Legumes is attached as one family)” (Renear, Sacchi, & Wickett, 
2010, p. 5). As part of the Catalogue’s standard dataset (Species 2000, 2014), the GSDs are 
required to provide data in fields that represent their particular chosen hierarchy and taxa, 
including the highest taxon covered, as well as all of the taxon beneath that highest taxon level.79  
 
 
Figure 20. Schematic of the Catalogue of Life Management Hierarchy interacting with the GSD Internal 
Classifications. Original image label: “The Catalogue of Life retains the GSD's own classification below points of 
connection and uses the management classification above” (Species 2000, 2016c).  
 The process of creating the management hierarchy was a difficult and complicated one, 
full of a great deal of heated debate and deliberation—most of which was accomplished through 
email and other remote mechanisms (T. Orrell, personal communication, June 15-16, 2016). As 
part of the process of finalizing the ultimate taxa categories for the management classification, 
“authors consulted more than 200 sources, most of which were from recent taxonomic 
                                                
79 See Figure 8 in chapter two for the standard dataset fields. 
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publications and websites” (Ruggiero et al., 2015b). As was conveyed by Peter Schalk, “The first 
hierarchy was replaced about 3 years ago … after 2 years of work [between] quite a few players 
in the Species 2000 field … It's still not perfect, but good enough...and even then you still have 
conflicts because their vision is not always the same” (2016b). Issues central to these 
deliberations were how taxonomic authorities were to be set, and how one taxonomic view was 
to be adopted over any other. Striking a balance between three basic user groups—experts, 
institutions, and non-scientists—is about negotiating which classification virtues are worth 
maintaining and which are suited for only professional conditions. In the end, the Catalogue is 
about managing data, not about managing internally-consistent taxonomic opinion, and thus, this 
hybrid structure was implemented to facilitate ready access to as much information as technically 
possible, while always deferring to taxonomic opinion as the optimal result in subsections of the 
Catalogue where appropriate. 
But, as Paul Kirk, of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, made me aware of, it is important 
to distinguish between two distinct entities and initiatives happening in parallel within the 
Catalogue infrastructure: 
The Catalogue of Life has two elements: those people connected with the Catalogue of Life that are 
producing a higher-level management hierarchy for life on earth ... [Thomas] Cavalier-Smith, Dennis 
Gordon, the ITIS people, myself, AlgaeBase ... they are looking at what's out there and trying to come up 
with a consensus for life on earth.80 That is happening in parallel with the management hierarchy that used 
to manage the content in the Catalogue of Life, which is slightly different. What the Catalogue of Life 
decided to do early on was decide that that we are not trying to resolve all issues connected with 
classification. If somebody comes to us with a GSD for a family or a higher rank, we're going to adopt their 
classification and plug it in, as far as possible, with existing classifications and try to avoid any overlaps So 
we've got these two hierarchies: [one with] everything as we see it down to ordinal level (not to family or 
genus)—a group that is producing higher-level stuff—but that might be out of sync with what the people 
are plugging things into. And everything is moving forward, but within the Catalogue of Life it is moving 
forward on two fronts. (P. Kirk, personal communication, August 30, 2016).  
 
Kirk articulates this distinction to emphasize the difference between the theoretical work going 
on to produce a consensus system to organize all life that must negotiate many taxonomic 
                                                
80 See (Ruggiero et al., 2015a). 
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traditions (the higher-level management hierarchy as described above), and the more practical 
work of creating the actual taxonomic system that is a composite structure fundamentally altered 
by the ingest of GSDs from all over the world (the Catalogue of Life as a dynamic database). 
The former has a stability factor of about 5 years (the general timeframe the Catalogue global 
team task force is set to review the management classification structure), while the latter, 
practical management taxonomy changes along with the ingest of every database that enters the 
Catalogue of Life taxonomic backbone.81  
In some ways, Kirk is pointing to the difference between the work entity of the 
Catalogue—the idealized notion of what a full management hierarchy might look like—as well 
as the text of the Catalogue—the species token and taxonomic relationships that constitute the 
Catalogue as part of monthly and annual editions. The practical consensus system is managed by 
a team of editors, led by the Executive Editor, Yuri Roskov, at the Prairie Research Institute at 
the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. Roskov handles all of the decisions regarding data 
transformation, and maintains contact with the various data providers that contribute GSD 
systems to the taxonomy. Part of this communication involves negotiating with database 
managers who contribute to the Catalogue free of charge as an open source piece of software.82 
Additionally, Roskov has between seven and ten individuals serving on a board of editors that 
help him negotiate with regional hubs and umbrella providers such as those located in Europe, 
                                                
81 See chapter two for information on publication timeframes for the Catalogue, which will correlate with the 
frequency at which the consensus management classification also changes.  
 
82 As we have seen thus far, taxonomies represent the output of real scientific work and hypothesization, so asking a 
scientist to contribute data is asking them to contribute many years of effort—potentially the result of an entire 
career’s work. Further, biodiversity database maintenance is a costly endeavor, rarely subsidized by the institutions 
where the scientists are employed. Concerns raised by scientists contributing data include, not getting properly 
credited by those that download and use data; not being able to control manipulation of their data once it is 
downloaded by other parties; and not having full control over data transformation as it enters the Catalogue of Life. 
Access agreements that attempt to clarify and reconcile these issues are, of course, negotiated, but within a 
distributed database environment such as the iLife consortium, full control of data throughout its full lifecycle is 
nearly impossible.  
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China, or South America (2016b). The intellectual and theoretical work of building the 
management system is designed to provide flexibility to the practical work of building the 
Catalogue’s database taxonomy.  
 A key issue to note is that, as discussed above, on a very practical level, each of these 
different database ‘ornaments’ has a classificatory logic that may differ from one another. As we 
have indicated, not everyone organizes animals or plants or bacteria in the same way. It makes 
sense to now think about how editors choose databases for ingest, and how their interference 
might be reconciled in the database space. 
Discriminating taxonomic contributions and filling gaps. 
Consensus is a contentious word within the context of the Catalogue, for the various 
camps within the practice of taxonomy cannot (and by definition, should not, given that 
taxonomy is a science) agree on one global standard for constructing hierarchical relationships. 
In the biodiversity database world, at least for the purposes of the Catalogue of Life, assessment 
of taxonomies has nothing to do with a correspondence to some a priori notion of reality or with 
what specific method of taxonomic opinion is invoked, but rather is based on the general notion 
that it is good enough given the state of biodiversity science and the reputation of the 
contributing individual at hand. In general, while the Catalogue is “reflective of [phylogenetic]” 
(Ruggiero et al., 2015a, p. 2) approaches within its hierarchical structure, it does not purport to 
be a cohesive phylogenic tree. Rather than method, reputation is considered the hallmark of good 
contributing GSD classifications: 
No, it doesn't matter to me at all [how they build their classification]. First of all, I am asking whether this 
taxon is covered globally or not in their resource, so whether it's a monograph or whether it's partial just for 
a region, or for an ecological niche (say, marine), and if they say, yes it is covered globally and it is 
produced to the best of our knowledge of [the] taxa, and has all modern publications, that is good enough 
for me. And, of course, if they say it follows the most up to date classification. There is nothing like a 
conversion method for different classification specialists. So they might be different. And for me, it means 
nothing, because taxonomists may never come to agreement. For example, in the scorpion group, there are 
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two big groups whose opinions conflict with each other and this can't be stopped. And actually, my honest 
belief is that we should not restrict diversity of classification hypotheses. So users may, or should, have a 
choice of the arrangement that is best for them. In the Catalogue of Life, following the approach of a single 
classification, we are not saying our classification is right and prefect, but we are saying we make our 
choice (Roskov, 2017). 
 
In an environment where taxonomy cannot be pinned down and labeled correctly, all the 
Catalogue has to go on is whether or not a scientist has done due theoretical and methodological 
diligence in producing their classifications.  
And while most classifications tend to use similar methods, minute differences cause 
misalignments that present themselves as gaps and overlaps. Moving taxa from one area of the 
taxonomic tree to another is not a simple editorial task. Recall the process of nomenclature and 
how, to a certain extent, nomenclature reflects taxonomic positions (the first part of a name 
indicates genus, the second part species). If a species is moved into another genus, the first part 
of the binomial name needs to be changed to reflect this modification. If the Catalogue were to 
attempt to do so, the new name would qualify as a ‘new combination’ (Global Names 
Architecture, 2017d) and, in order to be accepted by the taxonomic community as a valid 
nomenclatural act, it would need to be published in accordance with the particular code 
governing that group. Aside from causing undue confusion in the taxonomic community 
(changing a name for merely technical purposes rather than for descriptive purposes would be 
antithetical to normal nomenclatural practice), the process would be incredibly time consuming 
and expensive. Taxonomic practice occasionally interferes with the overall technical mission of 
the Catalogue.  
There is also a fundamental tension between GSD authority and editorial review. While 
the Executive Editor is a taxonomist by training, no one person can be a specialist in all areas. As 
Roskov remarked, “We are quite limited in our ability to control this data because the taxonomic 
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databases that contribute their data are the "kings in their kingdom"—they are responsible for 
taxonomic visions and concepts in their sector” (2017).  
Even as the Catalogue has taken shape over time, gaps inevitably present themselves in 
the management taxonomy. More charismatic species—those species that get more attention by 
scientists and policy makers (Bowker, 2008, p. 146)—have a tendency to get described and 
classified more exhaustively. Certain species groups, on the other hand, such as worms 
(Annelida) and mollusks (Kunze, Didžiulis, & Roskov, 2013), have a great deal of descriptive 
gaps in the literature (2016c). Information on these species just is not yet available in GSDs. 
There are also circumstances when GSDs are precluded from being included in the Catalogue 
due to user agreement disagreements on intellectual property issues. Databases are the result of 
difficult, individual labor, and, at the local level, one person (or group) controls the description 
and data related to one entire taxa; and so if that one individual refuses to contribute, an entire 
segment of the tree of life is excluded from the Catalogue’s global taxonomy.  
In order to fill these gaps, the Catalogue of Life attempted to implement an intermediate 
taxonomic space that they called proto-GSDs. Taking regional species databases (RSD) as their 
core dataset, proto-GSDs attempt to fill gaps that global species databases could not fill. Recall 
that RSDs are regionally specific, covering broad geographic spaces that can sometimes be as 
large as the country of China. Given this broad coverage, they often overlap with GSD content—
and, in fact, some of the collected GSDs are actually also part of RSDs. For example, an RSD 
like the World Register of Marine Species (WoRMS) (2017b) aggregates GSDs in a similar 
manner as the Catalogue (and in some cases, also produce their own taxonomic backbone). 
Unlike GSDs that are often organized around specific taxa and have global coverage, RSDs are 
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more difficult to integrate given their multi-taxa and geographically specific composition.83 
Editors will often take chunks of RSDs and fill in taxa that are not adequately covered in the 
GSD dominated Catalogue taxonomy. But RSDs have one significant downside: they do not 
necessarily cover a given taxa globally.84 Proto-GSDs, then, were meant to compensate for this 
issue, by artificially creating a GSD taxa space using multiple RSD segments compiled into one 
taxonomy. As explained on the Catalogue of Life Blog, 
A proto-GSD combines multiple regional checklists to try to achieve greater coverage for a particular 
taxon. One would think this would be quite straightforward, after all isn't it just a case of combining 
datasets and removing the duplicates? Well not exactly, as combining regional datasets can lead to all sorts 
of taxonomic issues because of possible duplication in species names and also the conflicting species 
concepts and classification systems. Take for example the Family Gentianaceae in the Plant Kingdom. This 
family of plants has an estimated 1650+ species worldwide. We have two current suppliers of Gentianaceae 
to the Catalogue of Life - ITIS Regional database and Catalogue of Life China. Together they supply the 
Catalogue of Life with 552 species in addition to 82 infraspecific taxa. The species Gentianella acuta 
(Michx.) Hultén appears in both checklists where it is a synonym in ITIS Regional and an accepted name in 
the Catalogue of Life China. This is because some of the species of Gentianaceae are cosmopolitan (ie 
present in North America and China) and the taxonomic concept (ie accepted name or synonym) is 
different. To combine the datasets the Catalogue of Life editors had to resolve these issues before 
publishing it in the Catalogue of Life. Gentianaceae is now part of a 'proto-GSD' (Matthias, 2013). 
 
No specialized software or interface was created for the Catalogue to perform these aggregating 
tasks, thus all of the editing work was being done directly within the database using .csv and 
Microsoft Access files (Roskov, 2016c). Designed software could potentially flag taxonomic 
conflicts and recommend master classifications between overlapping structures, thus releasing 
this burden from the taxonomy editors. Despite early attempts at building this infrastructure, 
such software mechanisms never materialized. One of Roskov’s major tasks as Executive Editor 
is to manually build proto-GSDs to the best of his taxonomic ability. Once compiled, these 
databases are tentatively placed in the Catalogue to bridge existing gaps (knowing that the 
“aggregation” is “primitive” in nature and that it is not—yet—scrutinized by a recognized expert 
                                                
83 In the long term, the boundaries of nation and regions change for various political and economic reasons, which 
could potentially pose the problem of how to assess the coverage of RSD databases.   
 
84 Some RSDs like WoRMS and ITIS do cover species globally, but others, such as the Catalogue of Life China, do 
not.  
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in that taxon) (Roskov, 2016c). This kind of manual intervention, however, is costly, and the 
Catalogue is unable to revisit these proto-GSDs for each Annual version produced by the 
Catalogue. Until software is available that can mechanize this process, the temporary gap 
measures will have to suffice.85 
Despite these proto-GSD efforts, there is no aggregative practice that is generally 
accepted by taxonomic specialists. “Professional taxonomists do not appreciate any kind of 
technical exercises like I described,” Roskov indicates, “For example, a plant list that is being 
built using software by [the] Missouri Botanical Gardens ... where they are trying to merge 
regional floras. I spoke to professional taxonomists ...and they are very much skeptical about this 
work. It is a very political process.”(2017). For the Catalogue, such interventions are better than 
nothing. “A draft checklist is better than [one with] gaps,” Roskov indicated. If the goal is to get 
an up-to-date snapshot of the world’s biodiversity in one coherent structure, the Catalogue will 
do all that it can to achieve this coverage, even if the mechanisms are temporary and imperfect. 
A major difference between taxonomic opinion and management hierarchies is this ability to 
accept flexibility and contingency. The Catalogue’s taxonomy is a practical tool that understands 
and embraces its limitations. As I was told on numerous occasions: it is better to embrace 
taxonomic disagreement than to wait for a professional taxonomic consensus that will never 
materialize.   
Part IV: Extensive Flexibility: Broadening Wilson’s Schematic 
What, then, might we be able to say about the instrumentation of the Catalogue versus 
the instrumentation of any other taxonomy, consistent as they are in their internal structure, 
classificatory relationships, and ontological stability? One unique aspect of the Catalogue’s 
                                                
85 See chapter five for discussion about GBIF’s taxonomy building algorithm.  
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taxonomy is the extent to which it, as a system of organization, is not only an information 
structure by which represented documents are placed in particular categories and relationships, 
but it is also a complete taxonomic document that is subsequently extended in different systems 
toward different purposes. In looking back to Patrick Wilson’s, Two Kinds of Power (1968), he 
presented two powers that exist within the bibliographical universe: that of descriptive power, 
defined as the ability to describe documents in such a way that we can call-up a set of 
undifferentiated documents; and exploitative power, which he describes as the ability for the use 
of texts in a manner most relevant to the circumstance at hand. A trait of both powers is that they 
are focused on the documents within the system. In other words, Wilson’s approach tells us how 
to describe objects in such a way as to provide the best use of them—and only them. And by 
extension, this would create a more powerful and functional bibliographic instrument.  
The instrument itself in Wilson’s narrative—the catalogue, or whatever organizational 
structure provided to seek out documents—is understood to remain intact as a cohesive entity. 
Wilson did not include (and perhaps couldn’t anticipate given the primitive computational 
abilities in 1968) in his analysis the possibility that a given system could be made with the 
intention of being repurposed, recombined, and redefined in a plethora of other infrastructures 
(within the iLife consortium and beyond), through a variety of means. This seems to me 
appreciably different than the expectations placed on other classification systems that we 
typically see in the documentary and bibliographic space. This is a kind of control over the 
system represented by the Catalogue of Life that is not covered in Wilson’s schematic. But this 
control is not a control at all in the traditional sense; it is the ability to forfeit control of what, in 
traditional biodiversity taxonomic circles, is highly valued: the internal coherence of taxonomic 
opinion in deference to a gain in exploitative power. In other words, in order to increase the 
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exploitative power of both the represented and recorded documents (species representations and 
their linked referents), as well as the emergent taxonomic document itself, a modicum of 
structural flexibility is necessary in the domain of descriptive control. Objects within 
biodiversity taxonomies need to be organized, related, and structured in such a way as to make 
them flexible. This is an active process, not a process that just happens to the Catalogue. 
Interestingly, the Catalogue’s approach to biodiversity taxonomic organization, makes the case 
that this extensive flexibility actually increases the exploitative power of the Catalogue’s 
document, given that it provides a mechanism for global documentary access in a multitude of 
different circumstances. 
Such systemic flexibility is what defines the Catalogue: Catalogue staff create a 
consensus-based composite taxonomic structure that is meant not only to provide a means to 
both classify and organize documents, but also to provide a structural backbone in other systems 
that, in practice, rearticulates and re-presents the Catalogue’s classification according to their 
various classificatory and epistemological interpretations. The third function of the Catalogue 
(aside from a species list and a taxonomy) is to be an instrument of organized knowledge (as 
opposed to an instrument to organize knowledge). One might argue the position that such re-use 
of a classification can occur with any classification. Somebody, can, for example, take the 
Library of Congress schedule and implement it for their own local purposes (whether or not 
permission was granted or needed), manipulating it as the see fit.86 And this can certainly be seen 
as a kind of imposed power onto an instrument or system. But differentiating this kind of 
imposed use as categorically different from the use of any document for any particular purpose 
                                                
86 Of course, the point of the Library of Congress classification—or any bibliographic classification—is its 
implementation in many local repositories. However, the LoC system is not downloaded and then amended to local 
circumstances—this would defeat the purpose of using the system since you would never be able to use the main 
classification schedule again without causing a great deal of headaches.   
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would be a fruitless enterprise. An imposed repurposing is not unique to the Catalogue or any 
other instrument, so it is not a power in Wilson’s sense. Wilson’s entire discourse in Two Kinds 
of Power aims to discuss how it is that we can control a certain set of documents or texts 
systemically so that they can be best described and exploited within a documentary (or in 
Wilson’s term, bibliographic) universe. One of the Catalogue’s central aims is that it is designed 
to be extended into other digital and organizational domains. The structures, policies, and 
standards that the Catalogue has imposed make such reuse possible in multiple ways. As do the 
mechanisms to obtain feedback and input on the recursive updating of that document as new 
Annual editions are released.  
The concept of extensive power helps us understand the potential functionalities 
taxonomies have within digital spaces. It also provides us with a mechanism by which we can 
conceptualize classifications without fully internal and classificatory coherence, which 
nonetheless serve an integral and powerful mediative purpose in the biodiversity domain. Among 
biodiversity infrastructures, such as those in the iLife ecology, such an extension is an essential 
part of what makes this and other infrastructures work—and how it is that scientists can produce 
functional mechanisms for coordinating local knowledge in global spaces.  
Conclusion 
The biodiversity taxonomic instrument is a complex machine. A fundamental question 
that arises within the space of eScience ecologies such as the Catalogue of Life is: Is it more 
important that these classifications be scientifically correct (as in, for example, representing 
current phylogenetic assemblages) or to more easily facilitate data sharing. And this tension is 
strong. I want to reiterate here that there is a sense in which the catalogue, and taxonomies in 
general, are both heuristic spaces (idiosyncratic, hermeneutic) and information communication 
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systems (just getting data to go where it needs to go). The vibrant conversations that went on in 
some of the biodiversity meetings I attended illustrate how strongly people’s professional 
identities are tied to what we see as a very simple tree structure. But these two applications 
(heuristic usage and data facilitation) have very different purposes within scientific practice; and, 
really, they depend upon each other to create a robust and functional scientific production 
system. These are entirely different user groups whose needs and concerns the Catalogue must 
strive to balance going forward. And I mean technically, but also socially: how do you get buy-in 
from scientists who do not want their hard work transformed just because a data management 
structure demands it to function globally? 
Whenever I think about the potential powers of the classificatory space I recall my 
aforementioned meeting with Tom Orrell where he asked, “Why does dogma overtake certain 
areas of the discipline?” It seems to me that dogma extends far beyond epistemological and 
methodological positions to build a taxonomy, but it also broadens to the ways in which we 
conceptualize the consistency and authority of classificatory spaces. Hope Olson (2002) helped 
us see through these authoritative structures and challenged us to push against them by imagining 
alternative techniques. Thinking of the Catalogue, what can be more alternative than setting 
aside one of the fundamental tenets of classification: control over internal consistency? Not only 
is the Catalogue composite in nature—that is to say, it is a database meant to aggregate many 
contributed database taxonomies—but it is also consensus-based, meaning that the taxonomy 
itself is a self-recognized and designed negotiated object. The Catalogue recognizes the 
contingent nature of all documents (species documents, nomenclature, and taxonomies) in the 
biodiversity space and is striving to make a space where that contingency can find some usability 
and functionality on a larger scale.  
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This prompts a larger question to the Information Studies community at large: what is a 
good enough classification system for the documents we describe and organize? And how can 
such consensus-based negotiations help diversify our systems, and share and collocate 
information more effectively and flexibly? To a certain extent I see composite structures like the 
Catalogue, exposing the fact that documentary systems, organized as they are with a multitude of 
classificatory schema, have never been completely consistent in practice or free of their own 
individuated forms of dogma—we see this in the plethora of classificatory approaches, theories 
and methodologies to constructing and hypothesizing organismic relationships. A. Broadfield 
once wrote, 
A common dictum is that classification should not be critical. Whatever precautions a classification may 
take, it will be critical. For it is a system of expressed judgments … The endeavor to avoid criticism can 
have only one result—the monumentalizing of beliefs which are looked upon, wittingly or otherwise, as 
being beyond criticism. Thus an attempt to achieve impartiality can become an insidious form of 
dogmatism (1946, p. 78). 
 
Critical views of the Catalogue stem from its designed flexibility and from the editor’s ability to 
acknowledge classifications as what they are: constructed points of view. Dogma takes on a 
different guise in this space: the only thing that is true is that the taxonomic construct will 
change. Method and theory are understood quite differently here. Embracing a pluralistic 
approach has been a key component for the scientists involved with the Catalogue: “[the] actual 
complexities of phylogenetic history emphasize that classification is a pragmatic human 
enterprise where compromises must be made” (Adl et al., 2005, p. 4). To embrace a plurality and 
to push against the ongoing debates about what constitutes a right and wrong mechanism for the 
organization of documents, seems to me a much more practical way of understanding the 
potentiality of classificatory spaces. It also shows the potential of embracing the critical nature of 
taxonomic spaces in general. If documents are contingent, then the classificatory document is no 
less stable; to think otherwise is to live within the simulacrum of control. Far worse in practice, 
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perhaps, is that if we assume systems to be at their core, coherent, then we begin the exploitation 
of a system at a power far less than we could otherwise have if we acknowledged (and could 
assess) their inherent, built-in limitations. The extent of our potential power—exploitative, 
descriptive, or extensive—over or through a system is only limited by the knowledge we have of 
the instrument in question. The fundamental relationships that create the paradigms we function 
within—implicit or explicit—need to be openly criticized and explored. We need to reach for 
Hope’s eccentric techniques. The Catalogue, I think, helps us see both these tensions and this 
capacity. 
One of the potentialities created by a ‘knowledge base’ like the Catalogue is that it can be 
recombined to create new forms of knowledge, with the ultimate aim of understanding the 
historical development of taxonomic knowledge and evolution. This aim has been met with 
mixed reactions. Moving onward, the next chapter will more closely examine the possibilities 
and critiques of the Catalogue. Can the Catalogue be used to answer broader evolutionary-based 
questions? In what ways is the Catalogue changing taxonomies that it brings into its structure, 
and how is the Catalogue changing itself as part of this process? And finally, what specific 
critiques of the Catalogue have been expressed by professionals in biodiversity practice—most 
of which are equally invested in the overall aim of information communication and centralization 
of services?  
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5: Knowledge Bases, Taxonomic Change, and Contentions with Consensus 
 
There are … a number of distinct ways in which a power may vary in the directions of increase or 
decrease…An obvious dimension of power is that of extent: if one’s control extended over the entire 
bibliographical universe, the extent of control would be as great as possible. The actual extent of a man’s 
power would be specified, if this were possible, by enumerating or describing in general terms the items 
over which he had control, items which I shall say constitute the field of control … A further dimension we 
can call range, though perhaps versatility would be more apt. The range of my power over any collection 
of objects corresponds to the number and variety of demands I can make on these objects. The greater the 
number and variety of purposes for which I can have suitable textual means provided, and the greater the 
number and variety of neutral descriptions in terms of which I can successfully pose requests, the greater 
power over my field of control … Another dimension is what we may call the dimension of supply. If we 
think of the sorts of power we might have over any collection of objects whatever, it springs to mind that 
the highest degree of power would be conferred by absolute ownership. The owner of an object, if his 
ownership is absolute, can do what he likes with the object; he can destroy it, mutilate it, give it away, use 
it in any way that he likes and can. 
—Patrick Wilson 
Two Kinds of Power: An Essay On Bibliographic Control (1968, pp. 36–38) 
Introduction    
 Given the described differences between traditional, descriptive-oriented classifications, 
and pragmatic, retrieval-oriented management classifications, one might ask the question, then, 
what is the ultimate purpose of these composite systems as it pertains to the biodiversity 
ecology? Based on the evidence presented thus far, I might simply state that the purpose of 
systems (instruments) like the Catalogue are to organize context-specific data and information 
(documents) to provide access to scientists (best textual means), who can then, in turn, produce 
more science (the situationally-relevant “means to an end” in Wilson’s bibliographic schematic) 
(Wilson, 1968, p. 22). But as the quote by Patrick Wilson that opens this chapter indicates, the 
kinds of powers we have over systems—and their limitations—are essential qualities to grapple 
with if we are to understand the extent of potential control we have over the documents in 
question. This chapter examines the potentiality and limits of the Catalogue’s taxonomic 
instrument, which we have spent these chapters deconstructing, identifying, and formulating.  
In identifying the purposes of information organization frameworks, Joseph Tennis states 
that they are created for “retrieval, attestation, and inference” (2006, p. 305). Retrieval is one of 
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the more obvious elements in taxonomic spaces and a prevalent topic in our previous discussions 
of biodiversity taxonomic structures: the ability to find information related to some taxon or taxa 
via a mediated browsing interface or query. Attestations are, according to Tennis, descriptions of 
concepts as represented in knowledge organizing structures. In the context of this manuscript, 
taxon concepts are validated through and constituted by a series of evidentiary claims about how 
and why they are intellectually formulated to fit within scientific discourse. Tennis’s final 
purpose of knowledge structures, that of inference, is particularly important in this chapter. 
Inferential purposes are the ability to “identify particular documents” (2006, p. 306) within the 
documentary universe. But given the extensive function of the Catalogue it goes beyond the 
identification of the represented documents within the database, it is also the identification of the 
purposes of the taxonomic document itself. It can also be those actions that intend to use the 
Catalogue space to draw conclusions (“inference, n.,” 2016) about larger biodiversity questions 
and frameworks that exceed the additive value of the component parts of the taxonomic structure 
in-and-of itself. The inferential purposes of the Catalogue exceed the sum of its documentary 
evidence, associated species concepts, and taxonomic relationships. Instead, inference takes 
these component elements and applies them to deduce more broadly stated heuristic goals about 
the development of biodiversity and taxonomic science, as well as macropattern conclusions 
about the state of evolution or structural questions about phylogenetic development. As A. 
Broadfield states,  
But the sciences do not exist only for the purpose of classifying, and therefore to arrange them according to 
genera and species is to ignore the explanatory connections which dominate the interests of scientists 
themselves…The several genera are not found in reality arranged in the system in which classification 
exhibits them; as they actually appear they are always realised (sic) in numberless individual instances, 
separated in time and space, and subject to continual change both in their own conditions and in their 
relations to one another (1946, pp. 91–92) 
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Thus, the Catalogue should optimally be able to provide a flexible environment to facilitate the 
application of concepts to questions asked about some set of conditions of the external world—a 
world that is continually changing and elusive by its very nature. The biodiversity taxonomic 
infrastructure should provide an equally-mutable combinatory space where trends and conditions 
for biodiversity science can be assessed by applying the concepts and relationships the Catalogue 
presents.  
An essential question becomes what should scientists ideally be able to do with these 
composite knowledge bases to answer broader macropattern, evolutionary questions? And, 
secondarily, what criticisms are applied to the Catalogue that precludes it from having adequate 
extensive uses in professional contexts? What are its extensive limitations in the current 
bioinformatics environment? As an infrastructure meant to deeply integrate itself into an iLife 
consortium that is fundamental to the global production of scientific biodiversity knowledge, the 
editors, staff, and facilitators of the Catalogue know that there is much work to be done to meet 
these various institutional, individual, and systemic needs. If anything, the NAMES conference 
in Leiden served as a venue where these kinds of limitations could be discussed, so that an 
adequate plan could be articulated going forward to rectify these limitations.  
To this end, this chapter is organized into three broad sections: the first, briefest, section 
will lay out a possible schematic in which we can understand the use of systems such as the 
Catalogue for the production of evolutionary and phylogenetic inference. Such a discussion 
situates the Catalogue not only as a database, but also as a space in which this data can be 
properly invoked to answer larger scale historiographic questions about how taxonomies (in 
contradistinction to nomenclature) can be traced as an evolving series of postulations over a 
broad period of time. The practice of nomenclature, and more specifically nomenclators, are to 
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provide a general sense of the historical development of species concepts. The Catalogue-as-
knowledge-base can also be conceptualized to provide just such a tracing mechanism for the 
production of taxonomies, varied and continually-changing as they are as a practice that argues a 
certain position about (current and ancestral) biological relationships. One mechanism invoked in 
the database space to maintain these historical taxonomic changes is Walter Berendsohn’s (1995) 
concept of potential taxa. Potential taxa are, in retrospect, a seemingly simple concept allowing 
for the conservation of linkages between alternative taxonomic specifications as they evolve over 
time. But they hold powerful potential in biodiversity database environments. 
The second part of the chapter uses Joseph Tennis’s (2015) concept of second-order 
classification theory to understand the kinds of possible changes classification structures 
undergo, as well as what we do with them, once they have been constructed and implemented in 
a particular context. Such a discussion frames the changes and uses of the Catalogue within a 
clear Information Studies position. Taxonomic ontogeny is introduced as a way in which we can 
theoretically understand the evolution of taxonomic documents similarly to the way we can 
understand the development and history of the species document. One example offered of an 
ontogenic transformation is the iterative and punctuated change the Catalogue undergoes as new 
GSDs are introduced into its management infrastructure as it grows over time. Each time a new 
GSD is absorbed by the Catalogue, a new network of classificatory relationships (spatial and 
temporal) is introduced, which I call a reformulation of classificatory distance. The second use 
of the Catalogue is how it serves to connect and reconcile various taxonomic approaches by 
virtue of its management hierarchical function. Such a role is central to the Catalogue’s purpose 
of communicating biodiversity information rather than arguing a certain evolutionary or 
phylogenetic position. And finally, the extensive re-use of the Catalogue is formulated in 
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Tennis’s terms, showing how the Catalogue can mediate between local and global taxonomic 
practices as it is embedded into other online biodiversity infrastructures as a taxonomic 
backbone. 
Finally, in Part III, the core of this chapter, I examine how these second-order issues and 
concerns are problematized and limited in the online biodiversity taxonomic and data 
environment. What are the most fundamental critiques of the Catalogue in relation to its intended 
and stated purpose in the iLife consortium? This is certainly not an exhaustive listing of the 
various critiques of the Catalogue, only those limitations that were identified most often in the 
interviews I conducted, and in the online discussions and taxonomic literature I closely 
examined.87 The first critique is the conflict between the Catalogue’s general aim to collocate 
disparate taxonomic functions in one system within a funding environment that privileges new 
and multiple cutting edge projects. The end result is that the Catalogue’s basic structure is 
potentially unsupportable in the long-term unless scientists can centralize administrative and 
funding allocation (processes that are currently being examined for implementation). Secondly, 
is the ability for users to comprehensively assess the completeness and quality of the Catalogue’s 
component taxonomic parts. As was discussed in the previous chapter, in most circumstances, 
GSD taxonomies can be assessed based on individual or group reputations and expertise. In the 
Catalogue’s diverse database space, however, assessment of data is a more problematic issue 
given the many sources from which the data is collected. This fact makes it difficult for some 
scientists to implement its data in research endeavors with full confidence. Some general reasons 
for this situation, as well as some methods articulated to possibly offset this issue, are then 
                                                
87 The Catalogue is very much a project in process, so these critiques should be seen less as static limitations and 
more as possible future trajectories and the identification of natural systemic challenges that occur when 
management taxonomies meet the function and purposes of traditional classificatory approaches. The Catalogue is 
aware of these issues and much of their efforts are directed to trying to meet the needs of various constituents. No 
one system will and can meet every need. 
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introduced. Given the interconnected nature of the iLife consortium, data error proliferation is 
then discussed as an issue that arises in fragmented networked environments such as the iLife 
ecology. The fragmentary information space these systems comprise also makes it difficult for 
feedback mechanisms to rectify these identified errors. The final limitation of the Catalogue we 
will discuss arises, ironically, from the highly curated composition of its taxonomy. Due to the 
tightly controlled editorial process for the construction of management hierarchy, it makes it 
difficult to quickly implement and radiate changes into the biodiversity online ecology. The 
annual publication schedule for the Catalogue means it takes considerable time for corrections to 
get integrated into the database of record. Further, the Catalogue’s current structure precludes the 
addition of taxon token forms that fall outside of the nomenclature practices controlled by the 
various Codes. The result of this approach is that un-named genetic barcodes and other OTU-
identified taxon labels do not fit into the Catalogue’s structure.88 One possible approach 
constructed by Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) is then discussed as a possible 
remedy to this general issue.  
Taxonomic informatics practice is a complicated endeavor; no database is and can be 
perfect, it is merely a representational model of biological and scientific processes. Trying to 
accommodate the complex arrangement of multiple taxonomies, as well as document how those 
arrangements evolve over a period of time is no easy task, particularly when such complexity 
                                                
88 As has been alluded to in this manuscript, this is an issue on the radar of the Catalogue and associated iLife 
platforms, and meetings such as the NAMES in November conference were meant to begin articulating ways to 
solve this issue going forward. Recall as well that the Catalogue of Life Plus—discussed in chapter three— is also 
an infrastructure articulated to iteratively manage this issue (See Figure 13). 
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must somehow be fixed in database fields that are relatively limited in their composition.89 As A. 
Broadfield indicated,  
Sciences are more engrossed with deductions than with placing things in a scheme, and with changes, 
rather than with the unchanging essences whose nature the theory of predictables would have us 
investigate. From the scientific viewpoint classification is only preliminary; we may posses so little 
knowledge that we can only classify, but science cannot long rest content with this (1946, p. 93). 
 
The end result is that preliminary data management activities—in the form of the production of 
management hierarchies—are occasionally at odds with the contextually specific activity of 
studying evolution, phylogenetic, and ecological concerns. The Catalogue is attempting to 
provide a flexible platform in order to be useful to scientific practitioners, but in the process of 
providing this flexibility, it must also manage an individual identity while inhabiting a hybrid 
space of translation and multiplicity. This chapter chronicles the Catalogue’s goal of providing a 
knowledge base standard, and presents the various complications this endeavor exposes as a 
function of taxonomic practice.  
Part I: Toward Combinatory Knowledge: Macropatterns and Historical Taxonomic 
Concept Repositories  
One result of the increased extensive ability of the Catalogue’s biodiversity database 
system is how it can potentially be used as a springboard to assess larger trends in the taxonomic 
world, over large swaths of time. As we have witnessed thus far, one of the key aspects of 
articulating taxonomic knowledge in digital spaces is being able to distinguish and record the 
various transformations species concepts undergo historically. Nomenclatural practices, 
designed as they are to trace the historical development of concepts via a variety of code 
mechanisms, do not have a direct analogue in the domain of taxonomies. That is to say, we 
cannot yet (easily) track the minute changes taxonomies undergo over time. Such information 
                                                
89 Refer to the collection management database limitations for the NHML in chapter one for another example of this 
issue.  
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could help us understand the broader trends and developments regarding how scientists have, 
historically, understood the ontological constitution of the natural world. As taxonomist Nico 
Franz has noted, “the real-life challenge for these information repositories is to capture more 
than one authoritative classification; they are built to represent the full spatial and temporal 
dynamic of the taxonomic process” (2005, p. 499). Dynamism is an essential concept here, 
especially since taxonomy (and the interpretation of the species in the natural world), as a 
scientific practice, is nothing if not constantly changing. The infrastructures that we build to 
support and document these processes should be able to mirror the various transmutations of 
taxonomic opinion and representation. 
As I have emphasized thus far in this manuscript, one of the primary ways in which we 
can understand the extensive capacities of structures such as the Catalogue of Life is through the 
implementation of its taxonomy as the backbone of other infrastructures (Species 2000, 2015b). 
Another way in which we can think about this extensive capacity is the extent to which the 
Catalogue can provide the capabilities to answer (and infer) “macropatterns” (Bourgoin, 2016) 
given the documentation of historical concepts within the database structure. In Figure 21, 
Thierry Bourgoin illustrates a possible schematic for how we can think about this phenomenon. 
Creating the management classification is just the first step of a long-term initiative by the 
Catalogue. The Catalogue, as it is currently composed, is a snapshot of current biodiversity 
knowledge, but that snapshot is relatively static (particular if we think of the most authoritative, 
Annual version of the Catalogue as the citable database of record). Names-as-data are 
synthesized and recorded so that valid taxa can then be utilized and implemented as the building 
blocks for other projects, initiatives, and investigations. In Figure 21, Bourgoin makes a 
distinction between classification, phylogeny, and evolution. The classification is but the first 
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preliminary step of this process of examining biodiversity (to invoke Broadfield’s statement 
above once again). The ultimate, long-view (Ribes & Finholt, 2009) goal here for platforms such 
as the Catalogue, is being able to add the “confrontation of classifications with phylogeny” in 
such as a way that these systems can better “understand evolutionary [concerns]” (Bourgoin, 
2016). The Catalogue, in addition to being a repository of current nomenclature, must also think 
about how to position itself to also be a repository of historical taxonomic concepts.  
 
Figure 21. From Taxonomic Databases to Knowledge Bases: Understanding Evolution. This figure expands the 
view of nomenclatural and classification control seen in Figure 12 to include the assessment of macropattern 
examinations such as phylogeny and evolution. The goal in a system of this nature is to a) take name data that is 
synthesized into validated taxon forms, and b) use these taxa as the building blocks for classifications that can then 
be used to articulate many possible phylogenetic hypothesizations. In a broader sense, the relationship between all of 
these apparatuses (names, taxa, classification, and phylogeny information) is to understand bird-eye view 
evolutionary concerns. Such a platform is about using the documentary units of a space like the Catalogue to form a 
knowledge base and laboratory for speculative evolutionary informatics. Source: Thierry Bourgoin (Bourgoin, 
2016). 
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 Biologists and informaticians have termed this kind of macro-level analysis, 
evolutionary informatics, which “concerns the capturing, storing and integrating of all these data 
(about biological specimens, images, genomes, etc.), as well as developing the analytical 
techniques that use them to answer evolutionary questions” (Parr et al., 2012, pp. 94–95). 
Infrastructures such as the Catalogue of Life stand at the center (Parr et al., 2012, p. 100) of this 
informatics integration, as either the taxonomic backbone to platforms like GBIF, or as the 
aggregator of curated taxonomic information and biodiversity data from WoRMS, ITIS, and any 
number of other infrastructures. This makes the Catalogue a key player in the constitution of any 
knowledge base, framing species occurrence data into composite taxonomies structures that can 
be recombined in numerous ways. The sum of this entire ecology of historical documentation 
provides a sandbox of potential knowledge products beyond the database content itself. Such 
work recombines data in ways that can provide long terms predictions, climate and species 
modeling and simulation (Landers, 2016). 
The success of this kind of data integration, however, involves the careful documentation 
of how taxon groups change over time. It is generally acknowledged that the long-term prospects 
and success of the Catalogue, in one sense, depend upon the system’s transformation from one 
that organizes taxa to facilitate data sharing, to a system that can map the historical contours of 
the various taxonomic instruments it inherits to create its superstructure. To do this, the original 
taxonomies and taxon concepts for GSD databases need to somehow be maintained as they 
intermingle in the management hierarchy. As we have seen, the core building blocs of this 
activity lies in an as-comprehensive-as-possible pool of species names (as concepts), so the 
Catalogue of Life must continue working to bolster the quality of its nomenclature foundation to 
assure that there are units to recombine and translate between different taxonomic specifications, 
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approaches, and methodologies. The Catalogue of Life Plus (discussed in chapter three) proposes 
a mechanism through which the historical trajectories of nomenclature can be documented. 
However, as we have seen, “due to the inherent limitations of nomenclature a name may 
correctly designate several perhaps equally well-founded concepts of a taxon” (Berendsohn, 
1995, p. 210). The question then becomes how to record and maintain these multiple interpretive 
name forms in the Catalogue database after they get rearticulated into accepted taxa and 
embedded into the management hierarchy? Once this kind of activity is perfected, it can serve as 
a kind of historical taxonomic concepts repository.90 To answer this question, we briefly look to 
the concept of potential taxa.  
In 1995 Walter Berendsohn published an influential article titled, “The Concept of 
"Potential Taxa" in Databases,” which provides a possible way forward for documenting 
historical taxa interpretations in digital spaces. As we know, names stand for species concepts, 
but those concepts change over time. Nomenclature forms provide some mechanisms for 
tracking these changes, but the challenge becomes how to interconnect these variances within the 
spaces of databases and database structures.91 A “potential taxa,” is one solution to this problem, 
which “is a name with taxon circumscription information attached to it by means of one or more 
literature references” (Berendsohn, 1995, p. 207) that is then connected to other name forms 
within the database environment using relational fields. Continuing, Berendsohn indicates how 
such a concept can be implemented within the biodiversity database structure itself, 
Due to the inherent limitations of nomenclature a name may correctly designate several perhaps equally 
well-founded concepts of a taxon. For the purpose of information handling, a way has to be found to 
differentiate between different taxa bearing the same name. In an information system, this can be achieved 
by introducing a data element or data area which impartially mirrors alternative taxonomies, and allows for 
                                                
90 A historical taxonomic concept repository is one of the potential long-term goals articulated at the NAMES in 
November meeting for a species list such as the Catalogue of Life. 
 
91 See my example in chapter three, adapted from Richard Pyle (2008), on the importance of nomenclature forms to 
trace historical changes to species concepts in a hypothetical fish population.  
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the inclusion of all information-bearing individual taxonomic concepts, including misnomers….A database 
system using potential taxa is able to treat an unrestricted number of different concepts related to a 
specified name. In a relational database system, this does not pose a technical problem, because the entity 
type "potential taxon name" must have but three attributes: a pointer to a name, a second one to a 
circumscription and status intersection which handles the name status and the connection to the 
circumscription reference, and finally a pointer to an entity-type handling classification. (1995, p. 210). 
 
As databases enter the Catalogue database, the ‘holding space’ field of potential taxa allows for 
mapping and re-mapping of taxon concepts over time. Additionally, potential taxa relationships 
allow for the ingest of taxon concepts into management hierarchies without losing their original 
taxonomic context and circumscriptive context. Names can be mapped to any of their previous 
taxonomic instantiations depending on how one chose to orient a particular query. Such a 
network of taxon connections records all of the possible name and data combinations depicted on 
the left side of Bourgoin’s Figure 21. With this recorded historical knowledge, new classificatory 
and phylogenetic arrangements can be proposed using this robust metadata. As H. Charles J. 
Godfray (2002) has indicated, the goal of a unitary taxonomy, as represented by a space such as 
the Catalogue of Life, is that it can serve as a single reference structure for “accumulated 
knowledge,” and that such a repository is essential in an age of information fragmentation. 
However, a downside of such an approach—especially one that does not take potential taxa into 
account—is the erasure of taxonomic expressions (2002) in these in composite structures. The 
concept of potential taxa allows unitary taxonomic approaches to “easily provide information on 
concept relationships between different systems and treatments thus creating a pathway between 
current and past treatments” (Berendsohn & Geoffrey, 2007, p. 20).  
However, Berendsohn identifies a few downsides to adding potential taxa metadata in 
biodiversity databases, including the inflation of species records, as well as a potential deluge of 
information for users in retrieval searches (1995, p. 211). In order for databases to function as a 
kind of knowledge base proposed by Bourgoin, however, such issues must be accepted and dealt 
   220 
with procedurally as part of the database interface. Additionally, as platforms like the Catalogue 
of Life increase their role in linked-system environments, such as the iLife ecology, maintaining 
taxon concept changes over time is going to be especially important. The dynamic structure of 
the Catalogue can then be documented and traced using the ever-increasing network of potential 
taxa connections. Potential taxa will undoubtedly continue to play a major role in the extensive 
power of systems like the Catalogue as a knowledge base for generative research. One must be 
able to identify the kinds of changes taxon concepts have undergone and juxtapose this 
knowledge with current scientific knowledge.  
Moving onward, building on this notion of taxonomic change, in Part II of this chapter, I 
will invoke Joseph Tennis’s concept of secondary classification theory to examine three kinds of 
transformations that taxonomies like the Catalogue must contend with as part of their 
construction and use. We can then proceed to some of the specific critiques of the Catalogue that 
stem from some of these transformations. 
Part II: Taxonomic Change, Interoperability, and Transformation 
One of the most prominent issues encountered in biodiversity database systems is the 
extent to which GSDs are “qualitatively transformed” (D. Remsen, 2010) as they are ingested 
into the compiled system. As databases enter the Catalogue of Life system, the editors do their 
best to maintain the integrity of the original GSD structure, but there are times when 
“adjustments may need to be decided upon by the editors on where and how to insert it, to make 
it as consistent as possible [with the rest of the Catalogue of Life], while not losing the essential 
taxonomic information it has been created to provide” (Species 2000, 2016c). One need look no 
further than Figure 19 in the previous chapter, which compares the taxonomic hierarchy from 
both the “Species 2000 & ITIS Catalogue of Life” (the upper image) and the standalone 
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“Integrated Taxonomic Information System (lower image),” to see how this kind of editing takes 
shape within database environments. The ITIS taxonomic hierarchy is far more detailed in its 
composition, particularly because it contains a more finely articulated higher-level taxonomic 
ranking system (inclusive of subkingdom, subphylum, infraphylum, superorder, etc.). In 
comparison, looking at the Catalogue of Life’s taxonomic tree, you can see that the Catalogue 
editors chose the genus node as the connection point for the ITIS database. Note the lack of an 
author and publication designation after the species epithet, Ursus, at the genus level in the 
Species 2000 taxonomy, which indicates that Ursus is part of the less-detailed Catalogue of Life 
management hierarchy. The Species 2000/Catalogue of Life hierarchy, on the other hand, retains 
the ITIS taxa detail below the genus node connection point (beginning at Ursus arctos Linnaeus 
1758), while above that point the general management classification backbone connects the ITIS 
classification to the rest of the contributed GSD database sets. The act of choosing one part of 
the ITIS classification, over any other, transforms the ITIS structure in fundamental ways, 
divorcing Ursus arctos from the upper backbone context in its original coordinated location in 
the ITIS database. Keeping this example in our mind as a concrete model, our attention will now 
turn to the kinds of ontological changes and taxonomic transformations that take place by virtue 
of the Catalogue of Life’s approach to taxonomic management. To do this, we turn to Joseph 
Tennis’s metatheoretical framework for classification structures to help us frame and define the 
kinds of change these taxonomies are engaging in over a given period of space and time.  
Contours of classification.  
In assessing the metatheoretical “contours” (2015, p. 244) of classification theory 
literature, Joseph Tennis has identified three basic strata, or approaches, to the study of 
classification that define the kinds of work currently being performed in this domain. Tennis’s 
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categories include, foundational classification theory, first-order classification theory, and 
second-order classification theory. As defined by Tennis, foundational classification theory is 
“concerned with philosophical and definitional aspects of classification” (2015, p. 246). A. 
Broadfield’s (1946) work, which has been invoked numerous times in this manuscript, is an 
example of such an approach, as would much of Bliss’s categorical and philosophical 
expositions (Bliss, 1929, 1933)92. Larger questions in this arena include ontological and 
epistemological questions about the concept and act of organizing knowledge. First-order 
classification is “solely concerned with the methods of classification scheme construction and 
use” (2015, p. 245)—very straight-forwardly: how we build classifications and articulate the 
processes we create in order to produce them. The two previous chapters pivoted on such first-
order approaches: how the Catalogue allocates evidence for concepts, how such concepts can be 
connected within the nomenclatural system, and how management classifications build their 
schematics in contradistinction to traditional taxonomic forms.  
Finally, and most pertinent to our current discussion, is second-order classification 
theory, which is “concerned with what to do with classification schemes once they are built” 
(2015, p. 246). In the case of the Catalogue, we are concerned with how GSD taxonomies are 
changed and manipulated in order to be absorbed into the Catalogue’s taxonomic space. 
Secondarily, we are interested in how its management structure is used in various contexts and 
how that intended use fundamentally changes the Catalogue’s composition. In practice, of 
course, any type of work performed in the domain of knowledge organization is likely to 
function on a number of Tennis’s levels simultaneously, since, for example, one cannot examine 
how to define a classification system without addressing the way it is constructed and then 
                                                
92 Bliss’s texts have a tendency to include both foundational and first-order discussion, the latter often introduced 
after broad epistemological and ontological questions have been adequately discussed as a contextual ground for his 
analysis.  
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subsequently used. But for our purposes we will focus more on the general notion of taxonomic 
change, both of the Catalogue’s taxonomy itself as well as with the taxonomies that comprise the 
Catalogue’s backbone. These concerns relate to how a composite taxonomy specifically is 
essentially used, and how such use requires change under certain conditions. These issues stem 
from the composite nature of the Catalogue, and fall under Tennis’s second-order classification, 
which is broken down into three subcategories, as follows: (1) how schemes change over time 
and how we update them, (2) how installed schemes interoperate, and (3) how systems change 
when they change context (reapplied or reengineered)” (2015, p. 246). While each of these 
elements are pertinent to biodiversity databases, the second and third are most relevant for the 
case of the Catalogue. Keying-in on Tennis’s second-order classification issues, we will discuss 
these in turn as they relate to the Catalogue.  
Taxonomic scheme change: Ontogeny and the taxonomic document. 
Taxonomic schemes change, particularly as the conception of the classified biological 
object (species concept) are redefined over a period of time. Such ontogenic concerns (Tennis, 
2002, 2012, 2015) have been of increasing interest in the Information Studies community, 
concerned as we are with how to theorize and manage the lateral transformations of knowledge 
organizing systems to keep them updated and relevant to our organizational and access concerns. 
As Tennis notes, ontogeny is the examination of “the life of a subject over time—the subject’s 
scheme history” (2012, p. 1351).  
Ontogeny, or ontogenesis, is a surprisingly appropriate term for the development of 
classifications in our context, given its general usage in the field of biology to describe the 
mechanism and development of individual organisms. In Ernst Haeckel’s, Generelle 
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Morphologie der Organismen (1866), he defines four general concepts: ontologie, phylogenie, 
ontogenesis, phylogenese. Løvtrup summarizes Haeckel’s concepts in the following way: 
«Ontogenie»: the history of the development of the individuals. 
«Phylogenie»: the history of the development (evolution) of the taxa. 
«Ontogenese»: the mechanism of the development of the individuals. 
«Phylogenese»: the mechanism of the development (evolution) of the taxa (1987, p. 199) 
 
In practice, as Løvtrup has indicated, the distinctions between the mechanism and the history of 
both ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes are no longer upheld (1987, p. 199), and as such the 
two Haeckelian term-pairs are now synonymous in discourse. Ontogenie (and its partner term 
ontogenese) refers to individual organisms—as in the progressive and regressive (1987, p. 201) 
development of one organism over its life span from its embryonic stage to death. 93 Phylogenie 
(and Phylogenese), on the other hand, refers to the historical reconstruction of taxon groups that, 
at base, are represented in phylogenetic classifications. But how can such terms be thought of 
analogously to the way we think about classifications in the biodiversity world? For one, and 
perhaps the most obvious, is the ways in which classifications are, or at least can be, a 
representation of an expressed and argued phylogenetic relationship. A given phylogenetic 
classification, as Løvtrup indicates, is one or “many [possible] lineages of progressive evolution” 
(1987, p. 201). The historical reconstruction of individual development (more intensional in 
nature) is “currently covered by the term <<developmental biology >> or << epigenesis>>” 
(1987, p. 199), and is generally similar to Tennis’s ontogenic examination of subject terms over 
time. 
 Our more documentary-focused concerns are about how species concepts are represented 
by name tokens, as well as how those tokens are coordinated in an overall taxonomic framework 
reflected in certain representational database structures. If we think about the change of subjects 
                                                
93 Løvtrup defines the progressive phase as the “phase, lasting usually from fertilization to maturation,” and the 
regressive phase “from then on until death” (1987, p. 201).  
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over time (in the sense that Tennis invokes above), the subjects of biological classifications are 
species (or species concepts articulated using a number of subsidiary forms of evidence). And, as 
we have seen, the position of that particular subject in a given classification is dependent upon 
the relationships built within that instrument, conceived as a cohesive whole based on the 
classificatory and methodological commitments of its builder. The instrument itself (and the 
Catalogue, in particular), then, is a document that can also itself go through various ontogenic 
transformations—defined by the accumulation of subject changes over time, as well as the 
changing positionality of its ‘subjects’ within a constellation of related concepts.  
 Such change happens on numerous levels in the Catalogue, one being the extent to which 
GSD taxonomies are snipped out of their original context for inclusion into the Catalogue of 
Life.94 The implementation of proto-GSDs in the previous chapter is another good example of 
such change: taxonomies are combined in various ways to make functional taxonomic systems to 
fill taxon gaps. A key problem in the Catalogue’s space is the extent to which the changes 
imposed onto GSD systems manifest in greater or lesser collocative capabilities within the 
Catalogue (Tennis, 2014, 2015, p. 246). The Catalogue’s data structure (Figure 22) is articulated 
in such a way to best trace and interconnect any given species concept (name) to its original 
position within the GSD (or RSD) “source database” data fields (in theory, these linkages are not 
only internal to the Catalogue, but also external in that they link back to the original GSD 
                                                
94 While I have categorized the change GSDs experience as they travel into the Catalogue in terms of Tennis’s first 
second-order concern—how “scheme changes over time”—I acknowledge that this is also very much in accord with 
Tennis’s third kind of second-order classification concern—that of “how systems change when they change 
context.” The assumption here is that many of the changes and uses of taxonomies can potentially fall under a 
number of Tennis’s categories, depending on what element of that change you emphasize. Secondly, I have chosen 
in this manuscript to focus, not on the changes these GSD taxonomies in-and-of themselves undergo, but on the 
Catalogue of Life’s context in particular. Since the Catalogue of Life is the emphasis here, I see the inclusion of 
these taxonomies changing the Catalogue’s scheme structure, which is the primary context of note. The GSDs are 
changing context, not the Catalogue, which is the context. If my emphasis were on the GSD space in particular, then 
I would have categorized this kind of classificatory change under Tennis’s third aspect.  
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website, if one exists), as well as with the common names, synonym, and GUID’s that 
interconnect it with other platforms in the iLife consortium and beyond.  
 
 
Figure 22. Catalogue of Life Entity Relationships Model, Version 4, 29th September 2014, by L. Abucay and Y. 
Roskov (Species 2000, 2016f). 
The position of subjects (species names) is also continually redefined in the Catalogue’s 
space. As taxonomies are brought into the Catalogue, they are set alongside other taxonomic 
structures, and by virtue of these juxtapositions the relative positions of one subject in relation to 
another within the Catalogue’s classificatory structure are transformed. These new arrangements 
have significant effects in terms of how we understand relationships. Relationships that are 
essential to understanding the internal theoretical logic of any given taxonomy. Relationships, 
however, are not just intellectual associations between classes (Green, 2008), but also spatial and 
temporal ones. I call these spatial and temporal relationships classificatory (or, to use Tennis’s 
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vocabulary, ontological) distances. In his book section, “Confusion Confounded,” Bliss (1933, p. 
218) speaks about the placement of disciplines in the Decimal Classification schedule and how 
the placement of topics has the potential to cause confusion: “Methodology (112) stands between 
Ontology and Cosmology and far from Logic, of which it is usually regarded as an extension” (p. 
218). Olson also points to the definitional qualities of classificatory structures: “the hierarchy 
thus created structured knowledge by putting every subject in its place. It creates a context for 
each subject within this hierarchical arrangement” (2002, p. 22). Locations within class 
schedules and facets, indeed, exist in a kind of Euclidian space with quasi-quantifiable, and 
certainly qualitative, distances set between them. As Rebecca Green and Giles Martin have 
indicated, “Traditional (rank-based”) biological taxonomies are organized hierarchically, with 
the rank (e.g., kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, genus, species) of a taxonomic unit/taxon 
indicating its relative position in the taxonomy” (2013, p. 10). Relative is a key term here, since 
if a portion of a taxonomy is removed from any given GSD and inserted into the Catalogue’s 
taxonomy, its definition within a particular hierarchy relative to other subjects has changed 
dramatically within this new context.  
This definitional problem is compounded when two distinct species share the same name 
within the Catalogue due the existence of different nomenclatural codes governing different parts 
of the biological kingdom. Recall that codes dictate the application of names (ICZN and 
ICNAFP, for example), and that each code prohibits the duplication of names for multiple 
species (homonymy). However, since the Codes are independent of each other, it is possible to 
have two species with the exact same names in both the plants and animal domains (Global 
Names Architecture, 2016; T. Orrell, personal communication June 15, 2016). As the 
International Commission on Zoological Nomenclature states, “for example, the genus Ficus is 
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available and valid for both a gastropod genus and the plants commonly called figs. It is assumed 
that points of confusion in referring to organisms in different Kingdoms will be rare, thus 
homonymy is not controlled in these cases” (2017).  In the Catalogue of Life, which is ostensibly 
charged with organizing multiple names following rules under different codes, such homonymy, 
though rare, happens on occasional circumstances. The existence of these possible errors also 
changes the definitional status of certain subjects given that they can no longer be disambiguated 
as they had been in their original GSD context.  
Lastly, the inherited qualities of descriptive-oriented classifications also include temporal 
associations that are transformed in the Catalogue’s new taxonomic space. “As a temporal 
mélange, the [Catalogue] is not an internally consistent system” (Montoya & Erickson, 
forthcoming, p. 3). The evolutionary, cladistic, and phenetic schools—and the representational 
diagrams they produce—all have within them assumptions about not only an organism’s formal 
and physical relationships, but also an implicit statement about how they are related in an 
interpreted evolutionary, genealogical, or ancestral framework. In evolutionary taxonomies, for 
example, classificatory distance “[depicts] genealogical history over time ” (Podani, 2013, p. 
322), and thus a shorter or longer classificatory distance distort the temporal relationships 
between subjects. Again, while management classification of the Catalogue is “hierarchical and 
reflective of phylogeny,” it is not “itself a phylogenetic tree” (Ruggiero et al., 2015a, p. 3) due to 
its practical approach of intermingling taxonomic approaches, so temporality is less of an issue 
in this composite space. 
The schematic transformations exhibited (and elicited) by the Catalogue apply to two 
distinct “subjects” within the taxonomic world: the species concept subject, as well as the 
taxonomic document subject. Each of these entities undergoes various changes as GSDs get 
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embedded within the taxonomic space of the Catalogue of Life. Hand-in-hand with how these 
subjects change is how the Catalogue is designed to operate, extensively, with the various other 
iLife infrastructure—the subject of our next section. 
Classificatory interoperability and reconciliation. 
The Catalogue of Life data submission format (Figure 22, above) is also pertinent to 
Tennis’s second second-order classificatory concern: that of how installed schemes interoperate. 
The data structures implemented by the Catalogue of Life facilitate ready transfer of data 
between multiple biodiversity communities.95 Indeed, the interoperability and evolution of 
taxonomic infrastructures has been recognized as a vital subfield of inquiry in I/S and KO, 
particularly given the rising need for computational infrastructures to communicate with each 
other effectively in a networked environment (Jung, 2008; Lei Zeng & Mai Chan, 2004; 
Teckelmann, Reich, & Sulistio, 2011). A 2015 one-day conference in Copenhagen, titled 
“Global and Local Knowledge Organization,” was meant to promote “a conversation about the 
tension between the global information structures and grounding meaning and ethics in localized 
contexts” (Mai, 2015)96, and further illustrates the growing interest in taxonomic interoperation. 
Laura Skouvig’s presentation at this conference expressed the context-specific nature of 
‘information,’ and how notions of ‘global’ information are often in discord with local knowledge 
systems (2015). Skouvig outlines how the control of information by the media in Denmark (the 
‘global’) has historically worked both harmoniously and in conflict with local conceptions of 
                                                
95 Darwin Core (Darwin Core Task Group, 2011) is the most generally accepted data standard and one of the 
possible submission formats for the Catalogue of Life (Roskov, 2016c). Darwin Core, however, does not have 
attributes or concepts that facilitate say, the description of host associations, which are valuable pieces of ecological 
information:  “[Host associations are] not part of the standard Darwin Core. If we have this species A and it's on 
Plant B, Darwin Core doesn't have that set up properly to convey that information” (Yanega, 2016). Local 
repositories, then, often create idiosyncratic standards, on top of Darwin Core, that can facilitate this kind of 
species/ecological documentation.  
 
96 See also (Adler et al., 2016). 
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information (as in exerting absolutist power by controlling the dissemination of information); in 
order to understand this reciprocal relationship, Skouvig claims, one needs to understand the 
historical and geographic context in which these practices evolved.  
Similarly, composite taxonomic authorities such as the Catalogue of Life must be 
understood within a historical, intellectual, and geographic framework in order to understand 
how international (global) standardization works in concert with, and against, the local 
repositories (individual biodiversity scientists or teams) that contribute to them. At its heart, the 
Catalogue is nothing if not a platform designed for the “switching and reconciling” of different 
biodiversity relationships, “vocabularies[,] and by extension, classification schemes” (Tennis, 
2015, p. 246). Previous chapters in this manuscript have explained how nomenclatural practices 
and codes have been put in place to facilitate the ready communication of species concepts, as 
well as to maintain links to the evidence used to support these circumscriptions. As an 
aggregative system, the Catalogue’s management hierarchy is meant to help taxonomies 
communicate, knowing full well that while it is not a perfect solution, a global view of 
biodiversity knowledge is necessary to understand the state-of-the-discipline. Such reconciliation 
is essential, especially if other iLife infrastructures, such as GBIF, can append occurrence 
records in the form of data points that “document evidence of a named organism in nature” 
(GBIF, 2016a). The extent to which the Catalogue can serve as an effective “switching 
mechanism,” however, is dependent upon the size of the system that integrates it, the purposes it 
serves, and the breadth of data it concerns itself with, which we will examine later in this chapter 
in relation to GBIF’s use of the Catalogue’s taxonomy. 
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Taxonomic transformations: Re-purposeability and extension 
 Tennis’s final second-order concern has to do with how classifications change when they 
are transformed (2015, p. 246).  How the Catalogue is repurposed and reengineered is absolutely 
critical if we are to understand the limits of the Catalogue’s extensive capabilities. Tennis 
articulates that, in “cases [where classifications are transformed from one kind of structure into 
another] we capitalize on the loose definition of classification in that we see concepts and 
relationships that obtain between relationships and we feel open to modify structure, often 
adding functionality, but sometimes taking it away” (2015, p. 246). As I claimed in the previous 
chapter, expanding Wilson’s notion of bibliographic power included the coordinated, controlled, 
and open design of the Catalogue for its re-purposing and use in subsequent systems. Each of the 
systems in the iLife consortium in Figure 1 implements the Catalogue’s taxonomy to some extent 
or another. In the case of the Encyclopedia of Life, the taxonomy is displayed as one option 
among an array of taxonomic approaches; in the case of the GBIF, their taxonomic backbone 
builds upon the Catalogue’s hierarchy to organize the data compiled from sources that may not 
otherwise have this intellectual structuring agent. One might think of this as a taxonomic 
amplification—the use of a composite taxonomy to point to GSDs that hold more in-depth 
caches of primary data; collocate multiple sources of taxonomic information; and, finally, to 
produce more taxonomic knowledge by the recombination of taxonomic information. 97 The 
Catalogue is intended to support the shift from local practices (idiosyncratic, internally 
consistent) to global spaces and standardization, intended for full-scale integration into the global 
infrastructure to support the “possibility of a quantum increase in the coherence of the world’s 
biodiversity data and analyses” (Species 2000, 2015b).  
                                                
97 Recalling here Thomas Orrell and Gerald Guala’s concept of synonymic amplification which described the 
process of making biodiversity information more locatable with the usage of synonyms deeply embedded into 
information retrieval systems (2016). 
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 Given these various mechanisms by which the Catalogue is used and changed in the iLife 
ecology, the next task is to examine how these ideal second-order notions are challenged by its 
use in extensional practical circumstances. While the Catalogue is certainly a large player in the 
biodiversity community, it has not been adopted and embraced full-scale by all taxonomists and 
bioinformaticians. Stephen Thorpe’s general critique of the management classification approach 
can set the stage for our next discussion of the Catalogue’s limitations: 
Biological classification is a mixture of scientific fact …and subjective opinion … Both   
these factors taken together doesn't make life very easy, and it is all in perpetual flux…However,   
I don't think that the issue can be "managed" in quite the way that is envisaged by some. I have thought a 
great deal about this, for my Wikispecies work. My primary governing principle is that, subject to 
monophyly, classification is primarily a filing system to make information management easier. So, it 
doesn't really matter which classification is followed, PROVIDING that it is explicitly stated which one. 
The problem with adopting a particular classification for a large group (like the "Protista") is that advances 
in taxonomy happen on much smaller subgroups, so if you blindly follow one particular broad 
classification, then you cannot accommodate the advances very easily. Hence, I think you have to simply 
treat matters on a case by case basis, and just choose and specify a sensible classification for that particular 
case (and change it, if necessary, if something more convincing is published). To try to come up with a 
single "officially endorsed" classification would simply be to ignore the subjectivity and fallibility of 
taxonomy... (2009). 
Part III: Limitations of Aggregated Taxonomic Knowledge 
The prevailing assumption I have been making about the use of management 
classifications to organize global species data is that they are an unequivocally useful and 
necessary instrument for data facilitation. The benefits of systems like the Catalogue are 
particularly popular to those heavily involved in biodiversity informatics where informaticians 
understand the need for consistent information control standards for the ready communication of 
disparate data points—but even in this space, agreement is not universal, as Stephen Thorpe’s 
quote reveals. As Brian Buchanon indicates in Theory of Library Classification, “we have 
summed in this book that systematic order achieved through the use of classification scheme is 
helpful; but we ought to consider its limitations and the objections to it” (1979, p. 119). It makes 
good sense to ask the same questions of composite management taxonomies as they relate to the 
practice of biodiversity work. The second-order issues, as they relate to classification systems 
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like the Catalogue of Life, lie at the core of what motivates the Catalogue’s chosen structural 
approach: they want flexible structures that keep a modicum of consistency in a landscape 
defined by change. But this very taxonomic change defines why many taxonomists and 
practitioners of biodiversity work deny the usefulness and pertinence of the Catalogue to their 
daily research. As Thorpe’s comment above brings to the fore, taxonomic contingency will 
perpetually be in tension with the urge to control that flux in “officially endorsed” systems 
designed for stability. Thorpe, however, does admit to the need for some control, adding that “a 
sensible classification” is prudent in some, practical cases. Yet his statement seems to apply only 
to smaller taxon groups (the “case”) than to the whole ‘tree of life’, as the Catalogue is 
attempting to accomplish. What Thorpe seems categorically against is a fully coordinated, top-
down approach to classification. Maintaining numerous smaller taxonomies, however, does not 
facilitate the integrated ‘global view’ of biodiversity knowledge that platforms like the 
Catalogue, GBIF, and EoL, are attempting to produce. Again, descriptive-oriented and retrieval-
oriented taxonomic systems take different epistemological positions about the scope and method 
of biodiversity knowledge management; and these two approaches often find no middle point in 
practice. 
Thorpe’s view certainly seems reasonable, especially given the fact that such top-down 
approaches (H. Charles J. Godfray, 2002) to classification are antithetical to the way in which 
taxonomy has functioned for hundreds of years. Contemporary biodiversity practice, however, is 
seeing the production of data at increasing rates, and large-scale questions about environmental 
issues and mass extinctions are driving the need for integrated approaches (Guralnick & Hill, 
2009). Fragmented approaches to data curatorship and storage just cannot support current big 
questions in global research. Additionally, as a prominent biologist indicated to me, taxonomic 
   234 
“perspective is costly” for advanced users, so maintaining numerous independent taxonomic 
systems is not necessarily a pragmatic approach. On the other hand, while “the world checklist 
system [approach works at the] production level, for advanced uses, it’s shit,” as one prominent 
taxonomist poetically proclaimed. There are many reasons why scientists draw this conclusion, 
included aggregated spaces like the Catalogue often reassemble taxonomic structures that 
specialists require in their original form; it is often difficult to assess data quality in these spaces; 
taxonomies also often contain errors that are difficult to mediate and fix, etc.  
Finding the balance between generalized and expert system usage is easier said (and 
planned) than performed in practice. As a case on point, in response to an inquiry regarding the 
level of impact composite taxonomies like the Catalogue have for professional use, Dr. Douglas 
Yanega, Senior Museum Scientist for the University of California Riverside Entomology 
Museum, indicated that,  
The answer is not a simple one, because the problem of creating a single, accurate catalogue is so 
incredibly difficult. I know several of the people involved in Catalogue of Life, and both Species 2000 and 
ITIS, and the ambition is great but the funding (and therefore the reality) are still inadequate to match that 
ambition. In a nutshell the problem is this: when a catalogue is incomplete or inaccurate, how can you tell 
what's missing, or wrong? If you don't know, then how much trust can you put in that catalogue? … The 
bottom line: in order for the Catalogue of Life model to ever be realized, we would need to have every 
taxonomist in the world supported from a SINGLE source of funding, and submitting their work to a 
SINGLE authoritative body of reviewers. It's a far, far cry from what we have now, and while I can have 
the dream, that's all it's every going to be - a dream. I admire the goal, I admire the ambition, and I wish it 
could work, but I don't believe it ever will. If you were to speak with anyone in the taxonomic community 
who is not personally involved in the effort, I think you will find virtually all of them treat ANY "top-
down" initiative with skepticism, because the top is never a big enough umbrella to include everyone 
(2016). 
 
Aside from the epistemological issues previously discussed that make a single system nearly 
impossible to implement on a universal level, two other critiques of importance arise in this 
context: first, funding models do not support the distributed work of the unified systems, and 
secondly, being able to judge the efficacy and completeness of the data sets included in said 
systems. Let us now switch our attention to examining these two issues in turn. 
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Distributed systems, distributed funding. 
As to funding, so much of taxonomic science—like any science, really—is dependent on 
the funding models that support the desk- and institutional-level work of biologists. The 
sentiment shared by Yanega regarding funding is a fundamental structural concern expressed by 
countless individuals I interviewed, both formally and informally. Funding agents just are not 
interested in supporting the basic infrastructure that makes centralized nomenclature and 
taxonomic services work. Despite this hesitation, institutions have seen much operational 
improvement by centralizing core biodiversity services. Large institutions like the Royal 
Botanical Gardens, Kew, and the Natural History Museum, London, have the institutionally 
backed capabilities, and long-term strategic plans, to aggregate biodiversity informatics and 
spatial analysis work. Kew’s Science Strategy for 2015-2020 (2017d) highlights the importance 
of curating “data-rich evidence,” and the subsequent dissemination of that data in online systems 
like Index Fungorum (2017c) and IPNI (2017e). Similarly, the Integrated Taxonomic 
Information Service (ITIS) at the Smithsonian NHMN, has received “a prestigious national 
award for successfully completing a major project aimed at providing easy access to the first 
credible database of scientific names of organisms in North America and its adjacent waters” 
(Office of the Secratary, Catherine Hawcker, 1998). The HAMMER award, created to 
acknowledge improvement of “[government] service to the American people,” noted ITIS’s 
centralization of nomenclatural vocabulary so central to the natural history data produced for six 
government agencies, including “the U.S. Geological Survey, the EPA, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (including the National Marine Fisheries Service and the National 
Oceanographic Data Center), the Natural Resources Conservation Service, the Agricultural 
Research Service and the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of Natural History” (1998). 
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Yet despite this proof that the centralization of local and site-specific data stores brings economic 
and operational benefits (and, perhaps more importantly, facilitates cooperative and aggregative 
scientific activity), scaling-up this collaboration outside of specific institutions, and convincing 
funders of its benefit, is proving especially difficult. 
The implications of a centralized CERN-style model introduced in the first chapter of this 
manuscript are geared toward the funneling of such resources into centralized buckets of activity 
that support global work. But a centralized database model is less-than-glamorous in the eyes of 
funding sources, often instead preferring software and biodiversity systems that represent new 
developments and approaches to information management. These “production level” tools are 
“very difficult to fund,” Alan Paton of Kew conveyed, “people don't want to fund the basic 
infrastructure that makes [taxonomic research] work. Funding is often available only for the 
development of new “systems, ideas, and things” (personal communication, August 24, 2016). 
Science in general, is “all about change,” another taxonomist remarked, “and functions within a 
paradigm that prioritizes research impact” as a mechanism to assess both quality and continued 
funding. But touting the importance of research infrastructure is a particularly “hard sell” 
(Borgman, 2015, p. 286) for funding agencies. As Chris Lyle, a Researcher in the Etymology 
unit at the Natural History Museum, London, indicted, this nomenclatural, taxonomic, and 
biodiversity work is performed “against a social / political / funding background that encourages 
intellectual academic research but not basic population of databases and moving from 
demonstration models to production systems” (personal communication, July 21, 2016).  
Funding models, therefore, hamper the process of maintaining taxonomic infrastructures 
such as the Catalogue of Life. Acknowledging that funding agents influence the direction of 
scientific activity is hardly a new observation. Similar issues arise in terms of biodiversity 
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research emphases, as Geoffrey Bowker makes clear, with more funding going to charismatic 
species over species perhaps less appealing, or of direct concern in the medical or vector 
community (2008, Chapter 4). As successful as the Catalogue has been, it exists on a plane with 
other platforms that, in theory, are also competing for the same, or at least similar, resources. 
Over the Catalogue’s seventeen-year existence, operations have run on a series of European 
Commission grants totaling some eight-and-a-half million Euros (Y. Roskov, personal 
communication, January 20, 2016). Strategic gatherings such as the NAMES in November 
meeting I attended in Leiden (Global Names Architecture, 2016b), are aimed, primarily, at the 
coordination of nomenclature, not only because it makes good intellectual and professional sense 
(though, of course, that alone would warrant the meeting), but also so that clear technical roles 
could be articulated to each iLife member. I use the term technical purposefully in this context, 
since the vast majority of grant funds awarded to the Catalogue (and, as I found, to other iLife 
systems) “go toward [information technology] development and building infrastructure for the 
Catalogue of Life. Not for the content. It is very difficult to find money for [content]” (Roskov, 
2016a). Activities such as proto-GSD creation and gap analysis are incredibly resource intensive, 
and are added on top of an already heavy taxonomic editorial load to make the management 
hierarchy function form edition to edition. The vast majority of the Catalogue’s global team and 
taxonomic advisors contribute their own time to these initiatives, as do the institutions that 
support the various scientists’ work that eventually makes its way into the catalogue taxonomic 
backbone. All of this activity adds up to several million more Euros (World Register of Marine 
Species, 2017c), much more than any individual infrastructure’s published core funding 
amounts. Adding a layer of complication to this schematic is the taxonomic work that happens 
underneath the Catalogue of Life within the GSD and RSD environments—all of which seeks 
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out funding for their own editorial and scientific work. What transpires from this narrative is a 
nested series of independently funded entities, beginning at the highest level in the Catalogue, 
cascading downward throughout the entire taxonomic system.  
So when Doug Yanega points to funding as a key system underpinning this biodiversity 
and taxonomic work, he points to a rather convoluted network of funding agencies that are 
tightly integrated with the practices that structure science as a whole. In addition to this issue of 
funding is Doug’s second major critique of the Catalogue: how are we to review the contents of 
the Catalogue to ensure data quality and completeness? How can we know what data is missing 
or correct, and how can we assess how complete any particular GSD database is within the 
system? One of the Catalogue’s primary aims is to make a complete species list taxonomy that 
facilitates the global distribution and collocation of knowledge that helps us understand the 
extent distribution of biodiversity knowledge. The downside of this approach, of course, is that 
such a veneer of cohesiveness makes it difficult to deconstruct the component parts to reveal its 
inconsistencies and gaps. 
Assessing data quality and completeness. 
In order to assess quality and completeness in a taxonomic space, we must be able to 
assess data provenance and have general transparency about that data’s known issues and 
shortcomings. The true extent of the effectiveness of systems like the Catalogue of Life is still 
unknown, and more importantly, we do not have articulated mechanisms by which we can 
measure this effectiveness. Certainly, one way we can assess quality is through the credibility 
and reputation of the institutions and individuals that provide information to the Catalogue.98 
Such credibility is made visible within systems by linking back to the contributing GSD or RSD, 
                                                
98 My previous discussion in chapter four regarding how Catalogue editors assess taxonomic contributions through 
illustrates this fact. 
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as well as the requiring the “Latest Taxonomic Scrutiny” data field for all contributed datasets to 
the Catalogue (Species 2000, 2014). This field group must include, the “name(s) of the 
taxonomic expert or editor, who is responsible for the taxonomic concept accepted in the source 
database and (b) date when the expert or editor [or small team] assessed the record” (2014, p. 
10). Such linkages and attribution is essential in deconstructing the veracity of the Catalogue’s 
individual entries, especially since the taxonomic editors depend entirely on the expertise—and 
reputation—of those that contribute this data. In addition to these provenance markers, source 
databases in the Catalogue provide a confidence rating, or dataset qualifiers (Species 2000, 
2017c), for the taxonomic data, which is valued on the following scale, 
1. Caution! This data set does not contain well scrutinised (sic) taxonomic checklist, and in parts 
may be a list of taxonomically unvetted names only. However, it is used temporarily by the 
Catalogue of Life to fill major gaps as only available source at the time. See database abstract for 
more details.  
2. Caution! This data set is a scrutinised taxonomic checklist, but it is incomplete and at an early 
stage of its development. See database abstract for more details. 
3. This is a well-scrutinised taxonomic checklist, but it is restricted to a subset of species by 
geography (regional database), or sector of biological discipline (e.g. thematic database in 
particular ecological area, conservation, quarantine, pest and disease control, medicine or 
molecular biology, etc). This data set was included in the Catalogue of Life to fill gaps at lower 
levels of the taxonomic classification (e.g. species, genera) as temporarily solution. See database 
abstract for more details. 
4. This is a nearly complete and fully scrutinised taxonomic checklist with a good quality of 
expertise at the current stage of its development. 5 - This is a complete and fully scrutinised 
taxonomic checklist for an entire taxon with a high quality of expertise and frequent updates, 
which covers nearly all known species diversity in the taxon worldwide (Species 2000, 2014). 
 
This information is then displayed in the main record at the appropriate taxon level (See Figure 
23). Of course, the rating itself is provided by the contributing database, so the quality rating is 
dependent on the contributor’s willingness and ability to acknowledge their own database’s 
strength and limitations. 
   240 
 
Figure 23. Catalogue of Life taxon record for Acidimicrobium ferrooxidans Clark and Norris, 1996. Note the 
“Source database” field, indicating the ITIS Global source database, the database version date (Sept 2015), the 
percentage of completeness of the species list this entry is embedded within, and finally, the confidence rating for 
the quality of the taxonomic checklist (level 5 value).   
Still other data aggregators, such as the Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF), 
have attempted to articulate more quantitative and decisive mechanisms for quality assessment. 
Acknowledging the “potential problems related to incomplete or difficult access to all fields in 
its scheme,” as well as in other “aggregated data research infrastructures,” a task force focused 
on “GBIF Data Fitness for Use in Distribution Modelling (sic)” (Anderson et al., 2016) was 
established to articulate a series of recommendations on data fitness and efficacy for large-scale 
modeling use. Error rates are certainly an issue of great concern for the biodiversity community, 
illustrated by Robert Mesibov’s (2013) audit of GBIF and Atlas of Living Australia (ALA) 
Diplopoda99 occurrence records. His study indicated a high variance in data quality and 
completeness, and he ultimately questions the value of aggregated data repositories such as these 
for local purposes (2013, p. 16). One of the main recommendations by the GBIF Task Force 
centered on a users inability to accurately differentiate between quality and non-quality data:  
GBIF.org should serve indicators of precision, quality, and uncertainty of data that can be calculated 
practically, and preferably “on the fly”, as well as summaries and metrics of completeness of inventories, at 
scales and for regions defined by the user. The summaries should display maps and graphs of completeness 
by region, time-period and taxa (2016, p. 2). 
 
                                                
99 The arthropod class, Diplopoda, consists of the millipede taxon group (“Current Status of the Myriapod Class 
Diplopoda (Millipedes),” 2007). 
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The task force specifically recommends clear fields to indicate error and uncertainty rates, as 
well as provide methods for users to visualize datasets to understand the larger contours of that 
data and “highlight possible inconsistencies and error” (2016, p. 4). GBIF is also transparent and 
forthcoming with the fact that their “interpretations” of the data can have unexpected errors.100 
“These [interpretations] do basic string cleanups but for many important properties we also use 
strong data typing. For example latitude and longitude values are represented by java doubles 
and the country, basis of record and many other terms which are based on a controlled 
vocabulary, are represented by fixed enumerations in our java API” (GBIF.org, 2016). To make 
any possible errors as a result of this process visible to users, potential interpretation error notes 
are appended to every occurrence record in the GBIF repository (2017).  
Aside from data quality, Yanega notes that there is also the issue of being able to 
decipher the completeness of any given taxonomic hierarchy. As Alan Paton of Royal Botanic 
Gardens, Kew, remarked, we are now experiencing, 
That transition between how the data is curated at local level to truly global curation of data. And at the 
moment the emphasis is on local creation because we know it works and nothing gets missed …the next 
step is a community resource where people can begin to curate it and disambiguate species. But in order to 
get to that level you need a critical mass of data in one place. Because you can develop all the tools, but if 
there's no digital data correctly identified with identifiers with some level of authority (this is good, this is 
reasonable or not good), then...what would people do with that data? We are kind of in that transition and I 
don't know how long it's going to take us to [make] that transition. One of the main barriers to that 
transition is "do we yet have the critical mass of data digitized? We've got 10% of our collections databased 
[at Kew], 20% across the board. It means 80% isn't digitized. And that's just at Kew. Literature form 1924-
2011, roughly, before born digital kicked in, is largely under copyright, and maybe 30% digitized (2016). 
 
This snapshot of Kew’s current state of digitization should be somewhat sobering when we think 
about the extent of biodiversity information available in any one of the iLife platforms we have 
been discussing. The problem is compounded by the fact that institutions all over the world 
experience this analog/digital divide. Digitization of museum specimen and type collections is a 
                                                
100 Certainly, the Catalogue of Life is also quite transparent about it’s own limitations as well, which even a cursory 
look at their website would reveal.  
   242 
costly endeavor—so much so, that most institutions cannot invest in these efforts. Some 
institutions, however, such as Naturalis Biodiversity Center in Leiden, Netherlands, have been 
able to invest a great deal of funding into digitizing their entire specimen collection. Such 
endeavors are an essential part of the taxonomic and biodiversity landscape, for the “transition” 
Paton refers to, depends on them. Naturalis recently completed a European-funded initiative to 
digitize their entire collection of specimens. The initiative itself was spurred on by a grant 
totaling €13 million to digitize at least seven million objects at the object level. To accomplish 
this feat, however, a tiered approach to the task was necessary: nine million objects of their forty-
two million-object collection were selected to be digitized at the object level, while the 
remaining thirty-one million specimens were digitized at the drawer/box/bottle level. Boxes (or 
any standalone container) typically hold closely related species at a particular taxon level—say, 
genus (see Figure 24). As Renee Dekker, then Head of Collections, conveyed, these efforts have 
proven resourceful and effective in locating specimens rather quickly,  
Naturalis is a state collection, and we are the tenants of the state collection. They visit us every 2 years and 
they randomly select 44 objects and we have to find them within 10 minutes. Which is easy if you have 
only a thousand paintings; if you have 42 million objects it’s a different story. But normally the scientists 
and the collection manager can link to that collection and find it within 10 minutes. The good thing now is 
that everything is databased at carrier level. I can find it and even the Director can find it because 
everything is [identified exactly] where it is in the collection—which floor, which cabinet, which aisle, 
which drawer, and in which position. And when the inspectors came recently, they randomly selected two 
microscopic slides —the smallest things, with many items in a box, and we have about one-hundred 
thousand microscopic slides—and because they are all linked and in the computer ... even I could find it, 
and not within ten-minutes, but five-minutes (2016).  
 
A rather impressive feat given the size of Naturalis’s collection.  
There are two broad questions, then, to be posed in relation to completeness as it exists in 
the biodiversity taxonomic and data space: (1) how much data is digitally extant and available in 
the iLife consortium at all, and (2) how much of that digitally available data has been collocated 
appropriately in composite structures such as the Catalogue of Life. The former question is being 
addressed by Naturalis’s attempts to digitize and move the intellectual objects of biodiversity 
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research online for broader global and systemic uses. While the latter question is our particular 
concern for this manuscript, the former issue cannot be ignored in the grander scheme of the 
discussion. The assessment and completeness of the data that populates databases like the 
Catalogue is one major concern, but so too is the very real issue of what is excluded from these 
systems for various reasons. A key question is how easily the digital surrogates created out of 
initiatives like those at Naturalis are finding their way into the systems, and perhaps more 
importantly, what information from these collections is not yet in a form amenable to global 
sharing. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Photograph of unidentified wasp specimen drawers at the University of California, Riverside, 
Entomology Museum. The orientation, structure, and detail of this specimen drawer are quite typical of those found 
at other natural history museums. Note the minute, multi-layered metadata labels that contain specimen-specific 
information such as unique institutional identification number, species information, etc. Photo by author, August 3, 
2016.  
  The fact remains that, even in the most highly funded and structured initiatives, full data 
integrity cannot be assured through any mechanism. Even Naturalis’s extensive efforts did not 
include fully OCR’d label text for online searching capabilities. In addition, in this and previous 
digitization efforts, the notes attached to the labels themselves were not digitized, even though 
these labels hold vital information for scientists. Every piece of extant information cannot be 
transferred into the digital environment, and this will always be the case. A good deal of the 
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penumbra of metadata surrounding what we primarily understand to do the most important 
intellectual work in the production of species concepts—the specimen itself—is often excluded 
from the global systems. For example, oftentimes, much of the metadata from type specimen 
cards never makes its way into the global database environment (See Figure 25). 
Determination (DET) labels are slips of paper that taxonomists paste onto the specimen 
cards over time to indicate changes that have been determined to affect the nomenclatural status 
of the specimen.101 These slips serve as kinds of archeological markers for the historical 
evolution of the species concept. In the example in Figure 25, you can see that this specimen 
began as Asystasia salicifolia Craib var. parviflora Imlay, J.B., in 1981; was then changed to 
Asystasia nemorum Nees in 1982; subsequently determined to be Asystasia saliforlia Craib in 
1983; and then reverted back to Asystasia nemorum Nees in 1998 (F).  Kew’s Herbarium 
Catalogue (2017b), being a particularly robust system, meticulously lists these species concept 
and nomenclature DETs over time (Figure 25, (g)), but many online systems fail to depict this 
level of detail in their online specimen card systems, losing vital information necessary to fulfill 
the goal of a fully-functional knowledge base necessary to answer large evolutionary or 
phylogenetic questions (see Figure 21 at the opening of this chapter). Such type specimen 
information is essential as well if a fully robust knowledge base system is going to serve as the 
foundation for quality evolutionary informatics work.  
 
 
                                                
101 I am thankful to Timothy Utteridge, Head of Identification and Naming and Senior Research Leader (Asia), at 
the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, for instructing me on the finer details regarding species concept and 
nomenclatural emendation practices. 
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(a)  (b)
(c)  (d)
(e)  (f)  
(g)  
Figure 25. Specimen card and determination slip detail for Asystasia nemorum Nees (Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, 
2017a). (a) Full specimen card; (b) original determination label; (c) determination by Bertel Hansen, 1981; (d) 
determination by Bertel Hansen in 1982; (e) determination in 1983; (f) the most recent determination/revision by 
Ensermu Kelbessa in 1998; and (g) the database fields representing these changes. 
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 But even as we gain the means, staff, and computational resources to digitize these 
various sources of biodiversity data, error is still an unavoidable aspect of this procedure. The 
process itself will inevitably introduce its own set of issues, as Yanega indicated to me, since 
computational systems are not yet as reliable as human readability: “Every conceivable mistake 
at every conceivable level will occur when relying on automated [digitization and 
georeferencing] systems,” 
It's hard to express the complexity of the problem in a single paragraph. There are two things: there's 
introduced error and there's original error. Original error is something a person is going to notice and figure 
out and resolve, and people tend to assume that original error is a very minor thing, and it's not. I've worked 
in more than a dozen different collections (not just our own, including the Smithsonian) ... [and for] all of 
them, roughly one out of every five labels has either an error or an omission that is significant in terms of 
when and where and who collected it. One of those three parameters was, in some respect, from something 
that is either misspelled, switched around, or absent (2016). 
 
Introduced errors are errors such as incorrect coordinates (in the case of georeferencing systems) 
or OCR errors (in the case of text-based digitization). Validating and manually appending 
information to these digital sources becomes another essential phase of this process. Fixing these 
kinds of errors, however, takes time to accomplish, and until we reach the practically impossible 
point where all information is transferred into the database ecology, completeness will remain an 
elusive concept. Yanega’s concerns certainly apply in specimen card spaces as well, for the 
transcription and/or OCR transfer of these texts into database fields is often fraught with error as 
well.102 
While I have only presented a few examples, it should be clear that completeness of data 
in the biodiversity/iLife environment is judged relative to the availability of digitally-transferred 
data sets from analogue sources, as well as by the extent to which we can judge these sources to 
be vetted and curated to the best standards available. Not everyone is convinced that the 
                                                
102 One type of error encountered frequently is the inability to read handwriting on type specimen cards and/or 
specimen labels. I can personally attest to these legibility issues. While individuals intimately knowledgeable with 
certain collections may be able to decipher certain handwriting styles, hiring others to do so is often another way in 
which error infiltrates the database text space. 
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Catalogue of Life can gain a reasonable level of dependability. As was discussed in chapter four, 
the management taxonomy implemented by the Catalogue (functionally and intellectual separate 
from the process of taxonomic opinion) has been a core point of contention for the many 
individuals who do not agree with such pragmatic approaches to taxonomic management. The 
management hierarchy, and the mélange of taxonomies that constitute its structure, make its 
content somewhat tenuous and imbalanced, keeping certain communities skeptical of its value 
for local, taxonomically relevant reference purposes. David Patterson expands upon this notion, 
No there is still no consensus over how to handle the protists. Molecular analyses have tended to add a fair 
bit of noise to the picture, this has led to many speculations expressed in the form of classificatory 
structures, and the consequence is a lot of confusion. Some parts of the scheme appear to be increasingly 
robust, although the scope and definition of the taxa remain uncertain. Survivors at the top level seem to be 
the Opisthokonts (animals, fungi and close protistan relatives), Amoebozoa and Rhizaria. Excavates go in 
and out of favor, while chromalveolates and Archaeplastida are not solid. Similarly, at more distal points in 
the conceptual tree, some taxa, such as Chromists, are unsupported by much beyond wishful thinking and 
so are contentious.   
 
Ideally, the application of phylogenetic principles as criteria for retention or dismissal of taxa would be 
wonderful, and protistologists have been somewhat slow to move in this direction. 
 
A protist classification that is more consistent with currently available data can be found at 
eutree.lifedesks.org.  It is a working structure rather than a reference structure.  In that system, if 
relationships are unclear, the contestants for most proximate neighbors are placed as sister groups to 
minimize the risk of producing polyphyletic taxa (2009). 
 
As was conveyed to me, it is much easier to assess the quality of an entity like a GSD, since 
these spaces are often tightly curated with—again—internally consistent methods and 
approaches. Such is the case with the protest databases references by Patterson, and any number 
of other group specific taxonomies. As Paton mentioned above, the transition to an environment 
where a “critical mass” of information is available is not yet upon us. A step toward this 
threshold is to ensure that completeness and quality of a system can be understood and 
transparent, so that they can be useful and reliable sources that scientific professionals can feel 
comfortable implementing as part of their daily practice.  
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But even exempting these issues, the Catalogue’s taxonomy is, in fact, used by a number 
of data aggregators as a backbone structure. In what sense do these uses expose some of the 
Catalogue’s extensive limitations? 
The Catalogue’s Extensive Limitations (or the Limits of Curated Spaces) 
Issues regarding quality and completeness aside, it should be noted (and readily apparent 
from previous chapters) that the Catalogue is still a highly curated environment. Editors do their 
best to balance the needs of multiple (competing) communities to provide a functional snapshot 
of biodiversity life for more practical and pragmatic purpose. But even at over 1.6-million 
species, there are still many environments where this number is deficient for descriptive and 
organizational purposes. As we will see in great deal below, GBIF is one such example. One of 
the key extensive capacities of the Catalogue is its ability to serve as the taxonomic backbone for 
numerous systems across the iLife ecology and beyond. In practice, the implementation of its 
hierarchy has its limitations. In some cases, such as the Encyclopedia of the Life, the Catalogue 
is displayed among an array of taxonomies to show the divergent opinion of the taxonomic 
community (Encyclopedia of Life, 2017d). In others cases, such, as GBIF, the Catalogue is used 
as the core structuring agent for searching, browsing, and organizing its species occurrence 
records. The GBIF Nub taxonomy, as it is called, “is updated regularly through an automated 
process in which the Catalogue of Life acts as a starting point also providing the complete higher 
classification above families” (Global Biodiversity and Information Facility, 2016a). The case of 
GBIFs nub taxonomy is a fascinating one, particularly because it integrates the Catalogue of Life 
as its core, but in order to meet its site-specific needs, builds upon this core to cater to its diverse 
occurrence record data set. Expansion on this example is merited for it illustrates the potentiality 
and limitations of the extensive uses of the Catalogue rather well.  
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Before proceeding, it makes sense here to reiterate how GBIF functions differently in the 
iLife environment than the Catalogue. For one, the Catalogue’s primarily currency is in valid and 
accepted names (as a nomenclator), and by connecting those tokens into valid taxon groups, 
produces a management hierarchy that can be used within other infrastructure to organize their 
data on top of this basic architecture. GBIF’s main function, on the other hand, is to collect 
globally-produced occurrence data and provide “a single point of access (through this portal and 
its web services) to hundreds of millions of records, shared freely by hundreds of institutions 
worldwide, making it the biggest biodiversity database on the Internet” (Global Biodiversity and 
Information Facility, 2013b). Names and taxonomic relationships are the primary focus of 
analysis for the Catalogue, while in the GBIF environment it is the occurrence data that are the 
primary issues of concern, ultimately appended to a taxon within that hierarchy for searchability 
and organization. In terms of nomenclature, the Catalogue of Life provides a significant 
percentage of the nomenclature information for GBIF’s Nub taxonomy, comprising some 
3,175,925 names, or approximately fifty-four percent of the total GBIF namespace (“GBIF 
backbone taxonomy - Constituents,” 2017).  Even with this partitioning of responsibilities in 
place, GBIF is unable to take the Catalogue’s management hierarchy and implement it 
wholesale. As Tim Robertson, Head of Informatics at GBIF, summarized, 
There is no global taxonomy that can organize the 730 million occurrence records. It just doesn't exist and 
therefore GBIF have had to assemble one. In the past, GBIF used to assemble this taxonomy from the 
occurrence records themselves. As records came in with kingdom, phylum, class, order […] and scientific 
names we would remove suspicious names, and try to assemble what was left. This proved to be too 
inconsistent and was messy. We found it needed higher quality source data. In 2011 we stopped that 
approach and we started building the backbone taxonomy using only what we believed were trustworthy 
checklist datasets. Using the Catalogue of Life as a basis, we integrated names accessed from 
nomenclatures like International Plant Names Index (IPNI) and Index Fungorum and others until we had 
enough coverage to organize the occurrence data.(2016). 
 
As there is still no single taxonomy existing that covers all known names, GBIF is forced to 
build its own GBIF backbone on top of the Catalogue of Life out of operational necessity 
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(GBIF.org, 2016). Within this activity, a conflict thus emerges: all the 640 million-plus 
circulating occurrence records that find their way into GBIF collectively comprise an 
undifferentiated landscape of species concepts, data types, and taxonomic hierarchy formats. In 
GBIF “not every dataset includes information at the same level of detail,” going on the 
presumption that “sharing what is available through GBIF.org is valuable, because even partial 
information answers some important questions” (Global Biodiversity and Information Facility, 
2013a). Unlike in the Catalogue, then, the data coming in to GBIF is not curated to the same 
extent. We can essentially think of this data pool as all the possible occurrence records for all 
possible species.103 The Catalogue’s taxonomic space, on the other hand—for all the reasons we 
have discussed up until this point—does not yet have the entirety of the possible two million 
extent global species yet to be document and included.104 While much of occurrence data 
ingested into GBIF can be matched to a position in the Catalogue’s core taxonomy, enough of it 
lies outside of the Catalogue’s curated core (recalling the Catalogue of Life Plus schematic) to 
merit building on top of that basic backbone.  
Certain professional scientists, including Roderic Page, Science Director for GBIF and 
Professor of Taxonomy at Glasgow University, have indicated that perhaps GBIF should “take 
more ‘ownership’ of data quality, but that's politically tricky” (Page [@rdmpage], 2016b). Which 
says nothing of the fact that curating taxonomic and occurrence data is an incredibly time-
consuming task. To offset this limitation of the Catalogue’s hierarchy for their own purposes, 
                                                
103 In a taxonomic and data quality sense, we can think of this undifferentiated occurrence record space as being 
(somewhat) analogous to Bourgoin’s notion of “names as strings,” Stage 1, in his Global Names-Catalogue of Life 
Parameters schematic (Figure 12). In this space data is relatively unrefined and not yet formatted in ways that 
facilitate integration into the GBIF system. 
 
104 See Footnote 11, in chapter one, regarding the disputation of the two million species figure utilized by the 
Catalogue of Life.  
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GBIF began implementing its own Nub taxonomy, mediated by computational and algorithmic 
methods, 
We have algorithms that we have tuned over time… But we start with one checklist and overlay another 
and build it up progressively. We've been doing this for many years and because our work is very visible 
with occurrence data, we get a lot of feedback on issues. Whenever we receive feedback we add tests to the 
algorithm codebase so that they catch real observed issues and we actively fix those. We've refined this 
algorithm … [it’s] not perfect ... but we believe we are getting better and better at it. What we have built 
now could potentially be an option for building the Catalogue of Life itself, or at least providing a sandbox 
of information for review through the CoL processes. The Catalogue of Life, by definition, is a collection 
of global species databases, plus a few regional ones that get integrated together—by using the integration 
approaches developed over time we might be able to accommodate more sources quickly. These could be 
considered provisional placement of names for final peer review and confirmation. …. The goal would be 
to build the names layer across nomenclatures and then start layering up the hierarchies of taxon concepts 
in the Catalogue of Life.  Ideally these would be linked to literature... GBIF can provide the linkages to all 
the type specimen information … to start linking with the museums—it seems like it can be a more 
inclusive, complete Catalogue of Life. A challenge is getting all the people involved to buy into that kind of 
concept. (Robertson, 2016). 
 
The situation described by Robertson is reminiscent of the Catalogue of Life Plus’s model, 
where, instead of nomenclature alone, provisional taxonomic positions are produced and 
published, while feedback mechanisms are put in place to more finely attune the structure to 
current taxonomic opinion. Additionally, GBIF’s algorithmic method is in-line with Yury 
Roskov and Frank Bisby’s initial vision for how proto-GSDs were initially intended to function 
to fill the gap spaces of the Catalogue of Life’s taxonomic backbone. Of course, as we have 
previously discussed, criticism over algorithmic approaches to building taxonomies are not 
universally accepted in the taxonomic community. Many scientists feel that such methods are not 
as refined as taxonomies assembled through individual mediation, in addition to the more 
political concerns regarding the substitution of computational methods for hard-earned 
taxonomic expertise. Of note as well, is that GBIF’s taxonomy, like the Catalogue’s, is meant to 
only be good enough for organizational purposes, while the refinement is left to experts that fall 
within particular domains. The Nub Taxonomy is just as contingent a document as the Catalogue 
is in practice. 
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The algorithms used to compile the Nub taxonomy and name checklist are freely 
available on github (Global Biodiversity and Information Facility, 2017b, 2017a), along with the 
database schema that connects these various names into a taxonomic schema 
(“gbif/checklistbank schema,” 2017). The extent to which these taxonomy-building algorithms 
can remain effective is dependent and contingent on the quality of individual data sources. 
“Some data [GBIF does] have is poor (e.g., @catalogueoflife has mangled butterfly names)” 
(Page [@rdmpage], 2016c), in addition to the fact that—similar to the Catalogue’s ingest of 
RSDs—many of the data sources are “[aggregations] of sources that [may] themselves be 
aggregations,” making it incredibly difficult to fix the data at the source (Page [@rdmpage], 
2016a, 2016d). Minute editorial miscalculations inherent in the Catalogue of Life have to be 
debugged and restructured downstream to meet various infrastructure-specific needs.  
In addition to these limitations to the breadth of the Catalogue’s hierarchy is its inability 
to quickly absorb new names as they are produced in the scientific literature. Due to the 
Catalogue’s annual publication schedule (for the stable, Annual version), it takes a good deal of 
time for new names to enter the fabric of their management hierarchy. Even if contributing GSD 
and RSDs were to quickly integrate these newly published or registered names into their own 
databases at the local level, there would be a considerable lag time between that change and it’s 
ingest into the Catalogue, its subsequent publication (according to the Catalogue’s annual cycle), 
and then it’s proliferation into related and integrated biodiversity data systems.105 Such is the 
                                                
105 The registration of names in relation to publication is an evolving issue in nomenclature circles. When 
publications were produced primarily in print form, defining what was the unit of publication was a relatively easy 
matter. As publications have become primarily electronic in nature, nano-publications (Maddison, Guralnick, Hill, 
Reysenbach, & McDade, 2012) are making it difficult to decipher what counts as a publication unit. As one 
taxonomist indicated, “previously [the name] had to be published, but now, electronic publications must be both 
published and registered” (personal communication). The International Commission for Zoological Nomenclature 
(1999), for example, is now pondering a registration system in lieu of the publication requirement, such that names 
must be registered (and thus, centrally located for informatics purposes), but where publication will not necessarily 
be a requirement (especially since peer-review is not a mandated quality of a publication in the Code). “The 
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balance that must be made for all curated and controlled spaces. This poses a problem for outfits 
like GBIF who see the publication of a name as a moment where they can both add a name to its 
Nub taxonomy, as well as ingest the associated data for those publications into its database. 
Waiting for the appropriate taxon to show up on the Catalogue’s radar is not the optimal 
approach for this purpose. These limitations have prompted some to call for “a more 
democratized [and] open Catalogue of Life” infrastructure, in which anybody can review the 
addition of new names, and where these newly produced names, often produced in micro-
publications, can be ingested immediately.  
Thus, GBIF is currently exploring ways in which immediate nomenclatural and 
taxonomic information uptake can be handled directly and automatically. Tim Robertson 
conveyed a story of how such a process might work in such an open system: 
There are also the new names being published though journals like Pensoft and through marking up 
journals through Plazi.org in Switzerland.  They are some of the quickest people to publish their data sets 
of new names. Last year there was a new species of spider described and published in Pensoft—and by the 
time it was published, within about four hours we had it in the GBIF backbone taxonomy, with the type 
specimen [information]. It was quite exciting to see such a short turnaround – we had to do a lot of behind 
the scenes work to make that happen but it was nice to demonstrate that it was possible and what we are 
heading towards – “published to GBIF within minutes”. Plazi and Pensoft in particular are pioneering rapid 
micro-publications (2016).106  
 
Of course, the idea of a more “open” Catalogue of Life compounds some of the issues scientists 
have regarding the Catalogue: its lack of uniformity and its top-down approach to classification 
in general, to name only two. On the other end of the spectrum, such an open system can also 
facilitate ready and minute editorial changes to produce a more up-to-date system. Such systems 
                                                                                                                                                       
registration required [will] supersede the role publications used to serve” in this possible new workflow. This 
registration system would thus establish the link between name and type. I have been unable to decipher if similar 
initiatives are being pushed forward in the International Code of Nomenclature for Algae, Fungi, and Plants. 
 
106 Plazi (2017), ZooKeys (2017), PhytoKeys (2017), and the Biodiversity Data Journal (2017), were mentioned 
repeatedly in my interviews as key sources for structured rapidly-disseminatable publications that can easily be 
harvested and implemented in the biodiversity informatics environments such as those in the iLife consortium. 
ZooKeys, PhytoKeys and the Biodiversity Data Journal are all a product of Pensoft Publishers, “an independent 
academic publishing company, well known worldwide for its innovations in the field of semantic publishing and for 
its cutting-edge publishing tools and workflows” (2017). 
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would need to somehow incorporate peer review into the workflow so that taxa can be placed 
provisionally and then a series of experts could review and confirm that placement.  
Error proliferation. 
In addition to the ontogenetic transformations that take place within and without the 
Catalogue’s taxonomic space, another issue identified in this composite and integrated space is 
the proliferation of GSD-introduced errors that radiate throughout the various networked systems 
of the iLife consortium (and beyond). This critique applies not only to the Catalogue’s 
infrastructure but to all highly-integrated systems in general: these systems proliferate errors 
incredibly quickly given their interconnected nature. A discussion on the Taxacom list serve, 
initiated by Stephen Thorpe, offers one example of how errors (and in this case invalid author 
references) are introduced by taxonomic and database systems, and subsequently proliferated in 
the biodiversity online ecology:   
But they do [qualitatively transform data]. 
 
Look at the authorship of Scolytus scolytus - 
 
In GBIF, EOL and Catalogue of Life 2007 the authorship is incorrectly listed a 
Wood and Bright 1992: 
 
GBIF:  http://data.gbif.org/species/14616352/ 
 
EOL: http://www.eol.org/pages/691357 
 
Catalogue of Life 2007: 
http://www.catalogueoflife.org/annual-checklist/2007/show_species_details.php?record_id=4242138 
 
However, in ITIS the authorship is corrected listed as (Fabricius, 1775). 
 
The problem began when a mash up was made from the Electronic Catalogue of 
Curculionoidea website. 
 
It correctly listed the authorship of Scolytus scolytus and cited the 
publication of Wood and Bright 1992 as the source.  Somehow, the mash up dropped 
the authorship name and replaced it with the citation name. Then it spread .... 
 
Now, almost every weevil that occurs in North America and was listed in the Wood 
and Bright 1992 publication has Wood and Bright as the author of the those 
species: Here is the EOL Scoltyus species list.  Run your eye down the list to 
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see how many species have Wood and Bright 1992 as their authorship: 
http://www.eol.org/pages/49702 
 
I sent emails to GBIF and EOL without receiving a reply and so like hitting your 
head against a brick wall — I felt better when I stopped. 
 
I am beginning to wonder whether discrete taxon treatment websites are indeed 
better than those that attempt to do all (Walker, 2010). 
  
This post highlights a number of issues that many scientists feel are major drawbacks of 
distributed data systems: the inability to validate and edit small bits of big data systems; the 
speed with which these potential errors are distributed; and, finally, the lack of feedback 
mechanisms for systems such as the Catalogue of Life, GBIF, and attendant systems, to remedy 
errors that are identified by specific users and user groups.107 On the one hand, this is a problem 
of data management at the stage of collocation: the necessary steps that need to be taken to 
establish the veracity of any particular source may have been overlooked by either the database 
provider or an editorial board. But as we have seen, these systems are working with complex 
data sets, and there will be no situation in which 100% accurate data will be reached through the 
work of any editorial body. Using the example above—and assuming that Scolytus scolytus 
Fabricius, 1775 is, indeed, the correct nomenclatural form—Catalogue editors had to make a 
good-faith decision at some point to include the “provisionally accepted name” from the 
“WTaxa: Electronic Catalogue of Weevil names” database (Species 2000, 2017e), and not from 
the ITIS database, which incidentally, still correctly lists the Scolytus scolytus Fabricius, 1775 
form of the name (ITIS, 2017b).108 It could be the case that the “Electronic Catalogue of Weevil 
names” was more comprehensive in those taxon groups over ITIS, and so what the Catalogue 
                                                
107 To be fair, the Catalogue and GBIF do attend to recommendations and suggestions submitted to them directly. It 
is often the case, however, that they are not contacted regarding these issues, or individuals do not know the most 
effective mechanisms to notify them of such issues.  
 
108 The Catalogue of Life and ITIS still have the “errors” described in Walker’s Taxacom post as of March 1, 2017. 
It should also be noted that I take no position on the correct form of this species. I only use this example to show that 
discrepancies exist in this informatics landscape and that these issues proliferate quickly in this online environment.  
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gained in terms of species coverage and breadth may have outweighed any small errors that the 
database introduced into the system.109 On the other hand, this is a theoretical issue whereby the 
ontological instability of biodiversity database systems comes into direct conflict with the 
practice of using them.  
Much of these issues can be rectified with an effective feedback mechanism, and as has 
been illustrated, museums, taxonomists, and databases, do, in fact, want feedback. But even as 
individual systems add mechanisms to make requested changes within their databases, they are 
likely to get wiped out as these systems transfer data between them over time. And all of this 
assumes that there is, in fact, somebody to contact to fix the error. Recall that GSDs are the 
source of most of these data points. And also recall that these GSDs are often manufactured and 
updated by limited staff—and in some cases, only one individual. An increasingly difficult 
problem in these spaces is how to manage and curate data sets that have been orphaned or 
abandoned by their creators? As was conveyed to me,  
A lot of people using data find issues and we aim to mediate their feedback back to the data publishers. We're 
beginning to recognize—we have to recognize— that some datasets are actively curated and some data really 
will never be touched again. As an example … the museum community they really do seek feedback—they 
curate their specimens, and they curate their databases…  If end users have feedback - even tiny little pieces of 
info – it is often acted upon. Then there is a whole class of content originating from citizen content initiatives; 
those are very active (iNaturalist, for example), and want and act on feedback. Then there is survey data, 
machine generated data, content where people have produced for project then moved on in their career – this is 
often content which will never be visited again by the originator.  We need to consider how we treat edits that 
should be applied to this data.  During 2017 GBIF aim to identify those cases and develop a community 
curation approach whereby people can correct issues in these datasets and republish a new version (Robertson, 
2016). 
 
Additionally, in algorithmically constructed taxonomies—such as GBIF’s—errors like this may 
be a product of computational error. As Nico Franz stated, “But that means there are no primary 
authors [for the GBIF taxonomy]? No people to directly dis-/agree with” (2016). One problem 
here is finding the correct source to contact to rectify these errors is equivalent to hitting a 
                                                
109 I do not know the reasons for the inclusion of the “Electronic Catalogue of Weevil names” database over ITIS, 
this is an example purely for analytic purposes.  
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moving target. So there are two kinds of data that exist within GBIF—and, by extension, any 
system that aggregates disparate data sets—data that is active (in that there is a responsible body 
concerned with the continued curation of said data asset), as well as what Tim Robertson called, 
“immutable” datasets that have nobody in charge of them and able to mediate incoming 
feedback. The end result of this bifurcation is that datasets need to be identified according to a 
set of activity parameters, and if it is categorized as immutable, mechanisms need to be put in 
place so that somebody can take control of managing that data and curating it to meet 
contemporary science and discovery uses.  
Divergent traditions and nameless taxa. 
The final limitation of the Catalogue that will be discussed here is its inability to absorb 
and formulate positions for classificatory productions that do not conform to Linnaean-
formulations. The increased use of genetic markers in the form of DNA barcodes (such as the 
mitochondrial C01 gene sequence) have been increasingly useful in constructing phylogenies 
(Waterton et al., 2013; Erickson & Driskell, 2012). The outputs of such genetically-based 
phylogenetic examinations are tree drawings that depict the hypothesized relationship between 
various entities (not unlike the output of numerical taxonomy discussed in chapter four). One 
result of the increasingly popular approach of phylogenetic inference is the “proliferation of 
taxonomic categories” (K. de Queiroz & Gauthier, 1992, p. 457). DNA tends to “split” more than 
it does “lump” species together into taxon groups. The applications of names to these DNA 
barcode strings, however, and the classification of these categories within existing taxonomic 
schema, are entirely separate activities performed after these phylogenies have been constructed. 
Increasingly, names are not being applied to this growing cache of genetically labeled 
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information. An interview with Berry van der Hoorn, Group leader for Biodiversity Discovery at 
Naturalis Biodiversity Center, provides an example of such a practice: 
So we're working, for example, on water quality, taking water samples from a ditch somewhere and then 
we extract DNA from the sample to identify species that are living in that environment. And this has all 
kinds of applications: for impact assessment, for agriculture, for deep-sea mining … wildlife forensics, 
food safety, etc. We have been running a project where we barcode a lot of species around here. I think 
we've barcoded 40,000 specimens from our collection and have a lot of [newly collected] material. This 
water project is able to function … because we have libraries of barcodes, so [this project] has a huge 
impact on taxonomy. It's an extra source of information for the real taxonomist, so if you want to do a 
revision on a certain species groups, if you are very old fashioned, you only look at morphological 
characters, but that is [less practiced] these days. You should … take molecular traits into account. 
 
Barcoding works quite well. For example, you don't even need species names anymore. Sometimes, for us, 
it depends on the questions you ask. We [went on] an expedition [to] a small island in the Caribbean … to 
check how [species] diversity varies over the island. Sometimes you don't even want to know the species 
name, you just say, we found 150 spiders here, 12 spiders there, and then that's enough. They call the 
output of this “OTUs”—unidentified, operational taxonomic units. And you can use [these OTUs] fairly 
well as a biodiversity index and then you don't even need to recognize the species itself. And of course, you 
have to take into account that you miss some species because you cannot identify some species using the 
CO1 gene, for example. But that doesn't matter for this biodiversity index because … for defining the water 
quality it doesn't really matter. It's the one species or the other one—these are minor details. 
 
Many taxonomists see this [approach] as a threat, but for me [I think] it supports taxonomy because it gives 
it so much new energy and information. You can build up so [many more] applications than you could 
before. We show how much taxonomy is [still] needed (2016). 
 
Interestingly, as van der Hoorn conveys, the divergence between traditional taxonomy (and the 
application of names to taxon) and the growing interest in barcoding as an approach to 
constructing taxonomies, is a matter of asking a different kind of research question. For van der 
Hoorn, the question was ecologically based, formulated within and for very specific conditions. 
The application of names is secondary to solving a project- and funding-specific research query.  
In practice, numerous scholars have pointed to this widening divide between traditional 
and phylogenetic approaches, and the detrimental effects it is having on the adequate 
accumulation and collocation of scientific knowledge as each proceeds forward invoking and 
implementing different methodologies. Nico Franz (2005), at the University of Arizona, 
documents this increasing tendency to not translate phylogenies into classifications in his article 
“On the Lack of Good Scientific Reasons for the Growing Phylogeny/Classification Gap.” Franz 
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notes, “by supplementing a traditional classification with a more precise estimate of phylogeny, 
one has not yet ‘removed the need to use’ any or all parts of that classification. In the vast 
majority of cases, the more recent phylogenetic analyses are properly considered revisions of 
pre-existing hypotheses (however coarse) about the relationships among taxa and the 
evolutionary histories of character traits” (N. M. Franz, 2005, p. 496). The traditional modes of 
taxonomy that have been built over the last 250 years, including the application of names to 
taxon groups, are essential to contextualizing and making meaningful the results of phylogenetic 
analysis. Additionally, unnamed phylogenies become siloed from this cache of knowledge linked 
to the historiographical record. One camp cannot communicate with other, thereby limiting the 
ability for systematics as a whole to proceed forward as a coherent unit and to build upon the 
virtues of each approach.  
Despite these competing views, there is certainly a synergy between the two camps that 
can flourish. A project such as the one described by van der Hoorn provides the raw data that 
taxonomists can use to produce more robust and complete classifications,   
When we barcode we intend to [eventually] upload it to [the Barcode of Life Data System]110 to stimulate 
all this taxonomic research. We don't have the capacity ourselves to name these organisms. That would take 
too much time. But if we barcode a lot of stuff and we give it back to [taxonomists] to sort it all out, work 
on it, describe the species, and give them names, that would be great. We give them a web platform to 
publish that information and contribute to these species catalogues, [and they could potentially] get 
rewarded professionally [by citing this work] (Van der Hoorn, 2016).  
 
In the meantime, however, while these increasing caches of barcodes are being produced, this 
information fails to make its way into aggregated and composite systems like the Catalogue of 
Life. The Catalogue, as previously discussed, has created the Catalogue of Life Plus as an 
infrastructure to take these OTUs, and eventually give individuals feedback mechanisms by 
which these numerical name-place-holders can subsequently be described according to particular 
                                                
110 For more information on the Barcode of Life Initiative and Data System, see (The International Barcode of Life 
Project, 2010). 
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codes of nomenclature. Such Catalogue of Life Plus infrastructure can support the synergistic 
activity described by van der Hoorn. But this is a far cry from being able to take these non-
nomenclatural values and add them into the management hierarchy for inclusion into its checklist 
and subsequent re-use in the iLife system.  
GBIF is working on mechanisms by which genetic barcodes and other kinds of similar 
data can be appended to their Nub Taxonomy framework. For example, species that are 
databased can often be recognized at a higher-taxonomic level—say, at the order or family level. 
For example, in Berry van der Hoorn’s described project above, spiders were collected from an 
area through the use of passive traps. GBIF’s goal in this case would be to append the barcoded 
data at the highest known taxon level—in this case, the barcoded spider data would be appended 
to Araneae order level of the Nub Taxonomy (See Figure 26).  
 
Figure 26. Hypothetical GBIF taxonomic hierarchy scribbled on note pad during an interview. The circled nodes on 
the taxonomy indicate the insertion of genetic or other non-Linnaean-named data at the lowest taxon level possible 
to suitably handle the data (personal communication, September 19, 2016).  
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The assumption here is that the availability of data imperfectly placed is preferred over perfectly 
situated data, given that the latter can take a great deal of time to assess. Users seeking out this 
information have the ability to search through the GBIF portal to locate this information. A 
fundamental information problem here, and one which Information Studies should be closely 
attuned to, is how the application of computational or statistical methods is only a small part of 
the overall goal of classification systems. Quentin Wheeler states, “phylogenetic classifications 
are optimal for storing and predicting information, but phylogeny divorced from taxonomy is 
ephemeral and erodes the accuracy and information content of the language of biology” 
(Wheeler, 2004). Language—and a set of name tokens, to be more specific—is essential as the 
concatenating force to bring together knowledge from different scientific sources. The 
biodiversity informatics world is closely attuned to these issues and divides, and are attempting 
to build classification systems that are more inclusive of multiple approaches to the production of 
classification systems. The goal of taxonomies such as the Catalogue of Life are to create 
inclusive systems that can, potentially, act as platforms by which the knowledge contained 
within multiple classifications can be distributed across the globe for use in any number of 
domains.  
Conclusion 
Referring back to the epigraph by Patrick Wilson that opened up this chapter, there are a 
number of dimensions of a documentary instrument that can increase or decrease an individual’s 
degree of exploitative power: the extent of documents within the bibliographic universe over 
which they have control; the range of activities that can be performed on those accessible 
documents; and, finally, the extent to which you can ‘own’ the object such that it can be 
manipulated or re-articulated for individuated functions. As a retrieval-oriented system, the 
   262 
Catalogue has set out to maximize all of these valences: to record as many biodiversity concepts-
as-documents as possible; to make these documents as combinatorial and useful as possible as a 
base for new knowledge; and finally, to allow the reuse of its taxonomic document for a 
multitude of extensive uses. In the process of such exploitation and extension, however, both the 
GSD taxonomies and the Catalogue itself, change in constitution, contingent as they are in 
practice. Joseph Tennis’s second-order classification theory was invoked to frame this change. 
Finally, some critiques of the Catalogue’s composite form were offered to illustrate its extensive 
limitations within the biodiversity iLife environment. What these critiques offer are ways in 
which we can conceptualize the structure of the Catalogue as pushing against some fundamental 
social, cultural, and structural scientific traditions that are deeply engrained in taxonomic and 
biodiversity culture. Operations that are somewhat clear and more easily controlled within 
traditional internal-coherent taxonomic structures—data quality, articulation of taxa 
completeness, errors reconciliation, etc.—are a far more difficult to handle and process in 
composite structures. Yet without such aggregating mechanisms, the full extent of our 
exploitative and extensive power over our collective documentation and knowledge is limited. 
In Henry Bliss’s, The Organization of Knowledge and the System of the Sciences (1929), 
he exalts the “order” of scientific classification, arguing that the “practical classifications” of 
libraries,  
Do not conform to the scientific order. They have been constructed by those who did not rightly apprehend 
that order or who ignored it. The foundations of those systems were laid a half-century ago, or nearly, when 
the order was less clearly established in the consensus. Their makers were intent on constructing practical 
classification that did not see that the better classification conforms to the system of science the more 
serviceable it will be” (1929, pp. 411–412).  
 
The turn toward composite and management taxonomies in scientific practice represented by the 
Catalogue—quite ‘practical’ and pragmatic in nature—troubles the rigid consensus-based order 
Bliss expected of the systems we create. As we have seen, however, biodiversity science is 
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anything but at a state of consensus; it defies universal consensus, for such consensus would 
indicate and scientific stasis. The Catalogue’s pragmatic approach does not purport to mimic any 
scientific system, but rather chooses management and access as the primary function over 
fidelity to any given scientific argument. Opinions as to the overall effectiveness of the 
Catalogue may differ, but one fact is sure to remain: composite systems are increasingly 
necessary for switching mechanisms in a world filled with fragmented data sources. While 
description-oriented taxonomies will always remain a fundamental instrument in biodiversity 
work, retrieval-oriented mechanisms will continue to be a vital tool, connecting that data to the 
larger, diverse, global pool of scientific discourse. Identifying the downfalls of systems like the 
Catalogue is essential if bases of knowledge are to provide accurate foundations for our most 
pressing global biodiversity questions. As Patrick Wilson indicates, the success of any 
documentary instrument as a means of access is entirely dependent on our ability to understand 
its limitations.  
As systems like the Catalogue forge forward in their attempt to concatenate global data, 
they will continue to balance the needs of local, specialist-specific scientific practices with 
generalized data use. This is a core tension and conflict within biodiversity informatics spaces, as 
Bob Mesibov explains,111 
The core issue here is the spectacular disconnect between working taxonomists and the acronymists who 
want to be the primary interface for access to specialist-produced data. Most specialists aren't asking 'larger 
questions' because they're thoroughly occupied with smaller ones. They don't need the infrastructures, but 
the infrastructures not only have an absolute requirement for specialist-produced data, but wistfully hope 
that specialists will assist with data quality within the infrastructure. Note that the acronymists aren't 
handing out money to assist the specialists, either with data quality work or with data generation. These are 
almost entirely separate enterprises. The argument 'We're all working on the same project and should 
support each other' doesn't wash with me, and won't wash until I see the pattern of growth in acronyms and 
decline in taxonomy start reversing (B. Mesibov, 2010). 
 
                                                
111 As of 2010 Bob Mesibov was an Honorary Research Associate at the Queen Victoria Museum and Art Gallery, 
School of Zoology, University of Tasmania.  
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Abbreviation, however, does not necessarily have to be equated with lesser quality. Systems like 
the Catalogue are continuing to develop and enhance their documentary properties. As Alan 
Paton gestured toward above, the science of taxonomy and biodiversity informatics is in a 
transitory state. There will be a point when a critical mass of data is obtained (even if we will 
never have it all at our digital disposal, for new species are constantly being discovered and the 
species concepts that represent them are contingent in nature). As CERN-like arrangements are 
solidified in the biodiversity community, infrastructures like the Catalogue will only improve as 
more-and-more knowledge is ingested into its database. And as evolutionary informatics 
continues to harness the potential of these aggregating infrastructures, the value of the Catalogue 
will become ever more apparent and necessary in structuring that collective knowledge. Full 
consensus on the Catalogue’s function may never be present, but over time, perhaps this 
“disconnect” described by Mesibov can be bridged with fully integrated online systems that can 
meet the needs of many communities. It is really only a matter of time, mutual professional trust, 
and collective vision.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Contingency and Future Trajectories 
 
When the Global Taxonomic Initiative (GTI) was proposed as part of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1998, there was a keen awareness of the importance of taxonomy 
to the production of good biodiversity science broadly conceived. Without taxonomy there is no 
way to organize the species and taxon specific knowledge in any useable and shareable way. As 
stated by the CBD, “The lack of knowledge of key groups of organisms of importance to 
humankind, many of which have global or multiregional distributions, calls for a global 
dimension to taxonomic activities” (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2003, p. 24). The 
Catalogue of Life arose, in part, to help meet this need to understand the extent and depth of all 
taxonomic data—past, present, as well as to provide a mechanism by which future knowledge 
forms can be integrated into this structure. Such an overarching and global view entails a great 
deal of coordination at many scales, that includes both a focus on minute nomenclatural forms, 
as well as grander visions about how taxonomic knowledge can be tracked over time. It is this 
coordination that has been the main subject of this entire manuscript. 
 More specifically, this dissertation set out to answer two very basic lines of inquiry: (1) 
how can biodiversity taxonomic practices inform our notions of information, documents, and 
concept representation within the discipline of Information Studies, and (2) how might we 
understand composite taxonomies as information systems designed to both represent biological 
knowledge and coordinate efficient data communication? In general, biodiversity taxonomies 
can inform the discipline of Information Studies in a number of ways. For one, they shed light on 
the documentary control of concepts and objects (species and species concepts) that are 
grounded in some in natural phenomena—phenomena we can test and measure such that these 
empirical observations help us better articulate their specified position in a full classification of 
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biological life. But despite this referential ‘ground’ of external objects, consensus on their final 
conceptualization are anything but straightforward. Species concepts are, by definition, 
contingent—the practice of biodiversity science, in fact, is defined by these multiple and 
idiosyncratic taxonomic arguments. General consensus on taxon’s position can generally be 
held, but even the most obvious taxonomic placement is vulnerable to rearticulation.112 New 
methods are employed, new theories are developed, and new data is always being collected. The 
description of texts and works in bibliographical systems—and their subsequent classification—
however, is much more subjective in nature: cataloguers are always seeking out the best 
decretive mechanisms to facilitate the use and needs of a user; users change, however, as do the 
contexts in which we need one form of information over another. Such description is predicated 
on the way somebody sees the world, and any other person can see things quite differently 
(Furner, 2009, p. 9).  
 So, at the heart of this manuscript is a deceptively simple proposition: all knowledge 
organization systems are constructs of cultural and historical circumstances, manufactured as 
artifacts of certain spatiotemporal positions. This, in and of itself, is not groundbreaking—Hope 
Olson (2002) articulated all-too-well the subjective nature of description and its subsequent 
properties of power in social conditions. What the Catalogue of Life exemplifies is a taxonomic 
space that is attempting to embrace diverse taxonomic conditions within the boundaries of one, 
multi-valenced taxonomic document.113 The theoretical implications of this move for 
Information Studies are fundamentally significant: within a space of strong taxonomic opinion, 
                                                
112 On March 23, 2017, a new hypothesis for the classification of dinosaurs was released by University of 
Cambridge scientists (Baron, Norman, & Barrett, 2017). The longstanding classification between Ornithischia and 
Saurischia, held by consensus since 1888 (Ghosh, 2017; Wade, 2017), has been upturned based on new phylogenetic 
research of 74 taxa and 457 traits (Baron et al., 2017, p. 501). 
 
113 To be sure, I am in no way intending to convey that the Catalogue is perfect, no system ever can be.  
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where taxonomies have long been held as the primary mode of arguing serious scientific 
questions, the Catalogue has dedicated itself to changing the functions and epistemological 
foundations of what taxonomies are supposed to do. For the Catalogue, the exemplification of 
some ‘real’ natural world circumstance is less important than representing the diversity of 
opinion on that matter. What the Catalogue loses in internal consistency, it gains in cultural and 
historical breadth. What it loses in taxonomic specificity, it gains in historical perspective. The 
rhetorical move in embracing such an approach seems to me particularly powerful. And of 
course, the existence of the Catalogue does not negate the absolute necessity of descriptive-
oriented taxonomic systems to biodiversity practice—these are fundamental scientific 
instruments and technologies. It merely annunciates the equally necessary position that switching 
between these divergent opinions in an equally accessible taxonomic space is also important. 
There are other questions and concerns that must be attended to outside the confines of our 
individual research questions.  
Imagine if such switching mechanisms existed to bridge epistemologically and 
ontologically distinct cultural KO systems of Western science and indigenous Native knowledge 
sets (or any other distinct system, within any discipline, for that matter)? Would that switching 
system be perfect? Certainly not. I am not even sure what would constitute perfection in this 
space. What such a system—with all of its flaws and successes—would declare, however, is that 
such conversation is important—that the aim of diverse and inclusive approaches to knowledge 
organization is a fundamental tenet, not only of our theoretical discourse, but of the practical 
mechanisms and instruments we design that serve the direct needs of these various constituents. 
Such a system would state that the drive for a perfect and consistent system is antithetical to the 
ways in which information, documents, and knowledge function as social, historical, and cultural 
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constructs. It means that well-meaning and imperfect mediation is more respectable than none at 
all.  If we take classification to be a process, then we also understand that classification can take 
many forms and occupy many different kinds of spaces.  
 Zooming out a bit, this manuscript also attempted to bridge the concepts of information 
and documentation in Information Studies with the practices and theories of biodiversity studies. 
I wanted to take foundational texts by Patrick Wilson and A. Broadfield, among others, and 
apply them to new and little examined spaces concerned with the documentation practices of the 
biodiversity and museum sciences. How do concepts of biodiversity evidence function within the 
representational spaces of the taxonomic document? And how can such an approach add to our 
current understanding of how document concepts are constructed within the field of I/S? At this 
point, it might be useful to rearticulate the general trajectory of this manuscript, if only to more 
clearly articulate how these questions, and many others, have been directly addressed.  
Documentation and Document Contingency 
This dissertation’s first task was to more broadly define the concept of knowledge 
organization to be more inclusive of extra-disciplinary approaches. To more broadly define the 
scope of our notion of documents and concepts, to be more inclusive of those practices we see in 
biodiversity studies. I argue such inter-disciplinary approaches are not only essential to 
sustaining momentum within the information disciplines, but that disciplines not otherwise 
acquainted with Information Studies literature can gain from our theories and historical 
knowledge. I also sought to bring a few sub-disciplines in Information Studies into the 
conversation with one another that, I believe, are central to the space of classification and 
knowledge organization: bibliographic studies, documentation studies, and philosophy of 
information. Thus, in chapter two, I established the documentary universe of biodiversity studies, 
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illustrating the primary kinds of documents-as-evidence that constitute the taxonomic landscape, 
including information, data, and documents, and how these fundamental concepts work within 
biodiversity systems to produce progressively more functional and truthful units of knowledge 
for use in scientific practices. Database-documents are also established as contingent 
documentary spaces that consist of compiled evidentiary forms (the represented documents) and 
emergent forms (texts that constitute the Catalogue’s space as a fixed and dynamic documentary 
resource). These emergent forms broaden our understanding of Wilson’s notions of texts, 
exemplars, and items.114 More fundamentally, though, examining a database as a document itself 
helps us better articulate how documents are not static entities, but are rather contingent, 
combinatorial structures that situates one of the basic truths of knowledge organization: the 
objects and subjects that we strive to represent, describe, and locate within systems are un-
fixable, and thus the role of the knowledge organizer is to embrace this fluidity and craft systems 
that can embody dynamism and fluid representations.  
This landscape then sets the stage for my subsequent problematizing of how these 
document entities are represented in databases via nomenclatural text strings, and how control is 
defined and managed in these contingent spaces. Chapter three expands upon the notion of 
unruly and complex concepts, a way in which we can understand the shifting representational 
and evidentiary notion of the species concept. Species concepts are understood as the 
triangulation of three entities: nomenclature, type specimen(s), and biodiversity/taxonomic 
literature. The relationship between these three evidentiary structures (kinds of documentary 
warrants) is constantly shifting and redefined over time, rendering any documentary 
arrangement continually contingent as new research and evidence is brought into examination. 
                                                
114 Such a conceptualization of these entities also brings into conversation elements articulated in the schema, 
Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR). 
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These unruly concepts can only be represented by text strings in the database environment, so an 
extensive discussion is had regarding how nomenclatural control is attained, and the kinds of 
problems shifting nomenclature presents to the study and assessment of authoritative taxon 
groups. Crucially, this kind of control marks a definite shift from descriptive to exploitative 
power—as names are disambiguated and validated in the database space, they become 
progressively more knowledge-based, and thus become more functionally useful as part of the 
biodiversity environment and within scientific discourse. The Catalogue of Life Plus is then 
introduced as an organizational and workflow mechanism to control for the proliferation of 
name-token types in order to fix these complex concepts in temporarily static forms. Such an 
examination, it seems to me, unearths two important notions about concepts and subjects-as-
concepts in knowledge organization schema: (1) that their authoritativeness and usefulness as 
valid forms of discursive knowledge are culturally-defined and continually shifting; and (2) that 
the biodiversity environment has begun to think about mechanisms by which such 
epistemological and definitional change can be charted, documented, maintained, and negotiated, 
over time without reifying one concept form/representation over any other. 
Taxonomic Contingency and Extensive Flexibility 
The second line of inquiry in this manuscript is to assess consensus modes of 
classification as spaces that force two (potentially) competing modes of organization together: 
classification as a heuristic, descriptively based system, and classifications as data management, 
retrieval-based tools. The Catalogue is presented as a mediating platform where numerous 
epistemologically distinct classification systems intermingle for the purposes of data 
management and collocation. Traditional classification systems in the biodiversity sciences are 
typically understood to be internally consistent ontological constructs: clear operationalizations 
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are articulated for what constitutes the order of knowledge, classes, and relationships that are 
generally predetermined.115 And such specifications allow a user to easily negotiate and 
understand the taxonomic instrument’s logic and capability. Consensus structures such as the 
management classification of the Catalogue of Life, on the other hand, disrupt this notion of 
internal cohesion. Chapter four, therefore, broadens our previous discussions to include the 
documentary instruments themselves: the taxonomies-as-knowledge that organize names into 
meaningfully related taxa in systems. I examine the specifications of the documentary 
instrument, one of the most important being the ability to understand and deconstruct its 
arrangement and organization. I describe two kinds of biodiversity taxonomic instruments: 
description-oriented and retrieval-oriented. Examples of the former, descriptive-oriented 
instrumentation are taxonomic models that represent internally-coherent arguments about 
scientific knowledge—this is normally what we think when we conceive of biological 
taxonomies: phylogenetic models, for example, that tell us some consistent and unified story 
about evolutionary relationships. A management classification, however, is an example of a 
retrieval-oriented system, designed to access data that might be separated from its ontological 
and epistemological point of origin. A consensus structure is the culmination of taxonomic 
coordination that takes Global Species Databases (inherited instrumentation structures) and 
merges them together to gain a better understanding of total extent knowledge about global 
organisms. Such management structures can then be used to organize data on a global level. This 
capacity for re-use, I argue, expands Wilson’s two existing powers of bibliographic control—
descriptive and exploitative control— with a new kind of extensive flexibility. The designed 
                                                
115 Even in faceted systems such as S.R. Ranganathan’s (2006) colon classification had pre-determined ontological 
categories established, such as facets and classes, that dictated the application of terms to described objects.  
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extensive nature of the Catalogue uniquely positions it to radiate its influence outward in the 
iLife consortium and beyond.  
Finally, chapter five takes these contingent taxonomic document forms, examines their 
systemic purposes, conveys how they can be used to produce and trace historical taxonomic 
trends as knowledge bases, and examines their extensive limitations. Using the Catalogue as a 
kind of historical taxonomic concept repository can potentially help scientists make larger claims 
about macroscale evolutionary and phylogenetic questions.116 Questions such as these leads me 
to discuss the ways in which taxonomies change over time, and how such changes can help us 
theorize and understand the extensive potentials and limitations of structures like the Catalogue. 
However, for all of their data-management virtues, the Catalogue has not yet been universally 
accepted in scientific circles as the most productive route for taxonomic science. Reasons why 
this might be the case are enumerated, and include: a distributed and unsustainable funding 
model (arising from the essential funding structures that support scientific work in general); 
given the mélange of databases that inhabit the Catalogue’s space, it is difficult to assess its 
completeness and quality; the heavily-curated nature of the Catalogue makes it difficult to 
quickly embrace new taxonomic or nomenclatural knowledge; its interconnectedness in the iLife 
system proliferates errors that are not easily fixed; and finally, given that the Catalogue uses 
Linnaean species names as the collocating element, finding ways to include nameless taxa, such 
as DNA barcodes, is especially difficult. What we see here, are that the tensions between 
descriptive-oriented and retrieval-oriented approaches to classification systems have not yet been 
ameliorated. The reasons for such a divide arise from complex and fundamental social, cultural, 
                                                
116 Such an approach is often called “evolutionary informatics” (R. Page & Michener, 2012; Parr, Guralnick, 
Cellinese, & Page, 2012). 
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and structural scientific traditions that are deeply engrained in taxonomic and biodiversity 
culture. 
Coming full circle, then, this manuscript examined how documentary control functions 
within an environment essentially defined by contingent concepts and documents, and how the 
disciplinary conditions within the biodiversity sciences are negotiating this tension through the 
basic knowledge and organizational structures that act as the fundamental instrument for 
taxonomic activities: classifications. 
Future Trajectories: Alternative-Synthetic-Classificatory Examinations 
Now that this first phase of my research has ostensibly come to an (artificial, but 
necessary) endpoint, I want to be able to articulate how it is that I conceive of going forward 
with this theoretical foundation in place. To explain, I want to return to the fourth stage of 
Thierry Bourgoin’s “Global Names-Catalogue of Life Parameters” introduced in chapter three of 
this manuscript (Figure 12), focused on the entire nomenclatural and taxonomic context that the 
Catalogue of Life is functioning within. Recall that Bourgoin provides a broad overview of how 
undifferentiated taxon names get slowly transformed and mapped into taxonomic knowledge and 
classifications. Such classificatory building occurs within GSD spaces all over the globe. 
Eventually, these GSDs are brought into the Catalogue, which creates a consensus-based 
management classification to collocate and organize this data for global communication and 
sharing. As was discussed in chapter five, the final stage of Bourgoin’s schematic gestures 
toward the use of the Catalogue—or any other biodiversity taxonomic platform—for large-scale 
evolutionary questions. This evolutionary reconciliation can only occur, however, among 
integrated taxonomies that can conform, or be mapped to, the taxonomic hierarchies and 
Linnaean nomenclature that have been prevalent in the Western production of science. We saw 
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how genetic barcodes are one source of integrative difficulty in this space, and how the 
Catalogue of Life Plus and GBIF were finding ways to address this epistemological and 
methodological gap.  
But even despite the productive (and, indeed, necessary) increased centralization of 
biodiversity data, much work has yet to be done to facilitate the inclusion of data sources that fall 
outside of western epistemological traditions.117 The accumulation of “normal” scientific 
progress articulated by Thomas Kuhn (1996) does not easily embrace knowledge produced 
outside of those established empirical traditions. For example, many scientists have articulated 
the importance of indigenous knowledge sets to the study of biodiversity issues (Mauro & 
Hardison, 2000), going so far as to call out the ethical responsibilities societies have to these 
marginalized natural history observations. Some projects have found methodologically sound 
ways to map indigenous knowledge sets with traditional, quantitative scientific forms. One such 
study by Clarence Alexander, et. al. (2011), found a correspondence between indigenous oral 
history narratives and scientific data based on geographic location information inherent in these 
data sources, and were thus able to present more robust climate maps depicting temperature 
change over time. Further, rich botanical and zoological manuscripts like the Mesoamerican 
Florentine Codex (Sahagun, 2012), rich in graphical and textual forms, chronicle natural history 
as conceptualized by historical communities. What of this knowledge in relation to our Linnaean 
based taxonomic systems? Even as integrative research of this nature proceeds, however, these 
data sources have yet to find their way into the data systems that are used to dictate climate 
policy and conservation around the globe. Indigenous knowledge has much to offer the general 
Western epistemology of biodiversity science (Agrawal, 1995; Cardoso, de Queiroz, Bandeira, & 
                                                
117 Certainly, this is not a critique on the iLife biodiversity landscape or the Catalogue of Life—collocating and 
organizing global data for one scientific tradition is difficult enough!  
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Góes-Neto, 2010). My next goal is to begin to theorize and practically address this gap by 
building upon the work performed in this dissertation.  
My subsequent project will focus on immediately establishing an Alternative-Synthetic-
Taxonomy Laboratory (Alt-Syn-Tax) that will bring together expertise from multiple domains 
(information communities, science & technology studies, and indigeneity studies) to develop 
systems that allow for the application of diverse classifications (and ontologies) using networked 
technologies, text-mining methodologies, and qualitative modes of text analysis. This research 
stream will make significant contributions to Information Studies by articulating the need for two 
disciplinary focuses: Information and Documentary Diversity Studies and Interdisciplinary 
Knowledge Organization Studies. Such a project can also inform the practices of biodiversity 
studies and biodiversity informatics. Information and Documentary Diversity Studies articulates 
ways in which traditional information and documentary approaches can be conceptualized as 
encompassing, and being augmented by, non-traditional documentary and descriptive forms. 
Interdisciplinary KO studies will focus on a more broadly defined boundaries for KO that allow 
for the inclusion and examination of new ontological and epistemological approaches. For 
biodiversity studies, it provides a mechanism through which contemporary scientific knowledge 
can communicate with a historically distinct cache of rich ethnohistorical and observational data 
in some productive way. Secondly, this project assumes that the epistemological rifts between 
Western science and other modes of understanding the natural world are reconcilable, at least to 
some degree, within hermeneutic taxonomic spaces.  
I want to push the concept of retrieval-oriented modes of organization to its limit, and test 
the extensive power of systems like the Catalogue. As this dissertation has highlighted, all 
database technologies are interpretive spaces to some extent—they structure data in ways that 
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influence how we understand our historical practices (Bowker, 2008). This project acknowledges 
the role classification technologies plays in the construction of knowledge, and seeks to find 
ways to reconcile the epistemological boundaries that are part-and-parcel of these technical 
spaces. Finally, this project will bridge information theory with practice by developing more 
culturally inclusive information systems, and in the process of doing so, will engage 
underrepresented and counter-traditional community-generated knowledge sets into systems that 
impact biodiversity global policy. I want Alt-Syn-Tax to embrace uncertain spaces and create 
solutions for complex intellectual problems in a collaborative environment.  
A core part of this endeavor is to (a) actively engage in global biodiversity policy 
domains so that governmental conservation practices and legal regimes represent diverse cultural 
concerns, (b) partner with museums and other cultural institutions to implement systems in 
practical settings, and (c) clearly articulate the professional and ethical responsibilities of 
Information Studies to pursue such diverse and extra-disciplinary endeavors. If the Global 
Taxonomic Initiative is any indication, there is a direct connection between policy and scientific 
practice. The classification systems we build (and the technologies that convey them) have a 
direct influence on how we conserve species, and how we understand and conceptualize climate 
and geographic issues of global concern (Edwards, 2010). Interviews I conducted for this study 
hinted at the complex policy regimes influenced directly by taxonomy. For one, as systems like 
ITIS create species lists, if one species is declared “invasive,” the import and export of that 
species—and the funding model that arises from that exchange—is directly impacted. National 
income is, at times, dependent on how we categorize biological objects. Thus, there is a direct 
connection between information and documentation studies and policy, and this is an area where 
biodiversity can be useful in highlighting these connections.  
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 Lastly, a more in-depth question about ontology is in order. If time permitted, I would 
have included a chapter on species ontology in this dissertation. More specifically, what kinds of 
characters and values constitute the description of a species—what kinds of questions are asked 
and what methods are invoked to describe and identify types of specimens as representative and 
constitutive of a natural object? How do scientists compose documentary evidence? And how do 
the processes and assumptions engrained in such descriptive practices differ from the application 
of bibliographic and documentary subject analysis?  
Conclusion 
Though the control of taxonomic data in knowledge databases is an acknowledged 
necessity in the biodiversity landscape, the question remains of how we define that control in 
relation to the shifting knowledge, object, and subject conditions that define the practices of 
scientists, and the work, hypothesizing, and paradigms of scientific communities. In Patrick 
Wilson’s concluding chapter to Two Kinds of Power (1968) he proposes a hypothetical Supreme 
Bibliographic Council,  
Whose task it was to evaluate the bibliographical situations of individuals and groups of individuals, to 
estimate the degree of bibliographical control available to them, to decide on its adequacy or inadequacy, 
and to suggest or order changes in those situations, by the creation of new bibliographical instruments or 
new institutional arrangements, or by the alteration of old arrangements, or by making more widely 
available instruments and services hitherto restricted in availability (1968, p. 132).  
 
So much of the power possible in Wilson’s bibliographical universe is contingent in the sense 
that instrumentalized control exerts only as much power as is applicable in a given context and 
known to a given individual. That a Supreme Council is even postulated as an intellectual 
exercise emphasizes the fact that a documentary instrument is, by definition, never complete, and 
perhaps more importantly, always potentially deficient in certain circumstance. Even if all extant 
documentation could be aggregated into one system (impossible though this may be), that 
aggregation (and its attendant control mechanisms and imposed relationship structure) 
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presupposes a certain set of uses, and such presuppositions will inevitably lead to information 
deficiencies for some set of individuals. Instrumental need is always idiosyncratic and 
contextually specific, while an instrument’s architecture must embody the ability to embody and 
attend to diverse approaches, multiple conditions, and exemplifications. It is this tension that lies 
at the heart of this manuscript’s discourse.  
Knowledge organization systems contain information—not only as containers contain a 
set of things or objects for aesthetic or functional convenience, but as containers inhibit the 
movement of said items within the bounds of its edges (or, as Hope Olson, might say, limits) 
(Olson, 2002). Systems construct and organize information into specific arrangements of 
knowledge. Having control in KO systems is equivalent to making an epistemological, 
ontological, and interpretive commitment to a kind of subjective knowledge. And such contours 
have direct influence on what kinds of powers people can have in relation to that system. The 
question becomes, how much control must you give up to make an optimally flexible KO 
system? We see this conflict playing-out between descriptive-oriented and retrieval-oriented 
systems in the biodiversity community. The two, perhaps, shall never meet at a workable 
medium. One community understands classifications as hermeneutic spaces, intent on modeling 
an accurate representation of the natural world, while the other sees these instruments as 
mediating, switching, data control spaces that facilitate a broader understanding of taxonomic 
practice as a object form in-and-of itself. In the biodiversity documentation environment—as is 
the case in Wilson’s bibliographical universe—the notion of access is not simply the satisfaction 
of a specific need for satisfaction’s sake, for no person can possibly know what they do not 
know. Systems must also be used to locate what was otherwise unsought.  
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Classification instrumentation must present combinatory and flexible knowledge spaces 
so as to produce new forms of knowledge, both intended and unintended. A Supreme Council 
will not and cannot exist to mediate access, so our systems must control for this usage 
contingency. The documents of biodiversity knowledge are far more than the species concepts 
taxonomies intend to organize, they are also a constellation of evidence, all of which will be used 
to recursively and consistently reevaluate taxonomic conclusions to produce new hypotheses. 
What we see in biodiversity spaces at the moment is a deep attention to mediating the 
expectations between those that want taxonomy to primarily describe, versus those that see the 
need for taxonomy to facilitate information retrieval.  
The larger ecological, political, and social consequences of taxonomies are clearly on the 
minds of those working for the Catalogue and in the iLife consortium. Their biodiversity 
scientific and taxonomic work is in service to the broader goals of conservation and a deep 
appreciation for the species they dedicate their lives to studying. Taxonomic and classificatory 
work is facilitative: it is a service provided so that some kind of action can then be taken toward 
some social, ecological, or political goal. As Patrick Wilson states,  
Findings on adequacy and inadequacy, on the part of a Supreme Bibliographic Council, will inevitably be 
political decisions … whether the policies that guide its decisions are stated in terms of exploitative or 
descriptive control or both, its decisions about who shall have how much of what sort of control will be 
decisions perfectly parallel in character to the decisions of other political-decision making bodies…There is 
a scientific and literary patrimony, as Langlois calls it, to be managed and exploited; men must decide 
whether they are content to record the existence of writings and store them up in repositories, or whether 
they wish to pursue the active exploitation of the patrimony, to provide means of making the maximum use 
of the useable writings. We can, by reflection and by experimentation, make clear the possible goals and 
discover and text devices for the attainment of those goals; it is only by a political decision that one goal 
can be singled out as the “proper” goal, that it can be said who is to have how much of the power over 
writings, and the knowledge contained in them, that bibliographical control confers (1968, p. 155). 
 
The Catalogue is one primary way by which the biodiversity community is attempting to gain an 
aggregative control over the global production of taxonomic knowledge, setting the stage for the 
production of new kinds of biodiversity knowledge. Hope Olson, too, called for eccentric 
   280 
techniques (2002) in order to break free from the limitations imposed by the cultural and social 
presuppositions that shape the categories we identify in our world. 
So, are consensus-based taxonomies, then, an implementable method by which we can 
conceptualize more traditional documentary and bibliographic classificatory systems? I suppose 
all I can say at this point is that the jury is still out. But despite some stated uncertainty as to the 
Catalogue’s general current success, there is a sense that it is undoubtedly proceeding in the 
correct direction. In a conversation with a prominent and globally renowned taxonomist, it was 
stated that infrastructure like the Catalogue could be a game changer for on-the-ground scientific 
work: “Oh god, people like me [are the audience for the Catalogue]. If I could trust those things, 
god I would use them all the time. [But], you [need to] get a bunch of obsessive compulsive 
people, clone them, and get them to sit down with these data sets and clean them up … You want 
there to be that validation….” Validation and trust is an essential part of this taxonomic space. 
Scientists are aware of the limitations of the systems they create, so they see their limitations, but 
judging the efficacy of other systems is a far more difficult prospect. Until—or, perhaps, when—
systems like the Catalogue can document their process fully enough to garner general trust, then 
the CERN-like infrastructure biodiversity scientists are striving for will come to fruition. The end 
result, of course, which is of central concern for my scholarly agenda, is that we better 
understand classification systems so that they can be more just. They must both fairly represent 
the communities and objects they intend to document, and be equally distributed to and 
representative of these communities as a form of public knowledge. My goal here has been to 
show how other disciplines, such as biodiversity studies, can inform the literature, theories, and 
work within Information Studies to rethink our problems anew. As Wilson indicates above, 
experimentation is key, lest our systems fail to provide the one service they set out to offer: 
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situational relevant information and the enhancement of intellectual, social, and knowledge-
based power. As I see it, the question is no longer whether our classification systems can attain 
true representational capacities, it is more about how we are going to acknowledge their 
constructedness and harness their contingencies for the most social and community-driven 
benefit.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure 27. Species Counts in the Catalogue of Life for the years 2000-2015 (Species 2000, 2017d). 
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